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PART ONE: 
ACADEMIC DOSSIER
ADULT MENTAL HEALTH ESSAY:
Compare and Contrast Cognitive Behavioural and Psychoanalytic 
Concepts of Depression in Adults, and the Evidence Underlying Each of
These Models.
December 2000
Introduction
It has been estimated that approximately 100 million people world wide suffer from some 
form of depression each year (Gotlib & Hammen, 1992, preface), and this number appears 
to be on the increase (Klerman & Weissman, 1989; cited in Hammen, 1997, p. 45). 
Furthermore, depression can have substantial debilitating effects on sufferers, which can 
include a loss of enjoyment in nearly all activities, impaired performance at work, 
deterioration in interpersonal relationships, and in some cases suicide (Hammen, 1997, pp. 
37-42). This combination of high a prevalence and its often debilitating effects means that 
understanding and treating depression must be a priority for our society. Furthermore, 
given that biological models of depression are at best incomplete (Davison & Neale, 1997, 
pp. 239-243; Hammen, 1997, chap. 4), and that associated pharmacological inventions 
often only have a limited efficacy (Hammen, 1997, chap. 7), psychological approaches 
potentially can play a valuable role towards this end.
The purpose of this essay is to compare and contrast two classes of psychological concepts 
of depression, namely cognitive-behavioural and psychoanalytic, and to briefly review the 
existing evidence for each. Such an enterprise is worthwhile because it is a step towards 
developing a unified psychological concept of depression, which will hopefully lead to 
more effective treatment.
Given space constraints, the term ‘depression’ will be taken to refer solely to Major 
Depressive Disorder (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000, pp. 167-176), 
since this is arguably the prototypical form of the clinical condition (Clark & Beck, 1999, 
p. 2). Following DSM-IV-TR, a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder requires that, for 
a minimum of two weeks, clients manifest at least five of the following symptoms, with at 
least one coming from the first two: depressed mood, apathy, weight change, sleep 
disturbance, psychomotor retardation or agitation, fatigue, excessive guilt or 
worthlessness, reduced concentration, and suicidal ideation. In addition, the symptoms 
must significantly impact upon the client’s life, they should not be attributable to a 
psychotic disorder, a medical condition, a physiological substance or bereavement, and 
there must be no history of mania.‘
' It m ay eventually  prove that Major Depressive Disorder m erely represents part o f  a continuum  o f  unipolar 
depression (Clark & Beck, 1999, pp. 13-22). In w hich case, the fo llow in g  d iscussion  m ight apply more
Finally, given the clinical emphasis of this essay, the term ‘concept’ will be taken to include 
the aetiology of depression, the mechanisms involved in its maintenance, and the proposed 
interventions to alleviate it. And, to allow for a clear description of psychoanalytic and 
cognitive-behavioural concepts, they will be discussed separately before being compared.
Psychoanalytic Concepts of Depression
There are a vast number of different psychoanalytic approaches to understanding and 
treating psychopathology (cf. Brown & Redder, 1991, p. 180). Following Greenberg and 
Mitchell (1983, p. 3), these can be loosely categorised into those that give primary place to 
instinctual drives and those that emphasize the individual’s relationships with ‘objects’ 
(typically other people). Given space constraints, only one example from each of these 
categories will be considered here; namely Freud’s (1917/1957) theory of depression, 
chosen because of its substantial impact (Bemporad, 1985, p. 84), and the interpersonal 
psychotherapy (IPT) model (Klerman, Weissman, Rounsaville & Chervon, 1984), selected 
because of its current high profile (Hammen, 1997, pp. 154-157). These will be discussed 
in turn.
Freud's Concept o f Depression as Presented in ‘Mourning & Melancholia'^
Central to Freud’s view of the mind is the idea that mental activity is fuelled by primal 
drives, like the libido, with desired objects (people, things, abstract ideas etc.) being the 
targets of these drives (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, chap. 2). Thus, for example, the 
relationship between an individual and a significant other would be understood in terms of 
the libidinal drive ‘attaching’ itself to the significant other (an object). Within this 
framework, in 1917 Freud presented his conceptualisation of the causes of at least some
w id ely . M oreover, it is worth noting that the m odels presented here do not exp lic itly  lim it them selves to  
M ajor D epressive Disorder.
" Freud m odified his v iew s on the aetiology o f  depression in later w ritings, subsequently attributing the 
disorder to an over critical superego (Freud, 1933/1964 , pp. 60 -6 1 ). H ow ever, g iven  the lim itations o f  
space, the focus here w ill be on his original (1917 /1957) conceptualisation, w hich has perhaps been more 
influential (Bemporad, 1985).
forms of ‘melancholia’, a disorder that could most likely be reclassified today as clinical 
depression (see the symptoms listed in Freud, 1917/1957).
In brief, Freud’s theory grew out of his observation that the symptoms of depression were 
similar to those of bereavement, with the exception that depression also tended to include 
self-criticism, unaccompanied by shame. Therefore he conjectured that depression, like 
mourning, occurs in response to the loss of an object. And further, that in mourning the 
libido detaches itself from the lost object and transfers to a new external object, while in 
depression the libido transfers its interest to part of the sufferer’s own psyche that becomes 
identified with the lost object (see Figure 1). Such a transfer is made more likely if the lost 
object was originally chosen by the sufferer because of its similarity to him/herself; that is, 
if they made a ‘narcissistic object choice’.^
According to Freud, it is the sufferer’s ambivalent feelings towards the lost object, 
including both love and hate, that then cause depression. This is because part of the 
sufferer’s psyche now hates another part, namely that which has become identified with the 
lost object. This introjected hate leads depressed people to be self-critical, with an absence 
of shame since they are not ‘really’ criticising themselves (but the lost object instead).
With regard to pre disposing factors, Freud argued that both early experience and 
constitutional makeup could lead to an increased vulnerability to depression, by either 
increasing someone’s predisposition to making narcissistic object choices or increasing the 
likelihood of them having ambivalent feeling about objects. An over critical conscience and 
repressed memories from previous traumatic experiences, which could become reactivated 
by the current trauma, were also thought to be influential (see Figure 1 ).
Turning to the proposed therapy, following the above conceptualisation of depression, the 
aim of intervention would be to help bring the sufferer’s loss and ambivalent feelings into 
consciousness, so that they can decide to channel the drives elsewhere rather than against 
the self (Davison & Neale, 1997, p. 243; Malan, 1979, chap. 12). Such a process
 ^ It is not clear to m e from Freud’s (1917 /1957) work how  a non-human object, like an ideal, can becom e 
identified with part o f  the sufferer’s ow n psyche.
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would be facilitated by the traditional psychoanalytic methods of interpreting dreams, free- 
associations and the transference (Davison & Neale, 1997, pp. 494-500).
Empirical Tests o f Freud's (1917/1957) Theory
It is difficult to directly test all aspects of Freud’s theory empirically. However, a number 
of testable hypothesis can be derived from his model (cf. Fisher & Greenberg, 1996), and 
the veracity of the three of the most important of these will be examined here. (For a more 
complete review see Fisher & Greenberg, 1996.)
The first hypothesis is that at least some sub-types of depression have a loss as their 
precipitating factor. There is evidence consistent with this, since it appears that depression 
is often preceded by a recent loss (Brown & Harris, 1989; Hammen, 1997, pp. 93-99). 
Moreover, while it may not always be possible to link the onset of depression to a 
discernible loss (Fisher & Greenberg, 1996, pp. 25-29), a proponent of Freud’s view 
could argue either that such cases represent a different subtype of depression or that they 
follow an undetected loss. Moreover, while these counter arguments run the risk of making 
this hypothesis irrefutable and therefore untestable, this should not detract too much from 
the fact that in may cases depression does follow a loss.
The second key hypothesis is that depression results from hate turned against the self. 
Consistent with this, there is evidence of self-directed hostility in depression (Fisher & 
Greenberg, 1996, pp. 45-55). But, this should come as little surprise given that Freud’s 
observation of this was one of the factors that lead him to develop his theoiy (Freud, 
1917/1957). More critically, I have been unable to find any convincing evidence to suggest 
that such hostility is targeted against the to-be-lost object prior to the onset of depression, or 
that self-directed hostility plays a causal role in depression, beyond that of other negative 
thoughts; though, of course, a proponent of the Freudian view might argue that they would 
expect to find no such evidence since the hostility should be unconscious and hence 
difficult to detect.
The third hypothesis is that the Freudian psychoanalytic approach should be effective at 
treating depression. Thus far this has been unsupported, since there have been no 
adequately controlled trials to determine the efficacy of long-term, psychoanalytic 
interventions for depression (American Psychiatric Association, 1993).
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Finally, it is interesting to note in passing that Freud’s (1917/1957) conception of 
mourning (and hence depression) may not be applicable worldwide. This is because it 
appears that in some cultures (e.g. Japan) an attachment to the lost object is maintained long 
after the loss, without leading to depression (Stroebe, Gergen, Gergen & Stroebe, 1992). It 
is unclear how this could be easily accommodated within Freud’s model (cf. Fisher & 
Greenberg, 1996, p. 22).
In summary, Freud’s (1917/1957) theoiy that depression results from introjected hate 
following a loss is not well supported by the existing evidence. Perhaps the greatest value 
of Freud’s theoiy is that it has helped stimulate research directed towards understanding 
depression and developing more effective treatments (e.g. Beck, 1967).
The Interpersonal Psychotherapy (IPT) Approach to Depression
In contrast to the classical Freudian view, the concept of depression associated with IPT 
emphasises the role that social relationships play in predisposing to, precipitating and 
maintaining the disorder (Klerman et al., 1984, chap. 3). Nevertheless, IPT can loosely be 
considered a psychoanalytic approach (Davison & Neale, 1997, pp. 501-502), not least 
because it has its roots in the work of ‘neo-Freudian’ psychoanalysts like Harry Sullivan 
(Frank & Spanier, 1995), who argued that the human psyche, and consequently 
psychopathology, can only be understood when considered in the context of the social 
environment (e.g. Sullivan, 1950/1971). IPT has also drawn heavily on the writings of the 
psychoanalyst John Bowlby (Frank & Spanier, 1995), who proposed that people 
instinctively need to form secure attachments to significant others, since from an 
evolutionary point of view this promotes the survival of the species (Bowlby, 1980, chap. 
3). Bowlby believed that a failure to build or maintain secure attachments, especially during 
childhood, could precipitate, or produce a predisposition towards, psychological problems 
(Bowlby, 1980, chap. 14).
It was in this context that IPT was developed as a short term therapy for depression, based 
on the assumption that social factors play a prominent role in the aetiology and the 
maintenance of the disorder (Frank & Spanier, 1995). As illustrated in Figure 2, IPT
11
Predisposing Factors
Early failure to form secure attachments 
-  Social deprivation
I
Precipitating Factors
-  Grief
- Disputes with family & friends 
- Role transition 
-  Social life deficits
I
DEPRESSiON
Maintaining Factors
-  increased social isolation 
increased friction in relationships
-  Break up of relationships
Symptoms
-  Loss of interest in socializing
-  Lack of energy and tiredness
-  Dysphoria and apathy 
- More self focused
Figure 2: An illustration of the IPT concept of depression, as ouitined by Frank and Spanier 
(1995) and Klerman et ai. (1984, chap. 3).
postulates that sufferers become trapped in a vicious cycle in which social problems 
maintain or worsen their depression and the symptoms of their depression lead to a further 
deterioration of their social situation (Klerman et al., 1984, chap. 3). To break this cycle, 
IPT typically focuses on one or two of the client’s current, social problems. These 
generally can be categorised as either grief, disputes with significant others, a change of 
social roles, or deficits in the client’s social life (Klerman et al., 1984, chap. 4). Therapy 
then proceeds by exploring the problem and the client’s perception of it, by generating new 
ways to approach or overcome the problem, and by then implementing these ideas; the aim 
being to improve the client’s social situation, and so reduce one of the maintaining factors 
of depression, and thus hopefully alleviate it.
Empirical Tests o f the IPT Concept o f Depression
As with Freud’s model, a number of testable hypothesis can be generated to assess the 
validity of the IPT concept of depression. Only the two most critical of these will be 
considered here, but see Frank and Spanier (1995) for a more detailed review.
The first hypothesis is that social problems should maintain depression, which in turn 
should maintain social problems. By and large, the evidence would appear to be consistent 
with this possibility (Frank & Spanier, 1995; Hammen, 1997, chap. 6). For example, 
Hooley and Teasdale (1989) found that lower degrees of anger and criticism expressed by 
sufferers’ families predicted lower rates of relapse; while Davila, Hammen, Burge, Daley 
and Paley’s (1995) results suggest that depression leads woman to create some 
interpersonal stressors that further maintain the disorder. Of course, it is difficult to 
establish the direction of causation in such studies with a high level of certainty. To do so 
would probably require that the variables involved be manipulated experimentally, but this 
would be highly unethical. Nevertheless, the data are consistent with the hypothesis.
The second hypothesis is that IPT should be effective at ameliorating depression. This has 
been supported by a number of controlled trials (Frank & Spanier, 1995; Hammen, 1997, 
pp. 156-157). For example, Frank et al. (1990) found that monthly sessions of IPT 
significantly reduced the chances of relapse in patients with recurrent depression, relative to 
a control group who received a placebo tablet. Of course, this does necessarily mean that 
the IPT conceptualisation of depression is correct, since the effectiveness of the therapy 
could be due to different reasons than those outlined above. Therefore, the goal of future
13
research must be to isolate the active ingredients of IPT, and in so doing hopefully develop 
more effective forms of treatment (cf. Frank & Spanier, 1995).
In summary, the IPT concept of depression would appear to be relatively well supported 
empirically, though more research is warranted.
Towards a Reconciliation o f Psychoanalytic Concepts?
Thus far the concepts of depression associated with Freud and IPT have been discussed, 
and it has been argued that current evidence appears to more strongly support the veracity 
of the later. However, these two concepts are not necessarily mutually exclusive and may in 
fact be complementary. For instance, the American Psychiatric Association’s (1993) 
practice guidelines suggest that IPT might be most profitably used in cases of depression 
where current social factors play a clear role, and that more traditional psychoanalytic 
approaches may be appropriate for clients who are still trying to come to terms with 
childhood experiences. It is a matter for future research to determine whether these 
principles, or others like them, are supported empirically.
Cognitive-Behavioural Concepts of Depression
As in the psychoanalytic domain, there are a number of different concepts of depression 
that could be classified as cognitive-behavioural, including those associated with Ellis’ 
rational-emotive approach (e.g. Ellis, 1999) and with Meichenbaum’s self-instructional 
training (Meichenbaum, 1977). However, given the limitations of space, I will focus here 
on perhaps the most currently influential of these (cf. Hawton, Salkovskis, Kirk & D. M. 
Clark, 1989, pp. 10-11), namely the cognitive theory and therapy of depression developed 
by Aaron Beck and his colleagues (e.g. Clark & Beck, 1999). An examination of the 
evidence pertaining to this approach will follow a description of the theoiy and its 
associated therapy.
Cognitive Theory & Therapy o f Depression
During the 1960s and 1970s Beck, who originally trained as a psychoanalyst, developed 
his cognitive theory partly as a response to the weaknesses he perceived in contemporary 
psychoanalytic and non-mediational behavioural approaches to depression (Clark & Beck,
14
1999, chap. 2; Hawton et al., 1989, chap. 1), and in the wake of the ‘cognitive revolution’ 
in main stream, experimental psychology (Eysenck & Keane, 1990, pp. 5-10). As with 
other cognitive-behavioural theories and therapies. Beck’s approach was predicated on the 
Stoic philosophy (e.g. Aurelius, c. AD 170 / 1995, p. 82) that it is not events per se that 
influence our mood and behaviour, but rather the meaning that we attach to them (Clark & 
Beck, 1999, p. 55).
According to early versions of cognitive theoiy (e.g. Beck, 1967, chaps. 17 & 18; Beck, 
Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979, pp. 10-16; see also Fennell, 1989), people’s experiences 
influence the development of ‘schema’. These comprise their core beliefs and assumptions 
about themselves and their environment. Generally, schema play a valuable, adaptive role, 
allowing people to learn from previous experiences, attribute meaning to current events and 
make predictions regarding the future. However, as illustrated in Figure 3, the theory 
postulates that some experiences can lead to the development of rigid, maladaptive core­
beliefs and assumptions, an example being ‘I am worthless’. These can remain latent, 
having little impact upon a person’s life, until they are activated by a critical traumatic event 
or series of events. Such events usually involve the loss of Someone or something that is of 
value according a person’s schemas, and the events may serve to appear to confirm the 
person’s maladaptive core beliefs and assumptions. For example, being raped could cause a 
loss of self-esteem and might confirm and activate a person’s belief that they are worthless.
The theoiy holds that, once activated, these maladaptive schema are one of factors that lead 
to the production of ‘negative automatic thoughts’, so called because of their unpleasant 
content and unintentional generation. The contents of these thoughts, which can be pictorial 
as well as linguistic, tend to reflect negative views of the self, the world and the future, the 
so-called ‘cognitive triad’ (see Figure 3 for examples). They also tend to be overly negative 
in comparison to reality. These thoughts form part of the vicious cycle of depression in 
which they help maintain the symptoms of depression (affective, behavioural, motivational 
etc.). In turn, these symptoms trigger the generation of more negative automatic thoughts 
because they lead to a systematic cognitive bias to remember and attend to negative 
information. However, it is worth noting that the theoiy steers away from making the 
strong claim that negative automatic thoughts cause depression (Haaga, Dyck & Ernst,
1991).
15
(Early) Experience
e.g. Over critical parent
I
Formation of Dysfunctional Beliefs 
and Assumptions
e.g. I am worthiess
I
Critical incidentfs)
e.g. Being raped
I
Assumptions Actiyated
I
Neaatiye Automatic Thoughts
e.g. I deserve to be punished 
The worid is cruel 
The future wiii be no better
Behayioura
e.g. Stay in bed
Symptoms of Depression
Somatic
e.g. Sleep disturbance
Affectiye
e.g. Low mood
Motiyationai
e.g. No longer interested in 
activities
Coanitiye
e.g. Difficulty concentrating
Figure 3: An iiiustration of an early version o f Beck’s cognitive theory o f depression.The 
structure o f the diagram is copied from Fenneii (1989, Fig. 6.1), but the examples are my own. 
Note that Beck does not make the strong claim that negative automatic thoughts cause 
depression, but only that they are one of the factors in the vicious cycle that maintains it  (cf. 
Haaga, Dyck & Ernst, 1991). See the main text for a full explanation that accompanies the 
diagram.
Based on this version of the theory, the aim of cognitive therapy is to help clients break out 
of the vicious cycle of depression, and to reduce the chances of them re-entering it, by 
teaching them techniques whereby they can challenge their inaccurate negative automatic 
thoughts and assumptions (e.g. Beck et al., 1979; Bradley, 1994; Fennell, 1989). For 
example, clients are taught to try to compensate for systematic negative biases in their 
thinking by more objectively weighing up the evidence available to them. Changes in 
behaviour and life-style are also encouraged, in part because these can provide direct 
evidence to contradict the content of some of the client’s depression maintaining thoughts.
More recently, the causal side of cognitive theoiy has been developed, with the introduction 
of the personality dimensions of sociotropy (sometimes called social dependency) and 
autonomy (e.g. Beck, 1983, pp. 272-281; Clark & Beck, 1999, pp. 93-95), concepts 
effectively borrowed from the psychodynamic literature (cf. Blatt, 1998). In brief, it is 
postulated that highly sociotropic individuals have core beliefs and assumptions that stress 
the value of their relationships with people, while highly autonomous individuals have 
beliefs that predominantly value achievement and control. As in the early versions of the 
theory, these beliefs act as a diathesis that when combined with an appropriate stressor can 
lead to depression. For example, a highly sociotropic individual could become depressed 
after the break up of a relationship, while a highly autonomous one might become 
depressed after a failure to achieve a promotion.
More recently still, partly to enable cognitive theoiy to be able to explain why clients who 
have experienced a single episode of depression appear to be more vulnerable to relapse 
(Hammen, 1997, pp. 31-35), Beck (1996) has introduced the concept of the ‘mode’. A 
mode comprises linked cognitive-conceptual, behavioural, affective, motivational and 
physiological schemas (see Figure 4), and is similar conceptually to the idea of a mood. A 
mode can vary in its degree of activation, and when this exceeds a certain threshold it will 
tend to dominate processing, to the exclusion of other modes.
Reformulated in this light, clinical depression is explained as follows. Experience leads to 
the development of core beliefs and assumptions that become embodied in an orienting 
schema. When an event occurs that according to these assumptions represents a major loss, 
the orienting schema activates the ‘primal loss mode’, which may have
17
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evolved to allow us to conserve resources in the face of deprivation. The different types of 
schema that constitute this mode give rise to the different symptoms of depression, 
including the cognitive triad, as shown in Figure 4. Furthermore, the orienting schema is 
affected by the activated mode, such that it is biased towards processing loss related 
information, and hence is more likely to keep the mode activated.
Depending upon the individual’s core beliefs and the nature of the loss, the primal loss 
mode can remain activated or gradually discharge, allowing other more constructive modes 
to come to dominate processing. However, even once it has stopped influencing processing 
the primal loss mode can retain some of its activity, and thus can be more easily activated in 
future, so explaining the apparent increased vulnerability to relapse produced by a 
depressive episode (Hammen, 1997, pp. 31-35). The introduction of the mode also allows 
cognitive theory to cope with the distinction between ‘intellectual’ and ‘emotional’ beliefs 
(e.g. Teasdale, 1999a), since a person’s perceptions and opinions will vary depending 
upon the mode that they are in. (Note that this reformulation is still compatible with the 
concepts of sociotropy and autonomy.)
However, rather than leading to a change in cognitive therapy, this theoretical development 
has lead to a re-interpretation of why it should be effective. Specifically, Beck (1996) has 
argued that cognitive therapy helps depressed clients counteract the negative processing bias 
of the orienting schema and helps them alter the beliefs and assumptions embodied in that 
schema, rendering it less likely to activate the primal loss mode in response to potential 
triggering stimuli.
Empirical Tests o f the Current Version o f  Cognitive Theory & Therapy
It is not possible to empirically address all aspects of the current version of cognitive 
theory, not least because some of them are imprecisely specified, a prime example being the 
concept of a schema (cf. Teasdale, 1993). However, following the approach adopted by 
Haaga et al. (1991), and others (e.g. Clark & Beck, 1999, p. 115; Clark & Steer, 1996), it 
is possible to generate a number of testable hypotheses from cognitive theory and therapy. 
Given space constraints, only the evidence pertaining to the main hypotheses will be 
discussed here, but for a more complete review see Clark and Beck (1999, chaps. 5-10).
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The first hypothesis is that a depressed person’s thoughts should reflect the ‘cognitive triad’ 
of negative views of the self, the world and the future, and should be more negative than a 
those of a non-depressed person (Haaga et al, 1991; Clark & Beck, 1999, p. 115). This 
hypothesis would appear to be supported by the current evidence (Haaga et al, 1991 ; Clark 
& Beck, 1999, pp. 116-121). For example, Blackburn, Jones and Lewin (1986) found that 
depressed participants reported the three elements of the triad significantly more than a non­
depressed control group. However, the majority of studies in this area employed 
retrospective questionnaires or inventories (Clark & Beck, 1999, p. 121). Therefore, to 
reduce the potential influence of memory biases more evidence using on-line measures is 
needed.
The second hypothesis is that depressed people should show a systematic negative 
processing bias for loss related information (Haaga et al, 1991 ; Clark & Beck, 1999), given 
the changes in the operation of the orienting schema. On balance existing evidence would 
also appear to support this hypothesis (Clark & Beck, 1999, pp. 175-217). For example, 
Bradley, Mogg and Lee (1997) found that participants who had been induced into a 
dysphoric mood were more likely to attend to depression related words than a control 
group.
The third hypothesis is that negative processing biases and negative thoughts should 
influence (but not necessarily cause) the other symptoms of depression (Haaga etal, 1991 ; 
Clark & Beck, 1999, pp. 142-159), since the different schemas in a mode are all linked to a 
cognitive-conceptual one. As previously, current research appears to be consistent with this 
hypothesis (Clark & Beck, 1999, pp. 142-159). For example, Teasdale and Russell (1983) 
were able to induce a dysphoric mood in participants by getting them to read negative, self­
referent statements. Moreover, the change in mood produced in studies of this type seems 
unlikely to be a consequence of the task demands, since participants who were instructed to 
simulate depression showed a different pattern of behaviour to a mood induced group 
(Alloy, Abramson & Viscusi, 1981). However, the main weakness of the majority of the 
studies in this area is that they do not use a clinical population (Clark & Beck, 1999, p. 
158). Therefore, more research needs to be done employing such a sample.
The fourth hypothesis is that highly sociotropic or autonomous individuals should be more 
vulnerable to depression, but that depression should only occur following an appropriately 
congruent stressor (Haaga etal, 1991; Clark & Beck, 1999, pp. 304- 310; Clark & Steer,
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1996). Thus far this hypothesis has received far less empirical support than those 
previously discussed (Clark & Beck, 1999, pp. 304-310). Specifically, while in some 
studies sociotropic personality has been found to interact with sociotropic stressors to 
predict dysphoria (e.g. Clark, Beck & Brown, 1992), in others it has been found to also 
interact with autonomous stressors (e.g. Robins & Block, 1988). Furthermore, studies 
have often failed to find an interaction between autonomous personality and autonomous 
stressors in the causation of depression or dysphoric mood (e.g. Clark, Beck & Brown,
1992). It is currently not clear whether the failure to obtain unequivocal support for this 
hypothesis is due to the insensitivity of the measures employed (cf. Clark & Beck, 1999, p. 
310).
The fifth hypothesis is that cognitive therapy should be effective at both reducing the 
severity of depressive symptoms and reducing the rate of relapse. On balance, there would 
seem to be evidence to support both these propositions (Blackburn & Davidson, 1995, pp. 
30-36; Bradley, 1994; Hammen, 1997, pp. 144-149; Teasdale et al., 2000, pp. 615-616). 
For example, Hollon, DeRubeis and Evans (1996) found that cognitive therapy was as 
effective as a pharmacological intervention at initially reducing clinical depression, and 
more effective at preventing relapse. However, the finding that psychodynamic- 
interpersonal therapy is as effective as cognitive therapy (Shapiro et al., 1994) raises the 
question of whether the efficacy of cognitive therapy is due to the reasons outlined in 
cognitive theory, or depends upon other factors (cf. Teasdale, 1999b). This question will 
be returned to later.
To summarise, many of the testable hypothesis that can be derived from cognitive theory 
and therapy have been, by and large, supported empirically; the notable exception being the 
diathesis-stress model of sociotropy and autonomy. This relative success reflects perhaps 
the greatest strength of cognitive theoiy and therapy, namely that it has been deliberately 
designed to be empirically testable, and has often been modified in response to the results 
of these test (cf. D. A. Clark & Beck, 1999, chap. 2). This approach to the development of 
clinical theory and therapy will hopefully be an enduring legacy of the cognitive 
programme, which will lead to the development of yet more effective treatments for 
depression.
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Comparisons and Conclusions
Now that two psychoanalytic and one cognitive-behavioural concept of depression have 
been presented, the main purpose of this essay, namely to contrast these concepts, can be 
tackled. To this end. Table 1 compares the three different concepts on several dimensions. 
The numerous differences between the theories are apparent from the table. However, it is 
worth briefly highlighting some of the similarities.
Considering aetiology first, all three concepts employ a diathesis-stress framework and 
emphasise the important influence of early experiences in determining someone’s 
predisposition to psychopathology. Cognitive theory’s maladaptive autonomous beliefs and 
Freud’s over critical conscience are similar, in that they both involve meeting high 
standards for one's self. In addition, high levels of sociotropy can be closely linked to the 
failure to achieve early secure attachments emphasised by IPT. As for the stressors, the 
theme of loss, be it social or otherwise, is pervasive; and cognitive theory’s sociotropic 
stressors appear very similar to those in IPT.
With regard to mechanisms and maintenance, both IPT and cognitive theoiy employ the 
concept of a vicious cycle in which the consequences of depression help maintain the 
disorder. Furthermore, Freud’s idea of self-directed hostility as a maintaining factor is 
compatible with the Beckian notion that cognitions help to maintain depression. Turning to 
interventions, all three concepts postulate that depression can be treated by psychological 
means, and IPT and cognitive therapy are similar insofar as they primarily focus on the 
problems that the client is currently facing. Finally, with regard to the evidence base, both 
IPT and the cognitive approach are reasonable well supported.^ However, all three theories 
need to be more precisely and formally specified so that they can be more adequately 
scrutinised. Furthermore, a priority for future research should be to establish the active 
ingredients in each treatment, since intervention efficacy does not necessarily imply that the 
associated theory is correct.
In sum, there appear to be many common themes and areas of overlap between the three 
concepts of depression that have been presented. Of course, just because different
^ The E lkin et al. (1989) study that directly compared IPT and CBT has not been discussed because o f  the 
controversy over the interpretation o f  the results (Frank & Spanier, 1995; Ham m en, 1997, p. 147).
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theories say the same thing does not mean that what they say is necessarily correct. 
However, the areas of agreement perhaps can give us the beginnings of some clues as to 
the form that a unified psychological theoiy could take.
In conclusion, given the high prevalence and debilitating consequences of depression it is 
important that we develop a better understand of it and more effective and efficient 
treatments for it. It seems likely that depression will need to be understood on a number of 
levels, namely biological, psychological and social. One step towards developing such a 
unified concept is to begin to examine the common themes and relationships between 
different psychological theories of depression. As has hopefully been made apparent in this 
essay, there are many areas of overlap, and this must be a source of some optimism as to 
the development of a unified concept. Finally, it is worth noting that a unified concept of 
depression does not imply that every client would be treated identically. Rather, a fuller 
understanding of the interrelationships between biological, psychological and social factors 
should allow us as clinicians to determine the most appropriate treatment for each 
individual, and so help them maximise the quality of their life.
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PEOPLE WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES ESSAY:
AH Challenging Behaviour In Individuals With Learning Disabilities 
Has A Communicative Function And Can Be Explained By Deficits In 
Communication Skills”. Critically Discuss This Proposition.
July 2001
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Introduction
An issue for services for people with learning difficulties is the ‘challenging behaviour’ that 
the service users sometimes present with. There are a number of slightly different 
definitions of ‘challenging behaviour’ (Joyce, Ditchfield & Harris, 2001; Lowe & Felce, 
1995). However, Emerson (1995) provides one of the more frequently used ones. 
According to this, challenging behaviour is ‘culturally abnormal behaviour of such an 
intensity, frequency or duration that the physical safety of the person [exhibiting the 
behaviour) or others is likely to be placed in serious jeopardy, or behaviour which is likely 
to seriously limit the use of, or result in the person being denied access to, ordinary 
community facilities’. This definition can encompass a wide variety of behaviours, potential 
examples being stereotyped rocking, masturbation, screaming, breaking property, head- 
banging, biting, hitting and eye-poking (e.g. Ashmann, 1997; Emerson, 1998); though, as 
the definition states, the inclusion of such behaviours would depend upon the impact that 
they have.
Total population studies in various areas of the United Kingdom have suggested that, at a 
given point in time, challenging behaviour is exhibited by between seven and nineteen 
percent of people with learning difficulties (Emerson et al., 2001; Joyce, Ditchfield & 
Harris, 2001; Qureshi & Alborz, 1992). Indeed, these figures may even be an 
underestimate given that they only concern people in contact with services. Moreover, 
challenging behaviour can have significant negative effects, including serious injury to the 
person manifesting the behaviour or others, the exclusion or isolation of that person from 
particular services or parts of the community, and demoralisation and stress in care staff 
(Bromley & Emerson, 1995; Joyce, Ditchfield & Harris, 2001). This combination of a high 
prevalence and substantial detrimental consequences makes it a high priority to better 
understand the causes of challenging behaviour, and to develop more effective and efficient 
methods of prevention and intervention.
The purpose of this essay is to review the literature concerning the causes and treatment of 
challenging behaviour, and in particular examine the proposition that such behaviour is an 
act of communication that arises because of deficits in communication skills. To this end, 
this ‘communication hypothesis’ will be elaborated upon and the evidence purported to 
support it examined. Then other approaches to challenging behaviour, including behaviour 
theoiy and hypotheses about the impact of psychiatric disorders, neurotransmitter
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imbalances and genetic syndromes, will be considered. Finally, it will be argued that these 
different approaches are not mutually exclusive, and the place of the communication 
hypothesis within an integrated model will be discussed.
Challenging Behaviour as a Form of Communication
Some authors have argued that at least some challenging behaviours represent attempts by 
people with learning disabilities to communicate, and that such behaviours can be decreased 
by enabling them to communicate the same information in a non-challenging manner (e.g. 
Carr & Durand, 1985; Donnellan, Mirenda, Mesaros & Fassbender, 1984; Remington, 
1997; Thurman, 1997). For example, a client might hit care-staff in order to try to 
communicate the fact that she does not want to continue with a particular task. According to 
this account, such behaviour could be reduced by helping her to learn to sign ‘no more’, so 
that she could then use this instead of the challenging behaviour.
However, before the utility of the communication hypothesis can be examined, it is first 
necessary to define ‘communication’. Following the ‘pragmatics’ literature, some authors 
have argued that any behaviour is a form of communication, since it can transmit 
information to others (e.g. Donnellan et al., 1984). However, while such a definition may 
be philosophically valid, it is of limited practical clinical use, since it implies that a priori all 
challenging behaviour has a communicative function. Therefore, for present purposes a 
person’s behaviour will only be regarded as having a communicative function if their 
primary purpose appears to be to transmit information to another person. In light of this, 
the communication hypothesis may be rephrased thus: The main purpose of at least some 
challenging behaviours is to transmit information to others, and these behaviours maybe 
reduced if the client becomes able to transmit the same information in another, more 
appropriate manner. There are three main strands of evidence consistent with this 
hypothesis.
The first concerns the prediction, which can be made from the hypothesis, that clients with 
greater deficits in appropriate communications skills will be more likely to resort to 
challenging behaviour to communicate. A number of studies have found just such a 
correlation between challenging behaviour and communication deficits (Chamberlain, 
Chung & Jenner, 1993; Duncan, Matson, Bamburg, Cherry & Buckley, 1999; Moss, 
Emerson, Kiernan, Turner, Hatton & Alborz, 2000). By way of example, consider Moss et
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al. (2000) who collected information from care-staff about the people with learning 
disabilities in contact with services in several specified regions. They found a significant 
association between the poverty of the clients’ speech and the severity of their challenging 
behaviour (both of which had been rated on a three point scale on the basis of the obtained 
information).
However, the above mentioned studies must be treated with some caution because most of 
them employed measures whose reliability and validity had not been determined. This 
perhaps explains why at least one study found a correlation in the opposite direction 
(McLean, Brady and McLean, 1996). Moreover, even if it is accepted that there are 
correlations between communication deficits and challenging behaviour, this does not 
necessarily imply that communication deficits play a causal role in challenging behaviour. 
This is because there could be other factors (e.g. mental state, genetic syndrome etc.) that 
have a detrimental effect on both communication and behaviour. These other possible 
causes of challenging behaviour will be returned to later.
The second type of evidence pertaining to the communication hypothesis comes from work 
by Emerson and Bromley (1985). They tried to determine the functions of the challenging 
behaviour manifest by people with learning disabilities in several Health Authority districts. 
To this end, they used interviews with care staff to identify the individuals in contact with 
services who manifested challenging behaviour. For these people the Motivation 
Assessment Scale (MAS; Durand & Crimmins, 1992) was also administered. This is a 
Likert scale that attempts to establish the function of challenging behaviour by asking 
someone familiar with it to rate the chances that the behaviour will occur in different 
circumstances. To illustrate, on one item informants are asked ‘Does the behaviour occur 
whenever you stop attending to him/her?’ and the extent to which they agree with this 
counts towards classing the behaviour as having a care-seeking function (Emerson & 
Bromley, 1995).
Consistent with the communication hypothesis, the MAS results suggested that the majority 
of aggressive challenging behaviour was motivated by a desire to communicate to staff a 
wish for attention. However, at least according to this measure, self-injurious behaviour 
seemed more often to serve a self-stimulatory function. While some authors would argue 
that self-stimulation is in fact a communication act equivalent to saying I am bored’
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(Donnellan et al., 1984), it does not fulfil the criterion for communication adopted here, 
since the transmission of information to another is not its primary purpose.
However, these findings must be viewed with some caution, since Toogood and Timlin 
(1996) have shown the agreement between the MAS and other methods of assessing the 
function of challenging behaviour is low (correlations ranging between 0.34 and 0.75). 
Moreover, recent work has also questioned the inter-informant reliability of the MAS 
(Emerson & Bromley, 1995). Nevertheless, it is probably safe to conclude that the primary 
function of at least some challenging behaviour is communicative. (The issue of self­
stimulation will be returned to later).
The third, and final, strand of evidence in support of the communication hypothesis 
comprises single-case studies that purport to demonstrate that challenging behaviour can be 
reduced by training alternative, more appropriate means of communication (e.g. Bird, 
Dores, Moniz & Robinson, 1989; Bradshaw, 1998; Carr & Durand, 1985; Donnellan et 
al., 1984; Rowland & Treece, 2000; Symons, Fox & Thompson, 1998; Thurman, 1997).
Perhaps the methodologically most vigorous of these studies was carried out by Carr and 
Durand (1985). In their study four children with moderate to severe learning disabilities and 
challenging behaviour participated in an ABACABAC design. Phase A constituted the 
baseline during which no training occurred. In phase B the clients were trained on a verbal 
phrase thought to serve a different function to the challenging behaviour, and in phase C 
they were taught to use a phrase thought to be functional equivalent to the behaviour. The 
results indicated that the challenging behaviour of all four clients substantially reduced in 
the C phase, but not in the A and B phases. This suggests that at least some challenging 
behaviours can be alleviated by training new communication skills, provided that they serve 
the same function as the behaviour. Thus, this supports the communication hypothesis.
Of course, because these studies are single-case designs, there remains a question over the 
extent to which their results can be generalised to other people with learning disabilities and 
challenging behaviour. Moreover, some caution is warranted since authors and journals 
may be less willing to publish cases were such an intervention has failed. Nevertheless, this 
work appears to provide reasonable evidence that teaching an alternative, functionally 
equivalent means of communication can reduce challenging behaviour, for at least some 
clients.
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To summarise, three strands of evidence have been presented, namely studies showing a 
correlation between communication deficits and challenging behaviour, work using the 
MAS that suggests that at least some challenging behaviours have a communicative 
function, and single-case studies in which challenging behaviour was reduced by teaching 
clients functionally equivalent, more appropriate communication acts. Each of these strands 
has methodological problems. However, taken together they seem to provide reasonable 
evidence for the hypothesis that some challenging behaviours serve a communicative 
function and may be ameliorated by teaching functionally equivalent, appropriate methods 
of communication. Moreover, it would also appear warranted to conclude that some 
challenging behaviours arise due to deficits in communication skills, so long as these 
deficits are not solely attributed to the person with learning disabilities, but rather are 
located in the system that comprises the client, the people who interact with them and their 
environment. Finally, it is worth recalling that the Emerson and Bromley (1995) study 
suggested that some challenging behaviours primarily serve non-communicative functions. 
Given this, other causes of challenging behaviour and alternative approaches to 
understanding it and intervening against it will now be considered.
Behavioural Models of Challenging Behaviour
There have been a number of different behavioural models of challenging behaviour but 
perhaps the currently most popular draws on the principles of operant conditioning 
(Emerson, 1995, chap. 5; Emerson, 1998). Aversion of this model, based on the work of 
Emerson (1995, chap. 5), is illustrated in Figure 1. Its workings will first be discussed, 
before its relationship to the communication hypothesis is examined and evidence is 
presented for its efficacy.
According to this operant conditioning model, challenging behaviour will occur if three 
conditions are met. First, the behaviour or its component parts must be part of the person’s 
‘repertoire of behaviours’. Second, the person’s motivational state must be such that they 
value the expected consequences of the challenging behaviour. Third, the environmental 
conditions need to be those under which the person would expect the challenging behaviour 
to potentially result in the desired consequences. Thus, by this account challenging 
behaviour is a goal-directed action, through which the client is trying to achieve an outcome 
that they value.
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Figure 1: A schematic representation o f a behavioural theory o f challenging behaviour. See 
the main text for an explanation. (This figure is based on the work o f Emerson, 1995, 
chap. 5.)
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Furthermore, operant behavioural theory attaches critical importance to whether this 
expected outcome actually occurs. Specifically, if the individual achieves their desired goal, 
whether this be a positive outcome or relief from a negative event, then it is assumed that 
the association between this goal and the challenging behaviour is reinforced. In other 
words, the individual leams that they can achieve the outcome they want by producing the 
challenging behaviour. Alternatively, if the expected outcome does not occur then it is 
argued that the association between it and the challenging behaviour will reduce. Thus, the 
model states that challenging behaviour will continue so long as this behaviour achieves the 
person’s desired goal (although this need not be on every occasion).
Before continuing, it is worth highlighting two important aspects of this model. First, the 
desired consequence of the challenging behaviour need not always be something external to 
the individual. For example, a person might repeatedly poke their eyes to create visual 
effects that they enjoy (cf. Halliday & Mackrell, 1998). Second, systemic factors are of 
crucial significance, since according to the model it is often through the actions or inactions 
of other people that the challenging behaviour is reinforced. Moreover, the environment and 
the people in it help determine the mood and motivational state of the person with learning 
disabilities, and so influence the value that they attach to consequences of the challenging 
behaviour.
In order to make this operant model of challenging behaviour more concrete, consider the 
following hypothetical example. A person with learning disabilities becomes stressed by 
having to perform a demanding task, and so the goal of ending the task is a valuable one. A 
staff member then leaves a glass nearby, providing them with an opportunity to achieve 
their goal. Therefore, with the aim of ending the task, the person with learning disabilities 
picks up the glass and throws it at the staff member. As a consequence the task ends and so 
the behaviour becomes reinforced, and thus is more likely to reoccur given similar 
circumstances.
On the basis of this operant model, there are a number of different approaches to try to 
reduce challenging behaviour. Following from Emerson (1995, chap. 5), these include 
changing the environment so that the motivational state of the person with learning 
disabilities is less likely to give rise to behaviour, trying to ensure that the antecedent 
conditions do not arise, and teaching the individual a functionally equivalent, more 
appropriate behaviour (Goldiamond, 1974). The latter is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Thus continuing with the above example, in theory the glass throwing could be reduced by 
first making the tasks the person has to perform less demanding so that they are less 
stressed, second not leaving glasses near them and third teaching them an alternative way to 
bring the task to an end (e.g. to say ‘no more’).
Having now outlined an operant behavioural approach to challenging behaviour, hopefully 
it is obvious that the communication hypothesis can be subsumed within this model. This is 
because both models regard challenging behaviour as being goal directed and state that 
helping the client to learn functionally equivalent, more appropriate behaviours can reduce 
it. However, the behavioural approach has the advantage that it can also address 
challenging behaviours whose main goal appears to be non-communicative. Moreover, it 
explains how these behaviours are learnt and how they are maintained, and offers a number 
of approaches to reducing them. Of course, ethical clinical practice should not be based on a 
theoiy unless it receives empirical support. Therefore, the evidence bearing on this 
behavioural model will now be examined.
Studies that support the applicability of the communication hypothesis to at least some 
challenging behaviours have already been reviewed. This evidence is also consistent with 
operant behaviour theory, given that it has been argued that this theory subsumes the 
communication hypothesis. Therefore, the critical question is whether there is evidence that 
some challenging behaviours serve a function that is non-communicative, and whether such 
behaviours can be reduced by replacing them with functionally equivalent, more appropriate 
acts.
Some such evidence has already been presented. Recall that Emerson and Bromley (1995) 
used the MAS to show that the primaiy function of some challenging behaviour appears to 
be self-stimulatoiy rather than communicative. It was argued that these results need to be 
treated with caution, given the questions over the MAS’s reliability and validity (Emerson 
& Bromley, 1995; Toogood & Timlin, 1996). However, other work is also consistent with 
the idea that some challenging behaviour has a self-stimulatory purpose (for reviews see 
Halliday & Mackrell, 1998, and Emerson, 1995). For example, Derby et al. (1992) 
evaluated the function of challenging behaviours that 79 people with learning disabilities 
exhibited, by experimentally manipulating different contingencies that could be maintaining 
the behaviours. For some individuals it was found that the frequency of their challenging 
behaviour increased when it was followed by sensory stimulation (e.g. tactile stimulation or
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music), and decreased when an alternative behaviour was paired with such stimulation 
while the challenging behaviour was not. Moreover, in these cases the level of challenging 
behaviour was usually unaffected by changes in the amount of attention the client received 
or task demands. These findings are consistent with the possibility that the primary function 
of some challenging behaviours is self-stimulation and that these behaviours can be reduced 
by providing alternative means of obtaining that stimulation.
The efficacy of interventions based on this operant model of challenging behaviour is also 
supported by a meta-analysis of 482 outcome studies (Bidden, Duker & Korzilius, 1997). 
This analysis included all the work that evaluated challenging behaviour interventions that 
was published in the 30 major journals in this field between 1968 and 1994, and that 
described their outcome data in sufficient detail. The critical result for present purposes is 
that the interventions that had been based on a functional analysis of the behaviour were 
found to be significantly more effective than ones that had not. Moreover, the more precise 
the functional analysis was, the better the outcome.
A critic might argue that meta-analyses are biased by the fact that they do not include non­
published work, which may be more likely to include treatment failures. However, it is 
unclear why this bias would affect one form of treatment more than another, and so affect 
our conclusions. Another problem is that perhaps the interventions based on the functional 
analysis were more effective not because of the analysis but rather because the clinicians 
involved were more diligent and skilled. Nevertheless, this review would seem to provide 
reasonable support for the efficacy of interventions based on a functional analysis, and so 
support operant behavioural theory.
To summarise, there is evidence to suggest that some challenging behaviours primarily 
serve a communicative function, arise in part due to communications deficits within the 
system, and may be reduced by helping the person with learning disabilities develop more 
appropriate means to communicate. However, the main function of other challenging 
behaviours appears to be non-communicative (e.g. self-stimulation). Such behaviours can 
also sometimes be reduced by helping the client learn more appropriate, functionally 
equivalent alternatives. Both these findings can be understood in terms of an operant 
behavioural model that views challenging behaviour as a goal directed action that is 
maintained by a process of reinforcement (in which the wider system plays a crucial role).
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and that emphasises the importance of helping clients to replace their challenging behaviour 
with something more appropriate that achieves the same goal.
However, the literature also contains other models of challenging behaviour and evidence 
for the role of other factors in its aetiology. These will now be briefly reviewed and, where 
possible, integrated with the behavioural account that has just been outlined.
Neurobiological Models of Challenging Behaviour
An alternative approach to understanding challenging behaviour is a neurobiological one. 
Neurobiological models have tended to concentrate on the role that the neurotransmitters
dopamine, serotonin and P-endorphin play in the aetiology of challenging behaviour
(Emerson, 1995, chap. 5). Because of space limitations the focus here will be on P- 
endorphin, but for a more detailed review see Emerson (1995, chap. 5).
Evidence for the involvement of p-endorphin comes from a study in which the levels of this
neurotransmitter were compared between a group of people with learning disabilities who 
were exhibiting self-injurious challenging behaviour and control group that were not 
(Sandman, Barron, Chicz-DeMet & DeMet, 1990). It was found that the self-injurious
group had a significantly higher concentration of P-endorphin in their blood plasma, than
control. Such a correlation is consistent with the possibility that P-endorphin plays a role in 
the aetiology or maintenance of challenging behaviour, but is not proof since there could be 
other common factors that have a causal effect on both challenging behaviour and P- 
endorphin.
However, additional evidence for the causal role of P-endorphin is provided by Sandman, 
Barron and Colman (1990), who report a double-blind trial on the effects of naltrexone on 
self-injury. Naltrexone is known to reduce P-endorphin levels. Therefore, it should
ameliorate self-injury if elevated P-endorphin levels are involved in its aetiology or
maintenance. Clients were given different dosages of naltrexone on different weeks, in a 
latin square design. Consistent with the prediction, it was found that lower rates of self­
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injury were associated with higher naltrexone dosages. Moreover, similar results have been 
reported by Symons, Fox and Thompson (1998), who employed a single-case reversal
design. Thus, there is reasonable evidence to suggest that the reduction of P-endorphin
levels can lower rates of some forms of self-injurious challenging behaviour. Therefore, it
seems probable that p-endorphin plays a role in its aetiology or maintenance.
Two hypotheses about this role are discussed by Sandman, Barron, Chicz-DeMet and 
DeMet(1990). According to one, people self-injure in order to obtain the ‘high’ associated
with P-endorphin release. While, the other postulates that P-endorphin lowers people’s
sensitivity to the pain caused by self-injury. However, regardless of which proves to be 
more accurate, they are both compatible with an operant behavioural model. Specifically,
for the former hypothesis the P-endorphin can be considered as an internal reinforcer and in
the latter it can be considered to alter the motivational state (see Figure 1 ).
Thus, the most effective intervention for at least some challenging behaviours may be a 
combination of training functionally equivalent (or similar) alternative behaviours and the
administration of p-endorphin antagonists (cf. Symons et al., 1998). However, if
medication is to be used to reduce challenging behaviour then it must be based on a clear 
neurobiological hypothesis rather than just represent an attempt to sedate the client, and 
treatment gains must be weighed against the occurrence of any side-effects.
Challenging Behaviour as a Consequence of Psychiatric Illness
Several authors have speculated that psychiatric disorders may play a role in the aetiology 
and maintenance of some challenging behaviours (e.g. Emerson, Moss & Kiernan, 1999; 
King, 1993; Meins, 1995). A recent study by Moss, Emerson, Kiernan, Turner, Hatton 
and Alborz (2000) provides some evidence in support of this view. Moss et al. collected 
information from care-staff about the people with learning disabilities in contact with 
services in several regions. On the basis of this they then rated each individual’s 
challenging behaviour on a three-point scale (i.e. none, less demanding and more 
demanding). Carers were also asked to complete the Psychiatric Assessment Schedule for 
Adults with Developmental Disability (PAS-ADD), a semi-structured clinical interview 
designed to determine if a person with learning disabilities has a psychiatric condition and.
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if so, what that condition is. The PAS-ADD has been shown to have adequate reliability 
and validity, at least for people with a mild or moderate learning disability (Caine & Hatton,
1998).
It was found that there was a significant positive association between the number of 
psychiatric symptoms that clients were reported to have and the severity of their challenging 
behaviour. In addition, depression appeared to be the psychiatric illness most strongly 
related to challenging behaviour. Moreover, this latter result has been replicated in other 
work, in which mental illness was assessed by a psychiatrist rather than the PAS-ADD 
(Meins, 1995).
However, these findings need to be treated with some caution for several reasons. First, at 
least part of the association between mental illness and challenging behaviour may be a 
product of the fact that some potentially challenging behaviours count as psychiatric 
symptoms (e.g. ‘repeated actions’ and ‘odd gestures or mannerisms’; cf. Holland & 
Murphy, 1990). Second, it is probably difficult to reliably diagnose psychiatric illness in 
people with severe or profound learning disabilities, not least because of the potential 
communication difficulties (Caine & Hatton, 1989). Third, an association between mental 
illness and challenging behaviour does not necessarily imply that the former plays a causal 
role in the latter. An alternative possibility is that both could share common causal factors 
(e.g. poor quality of environment; cf. Emerson, Moss & Kiernan, 1999).
Clearly more research into this area is required. Perhaps this could involve a longitudinal 
study in order to try to establish whether the onset of mental illness precedes the 
development of some challenging behaviours, as it should do if it is playing a causal role. 
In the meantime the best approach would appear to be to assess any client who presents 
with challenging behaviour for psychiatric problems, and then to offer treatment for these 
problems to reduce the client’s distress. As a by-product of this treatment, challenging 
behaviour may also reduce.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that if mental illness is found to play a causal role in some 
challenging behaviour then this can be explained within the operant behavioural model. 
Specifically, mental illness could affect the motivational state (see Figure 1) of the person 
with learning disabilities and so alter their valuation of the consequences of the challenging 
behaviour (cf. Emerson, Moss & Kiernan, 1999).
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Challenging Behaviour as a Consequence of Genetic Syndromes
A number of genetic syndromes that frequently lead to learning disabilities are associated 
with higher rates of challenging behaviours than in the general learning disabled population 
(Deb, 1998). Examples include Aicardi, Brachmann de-Lange, Lesch-Nyhan and Rett's 
syndromes (Deb, 1998). However, given space constraints the focus here will be on 
Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, which is of particular relevance to the present discussion because 
the challenging behaviour associated with it does not appear to be fully under voluntaiy 
control (Deb, 1998; Udwin & Dennis, 1995).
Evidence for this assertion is provided by a description of the behaviour of 19 clients with 
this syndrome, reported by Christie, Bay, Kaufman, Bakay, Borden and Nyhan (1982). 
All of these clients exhibited challenging behaviour, in the form of self-mutilation (e.g. 
biting lips, tongue or fingers). In some cases this mutilation was so severe that parts of 
fingers or the tongue had been bitten completely off. Moreover, the clients seemed to want 
to be restrained and usually became highly distressed when they were not, which suggests 
that they did not feel that they could fully control their challenging behaviour. Interestingly, 
as they grew older some of the clients appeared to gain partial control, for example by 
sitting on their hands. Nevertheless, the fact that they could not just leave their hands by 
their side suggests that the self-mutilation was not voluntary. Indeed, one individual is 
reported to have told his hand to ‘be good right hand’.
The observation that these clients self-injure when they apparently do not wish to do so is 
not easy to reconcile with operant behavioural theory, which views challenging behaviour 
as an attempt to achieve a desired goal. As yet, the aetiology of the self-mutilation is not 
well understood, though it may involve defects in the basal ganglia and excessive 
excitability in certain motor neurones (Deb, 1998; Udwin & Dennis, 1995). However, 
some psychological help is possible, since a reduction in environmental stressors and an 
increase in adult attention do seem to at least reduce the frequency of the self-mutilation for 
some individuals (Udwin & Dennis, 1995). With regard to the broader picture, it seems 
reasonable to conclude there are at least some challenging behaviours that cannot be fully 
explained by the current operant behavioural model.
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Summary and Conclusions
To summarise, challenging behaviour is prevalent in the learning disabled population and 
can have substantial detrimental consequences. This makes it a priority to understand its 
causes and maintenance, and to develop effective interventions. Evidence has been 
presented that suggests that some challenging behaviours serve a communicative function, 
arise in part due to communication deficits in the system, and can be reduced by helping the 
person with learning disabilities learn functionally equivalent, more appropriate means of 
communicating. However, it also appears that other challenging behaviours primarily have 
a non-communicativefunction (e.g. self-stimulation). These can also be reduced by training 
alternative means of achieving the same goal. Both these functional classes of behaviour 
can be understood within an operant behavioural model, that views challenging behaviour 
as a goal directed action that is maintained by internal or external reinforcement. A 
consideration of the client’s motivational state and systemic influences are also important in 
this model.
In addition, neurotransmitters, including P-endorphin, and psychiatric disorders may be
implicated in some challenging behaviours, though the effect of these factors can be 
understood within the behavioural model. However, a few examples of challenging 
behaviour, notably those associated with Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, do not appear to be 
explicable within this model because they seem to occur against the wishes of the person 
with learning disabilities.
Thus, challenging behaviour is a complex phenomenon, which can have a variety of 
different causes and needs to be analysed at biological, psychological and social levels. 
Clearly additional research is required to better understand challenging behaviour and how 
to effectively reduce it. Nevertheless, it appears that a functional behavioural approach,
where appropriate in combination with P-endorphin antagonists, can reduce many incidents
of challenging behaviour. Thus, a priority must be to ensure that this form of intervention is 
made more widely available, given that it appears to be formally employed in only around 
15 percent of cases of challenging behaviour (Emerson, Robertson, Gregory, Hatton & 
Kessissoglou, 2000).
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Introduction
The Anxiety Disorders are a group of psychiatric conditions whose central characteristic 
is the presence of irrational fear and anxiety on a level that causes the sufferer clinically 
significant distress or substantially impairs their daily life (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). Research suggests that between two and nine percent of children 
(i.e. people below the age of 18) suffer from some form of Anxiety Disorder 
(Anderson, 1994). And, this is probably an underestimate because some children may 
be reluctant to disclose their condition (Henin & Kendall, 1997). Therefore, the further 
development and implementation of effective interventions to help alleviate childhood 
Anxiety Disorders is clearly a priority.
One approach to treatment development is to apply theories and therapies that have 
proved successful in understanding and alleviating adult Anxiety Disorders to their 
childhood counterparts (Shafran, 2001). However, a danger inherent in this process is 
that crucial differences between the adult and child versions of the conditions could be 
overlooked. And, it is a real possibility that such differences may exist, given the 
numerous systemic, cognitive, affective and physiological differences between children 
and adults (e.g. Carr, 1999, chap. 1). Therefore, it is important to establish whether, 
and in what way, childhood Anxiety Disorders differ from the corresponding conditions 
in adulthood.
This essay will examine this issue for two prominent Anxiety Disorders, namely 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder and Generalised Anxiety Disorder. Furthermore, 
although it is possible that developmental changes may lead to substantial variation in 
these Anxiety Disorders across childhood (Shafran, 1998), for each disorder this essay 
will concentrate on the similarities and differences between the adult condition and a 
composite of its childhood variants. This is because this is the comparison that currently 
has the most research evidence bearing upon it (Shafran, 1998). Nevertheless, the issue 
of variation within childhood will be also touched upon throughout.
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (GOD)
One of the cardinal indicators of OCD is the presence of either obsessions or 
compulsions, or both (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Following DSM-IV, 
an obsession is defined as an anxiety-provoking image, impulse or thought that 
repeatedly intrudes into a person’s consciousness; examples could include pornographic 
imageiy or an impulse to swear (Sims, 1995). A compulsion is viewed as a repetitive
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mental or physical act that is intended to stop a feared event or decrease distress; 
examples are the repeated checking that a door is locked or the repeated washing of 
hands (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). For a diagnosis of OCD, the 
obsession or compulsion must cause substantial distress or impairment of daily life and 
must be clearly excessive or inappropriate. And, if the sufferer is an adult, they must 
have recognised this excessiveness at some point. Furthermore, other mental disorders 
(e.g. psychosis) must be eliminated, and the OCD must not be directly attributable to a 
physiological substance or general medical condition.
For clarity, the comparison of adult and child versions of this disorder will be divided 
into three sections; namely phenomenology, cognitive-behavioural approaches and 
neuro psychiatrie approaches. Unfortunately there is not the space to discuss other 
models of OCD that are currently less influential, like psychodynamic theories (Davison 
& Neale, 1997).
A Comparison o f the Phenomenology o f Childhood and Adult OCD
Clearly there are mainly commonalities between adult and childhood OCD, since they 
both follow all but one of the DSM-IV criteria. However, there also appear to be a 
number of phenomenology differences. First, according to DSM-IV, adults must have 
recognized that their obsessions or compulsions are excessive at some point during the 
condition, while children need not have (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). This 
distinction is supported by the findings of a range of clinical series studies on children 
and adults with OCD (Geller et al, 1998; Foa & Kozak, 1995). However, from their 
data it is also clear that at least some children do have insight into the excessiveness of 
their obsessions or compulsions. Moreover, the lack of insight manifest by other 
children may be an epiphenomenon that is a consequence of their insufficient cognitive 
development (cf. Geller et al., 1998). Thus, the observed difference in insight may not 
reflect a fundamental difference in the processes underlying childhood and adult OCD. 
Nevertheless, this difference has treatment implications, which will be considered later 
in the section devoted to interventions.
A second apparent difference is that a DSM-IV field trial found that adult OCD occurred 
equally in men and women (Foa & Kozak, 1995), while clinical series studies of OCD 
in children have consistently shown the disorder to be more prevalent in males (Geller et 
al., 1997). However, this need not imply a fundamental difference between adult and 
childhood OCD, since at least one alternative explanation is that the factors that
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precipitate OCD may be more likely to occur earlier in the life of males, leading to earlier 
onset in males.
A third seeming discrepancy is that epidemiological and clinical series studies suggest 
that childhood, but not adult, OCD is frequently co-morbid with Disruptive Behaviour 
Disorders and Learning Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; Cellar et 
al., 1997). However, this difference may be a consequence of the fact that adult studies 
tend not to assess for Learning and Disruptive Behaviour Disorders (Cellar et al.,
1997).
To summarise, by definition childhood and adult OCD share all-bar-one of the same 
DSM-IV criteria. Furthermore, the apparent differences in insight, gender ratio and co­
morbidity do not constitute strong evidence of fundamental differences in the processes 
underlying childhood and adult OCD. Nevertheless, the difference in insight does 
potentially have important treatment implications, which will be expanded upon later.
A Comparison o f Cognitive-Behavioural Approaches to Childhood and Adult OCD
Cognitive-behavioural approaches to childhood OCD have largely developed in the 
wake of their adult counterparts (e.g. March, 1995; March, Franklin, Nelson & Foa, 
2001; Shrafan & Somers, 1998). Therefore, to set the stage for an adult-child 
comparison, a prominent cognitive-behavioural model of adult OCD will first be 
described; namely Salkovskis’ (1985; 1999) theory, which is illustrated in Figure 1. In 
brief according to this model, thoughts, images or impulses of an unpleasant nature 
intrude into the consciousness of the majority of the population. However, these 
intrusions only develop into obsessions when they are consistently misinterpreted by 
the individual to indicate that he or she has been, or will be, responsible for harm to 
themselves or another. For example, someone with OCD might believe that, because 
they saw an image of themselves killing their baby, they may actually do that.
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EXISTING SCHEMA
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Figure I: A diagrammatic representation o f the main aspects o f the current version o f  
Salkovskis’ cognitive-behavioural model o f OCD (adaptedfrom Figure 1 in Salkovskis,
1999). See the main text for an explanation o f its workings.
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It is hypothesised that this misinterpretation leads to an increase in anxiety, which 
promotes the occurrence of anxiety related cognitions, like the obsession (cf. Teasdale 
& Russell, 1983). Further, it is thought that attempts by the sufferer to suppress or 
neutralise the obsession have a rebound effect that increase its frequency (cf. Wegner, 
Schneider, Carter & White, 1987), and that safety behaviours, like avoidance and overt 
and covert compulsions, prevent the sufferer from learning that their misinterpretation 
of the obsession is mistaken. However, an explanation of the origin of the tendency to 
misinterpret obsessions is still under construction (Salkovskis et al., 2000).
Given the pivotal, maintaining role that adult cognitive-behavioural theory attaches to 
the misinterpretation of obsessions, the associated therapy attempts to help sufferers 
recognise how their interpretation is mistaken (e.g. Salkovskis, Forrester, Richards & 
Morrison, 1998). This is achieved through ‘guided-discovery’, during which 
discussion and behavioural experiments are used to help the sufferer learn new 
interpretations (Salkovskis, 1999). Subsequently, the sufferer is encouraged to reduce 
other maintaining factors, like compulsions and avoidance.
While it is arguable that a model is of little clinical value if it is not supported by an 
evidence-base, space constraints prevent a detailed review of the evidence for 
Salkovskis’ approach (but see Clark, 2000). Nevertheless, in one of the most clinically 
relevant studies (i.e. Freeston et al., 1997) adults with OCD were randomly allocated to 
a group that received cognitive-behaviour therapy and a waiting-list control group. Both 
groups were given a battery of measures of the severity of their condition, which 
showed good reliability and validity. It was found that following therapy the treatment 
group’s scores on these measures significantly decreased relative to control, and this 
was maintained at least until a six-month follow-up. Of course, such a result does not 
elucidate the active ingredients of the therapy (cf. Clark, 2000), nor imply that it works 
for the reason specified by Salkovskis’ theory. But, when taken together with other 
evidence (which there is not space to review, but see Clark, 2000) it suggests that 
Salkovskis’ model and its associated therapy are currently a useful psychological 
approach to adult OCD.
It is now possible to compare this approach with cognitive-behavioural theories and 
therapies of childhood OCD; in particular those detailed by Shafran (1998), March 
(1995; March et al., 2001) and Piacentini (1999), which appear to be the most 
prominent in the literature.
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Considering the cognitive-behavioural theories of childhood OCD first, these differ 
from Salkovskis’ model in that they are more behavioural in emphasis (Shafran, 1998). 
Specifically, they make little or no mention of the kernel of Salkovskis’ approach, 
namely the misinterpretation of obsessions (Shafran, 1998). Rather, they assume that 
experience has led the child sufferer to learn a direct association between the obsession 
and anxiety or, in the case of compulsions without an apparent obsession, the 
circumstances that trigger the compulsion and anxiety (e.g. Clark, 2000; Shafran, 
1998). Avoidance, compulsions or reassurance from another are seen as maintaining 
factors, since it is assumed that they prevent the child from extinguishing the link 
between the obsession (or the compulsion triggering circumstances) and anxiety.
At first sight, the difference between the childhood and adult models of OCD would 
appear to be warranted by the observation that compulsions without apparent 
obsessions occur more frequently in children than adults (Rapoport, Swedo & Leonard, 
1992; Shafran, 2001). After all, how can the misinterpretation of an obsession play a 
crucial role in cases where there is no obsession to misinterpret? However, a proponent 
of Salkovskis’ approach could argue that all children with OCD do experience 
obsessions that they misinterpret, but that because of their insufficient cognitive 
development some of them do not recognise them as obsessions or are unable to 
describe them to others in such terms (cf. Shafran, 1998). However, it remains an open 
question as to whether a child who does not have the cognitive ability to recognise their 
obsessions could still have the faculties to cognitively misinterpret them. Therefore, 
while there may be a substantial difference in emphasis between the current cognitive- 
behavioural theories of childhood and adult OCD, more research is required to establish 
the extent to which the role of obsession-misinterpretation actually differs between 
adults and children, and indeed between children of different ages. Only following this 
will it be possible to start to address the question of whether the intra-psychic 
psychological processes underlying childhood and adult OCD fundamental differ.
Nevertheless, it is also useful to consider how the cognitive-behavioural therapies of 
childhood OCD compare to their adult counterpart, and whether any differences 
between them are empirically justifiable. The childhood therapies comprise primarily 
graded exposure to the obsession, or compulsion triggering circumstances, while 
preventing any compulsions or safety behaviours; the aim being to extinguish the 
association between these stimuli and anxiety (e.g. March, 1995). These techniques 
also figure in the therapy of adult OCD, but in that case they are seen as means of 
helping the client reappraise their interpretation of their obsessions.
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The cognitive component of the current cognitive-behaviour therapies for childhood 
OCD is generally substantially less than in the adult version, being largely limited to 
generating a sense of understanding of the techniques being employed and a belief that 
they can work (March et al., 2001; Shafran, 1998). This appears to be based on the 
assumption that children’s immature cognitive processes, and generally lower insight 
into their disorder (see earlier), make them less amenable to the cognitive techniques 
employed in the adult therapy. However, while this may well be true, there does not 
appear to have been a systematic attempt to empirically test this (Shafran, 1998), or to 
establish how to identify which children might benefit from such techniques and which 
would not.
Another major difference from the adult therapy is that the child’s family are typically 
heavily involved in the process. This inclusion enables systemic factors that might be 
helping to maintain the OCD, like the offering of reassurance, to be addressed and helps 
facilitate parental support of the graded exposure (Piacentini, 1999; Shafran, 2001). 
Greater family involvement is a common difference between adult and child therapies 
across a range of disorders and reflects the fact that a child is usually more dependent 
upon, and influenced by, their family system than an adult (Carr, 1999).
Finally, the evidence-base for cognitive-behaviour therapy of childhood OCD is 
substantially weaker than for its adult counterpart, due to the relative lack of large- 
sample randomised control trials (Safran, 2001). Clearly, this is an area requiring 
further research.
To summarise, current cognitive-behavioural theories and therapies of childhood OCD 
have a greater behavioural emphasis than their adult counterpart. However, more 
research is required to establish the role that obsessi on-mi si nterpretation plays in 
childhood OCD, and the benefit that children of different ages might gain from cognitive 
techniques that address this. In advance of this, it is not possible to definitively say 
whether the intra-psychic psychological processes underlying childhood and adult OCD 
fundamentally differ. However, the relative emphasis on family factors in formulation 
and treatment does appear to be a potentially important difference between childhood 
and adult OCD.
A Comparison o f Neuro-Psychiatric Approaches to Childhood and Adult OCD
The other class of model that dominates the OCD literature is the neuro psychiatrie 
approach (Shafran, 2001; Turner, Beidel, Stanley, & Heiser, 2001). However, this will
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be considered in less detail, because the interventions associated with it are the purview 
of psychiatry not psychology. Perhaps the most influential neuro psychiatrie theory of 
adult OCD suggests that an over-sensitivity to the neurotransmitter serotonin plays a 
role in the aetiology of the disorder (Henin & Kendall, 1997). This receives support 
from double-blind randomised control trials that have demonstrated that serotonin 
agonists can reduce OCD symptoms (Antony & Swinson, 2001; Henin & Kendall,
1997). Consequently, such agents are often used as a treatment for adult OCD (Antony 
& Swinson, 2001).
There is some evidence to suggest that the serotonin hypothesis, and its associated 
treatments, may also be applicable to childhood OCD (Shafran, 2001). For example, in 
a multi-centre, double-blind, randomised control trial, a serotonin agonist led to a 
significantly greater improvement in children, aged 6 to 17, with OCD compared to 
control (March et al., 1998). Thus, the involvement of serotonin in the aetiology of 
OCD and the effectiveness of serotonin agonists as a treatment may be a commonality 
between the adult and child variants of the disorder. However, the side-effects that these 
medications can have on some children, for example triggering manic episodes 
(Shafran, 2001), indicates that care needs to be taken when they are prescribed to 
minors.
Other research has suggested that some childhood OCD may differ from that in adults 
because it is triggered by over-activity of the immune system (Garvey, Giedd & Swedo,
1998). However, this will not be considered in detail, since it remains controversial as 
to whether the resulting disorder should indeed be classified as OCD (Shafran, 2001 ).
Finally, cognitive-behavioural and neuro psychiatrie models of OCD are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, since they may be describing the same processes but at different 
levels (Henin & Kendall, 1997). However, further research is required in order to 
adequately integrate these approaches and their associated interventions (Antony & 
Swinson, 2001; Shafran, 2001).
A Summary o f the Comparison o f Childhood and Adult OCD
In conclusion, adult and childhood OCD share many symptoms, and while they appear 
to differ in terms of co-morbidity, gender-ratio and insight these are not necessarily 
fundamental discrepancies. There are substantial differences in cognitive-behavioural 
approaches to adult and childhood OCD, but more research is required to establish 
whether these are warranted. The serotonin-hypothesis appears to be applicable to
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adults and children, though care needs to be taken regarding childhood side-effects of 
medication. Finally, it is probably too simplistic to draw a sharp dichotomy between 
childhood and adult OCD. Rather, new research should focus on how OCD changes, if 
at all, across childhood and into adulthood, and on what treatments are effective for 
each stage of childhood (cf. Shafran, 1998).
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD)
According to DSM-IV, a central characteristic of Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) 
is a persistent, high-level of irrational anxiety and worry, that the sufferer finds hard to 
control and that causes them significant distress or impairment in their daily life 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). This worry needs to have occurred for the 
majority of the time over a period of at least six months, and in adults to have been 
accompanied by at least three of the following symptoms: restlessness, easily tired, 
concentration difficulties, irritability, muscle tension and disturbed sleep. Children are 
only required to exhibit one of these symptoms. In addition, the worry needs to be 
concerned with a range of domains, and the symptoms must not be attributable to the 
influence of a physiological substance or a general medical condition, and must not 
occur solely within the context of another mental disorder.
As with OCD, the comparison between the childhood and adult variants of this disorder 
will be separated into sections dealing with phenomenology, cognitive-behavioural 
approaches and neuro psychiatrie approaches; the latter two appearing to be the most 
prominent models in the literature (e.g. Rapee & Barlow, 2001 ; Wagner, 2001).
A Comparison o f the Phenomenology o f Childhood and Adult GAD
By definition, childhood and adult GAD meet the same DSM-IV criteria, with the caveat 
that adults need to show three of the symptoms associated with anxiety compared to one 
for children. Nor does the overall prevalence rate of around three percent appear to 
differ between adulthood and childhood (Rapee & Barlow, 2001).
However, an apparent phenomenological differences is that, in both clinical settings and 
in epidemiological studies, approximately two-third of adults with GAD are female 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000), while there was found to be an equal gender- 
ratio of children diagnosed as having GAD, following referral to an anxiety-clinic 
(Treadwell, Flannery-Schroeder & Kendall, 1995). One possible explanation for this 
apparent discrepancy is that boys with GAD may have been more likely to have been
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referred to a clinic than girls because they may have acted-out more. Alternatively, the 
discrepancy could have arisen if GAD has an earlier onset in males than females, 
because this would initially mask the two-to-one female-to-male bias. Either way, this 
discrepancy is not strong evidence of a fundamental difference between adult and 
childhood GAD.
Another apparent difference in phenomenology between childhood and adult OCD 
concerns the main content of the sufferers’ worries. Specifically, children with GAD 
often worry about school, while adults are more likely to worry about work (American 
Psychiatric Association, 20(X); Rapee & Barlow, 2001; Wagner, 2001). However, it 
seems likely that this simply reflects the difference in adult and child lifestyles, rather a 
fundamental difference in their GAD; if adults with GAD did still go to school they 
probably would worry about it.
To summarise, there are many similarities in the phenomenology of adulthood and 
childhood GAD. Moreover, the apparent differences in wony-content and gender- 
balance do not seem to be fundamental.
A Comparison o f Cognitive-Behavioural Approaches to Childhood and Adult GAD
For purposes of clarity. Wells’ (1995; 1997; 1999) cognitive-behavioural model of 
adult GAD will first be described before it is compared to childhood GAD. According to 
this model, which is illustrated in Figure 2, people with GAD have ‘positive meta­
beliefs’ concerning the benefits of worrying (e.g. ‘worrying means that I will 
prepared’). Consequently, in response to anxiety provoking triggering situations, they 
tend to use worrying as a coping strategy. This increases their frequency of ‘type I’ 
worries, which can be worries about anything except mental processes (e.g. ‘I might 
lose my job’ or I am going to get cancer’).
In contrast to people who worry but do not have GAD, sufferers are also hypothesised 
to have ‘negative meta-beliefs’ about worrying, which become activated by type I 
worries. An example of a negative meta-belief is: ‘my worrying is damaging me’. As a 
consequence, the sufferer starts to worry about their worrying, which is referred to as 
‘type II’ worrying. This type II worrying is maintained by safety behaviours, like the 
avoidance of situations that might trigger worries, since they prevent the sufferer from 
unlearning their negative meta-beliefs. It is also maintained by the sufferers’ attempts to
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Type 2 Worry 
(Meta-Worry)
Emotion
Behaviour
Thought
Control
Type 1 Worry
Trigger
Negative meta-beliefs activated
Positive meta-beliefs activated 
(Strategy selection)
Figure 2: A diagrammatic representation o f main aspects o f the current version o f Wells ’ 
cognitive-behavioural model o f GAD {adapted from Figure 8.0 in Wells, 1997). See the 
main text for an explanation o f its workings.
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control or suppress their worries, which may actually increase their frequency (cf. 
Salkovskis’ model of OCD), and by the generation of anxiety, which can trigger further 
worrying. On the basis of this model. Wells (1997) suggests that therapy should 
comprise cognitive and behavioural strategies primarily aimed at altering the sufferer’s 
positive and negative meta-beliefs about worry.
Because Wells’ model is relatively new, the evidence-base for it is currently weak (cf. 
Wells, 1999), and as yet no controlled trials of its associated therapy have been 
conducted. That said, some preliminary support is provided by a study (Wells & Carter,
1999) in which university students were given reliable measures of type I worry, type II 
worry, trait anxiety and the life-impactof their worrying. As was predicted on the basis 
of Wells’ model, there was a significant correlation between type II worrying (i.e. 
worry about worry) and life-impact, when the other factors were partial led out. While 
this is a promising start, it does not necessarily imply that type II woriy plays a critical 
causal role in GAD, not least because a non-clinical sample was used. Clearly more 
research is required.
Having briefly reviewed a prominent cognitive-behavioural approach to adult GAD and 
its evidence-base, the equivalent approach to childhood GAD and its empirical support 
will now be discussed, before the two are compared. Cognitive-behavioural models in 
the childhood domain appear to be largely limited to the hypothesis that childhood GAD 
is in part maintained by a cognitive bias to perceive stimuli as threatening and by safety 
behaviours, like avoidance (Wagner, 2001).
This hypothesis receives some support from a study of children aged between 9 and 14 
and diagnosed as having an Anxiety Disorder (Vasey, Daleiden, Williams & Brown, 
1995). This study comprised many trials, on each of which the participants were shown 
a pair of words. One of these words was then replaced by a dot, and the children 
pressed a button as soon as they saw it. It was found that the children reacted 
significantly faster when the dot appeared in a location previously occupied by a 
threatening word (e.g. murder) than a location following a non-threatening word. 
Furthermore, this bias was not evident in a matched non-anxious control group.
One interpretation of these results is that the anxious children paid more attention to the 
threatening words and so were quicker to detect their replacement by a dot, while the 
control group paid similar attention to both types of words. Therefore, as predicted by 
the cognitive-behavioural model of childhood GAD, there appears to be a correlation 
between Anxiety Disorders and a cognitive-bias towards threatening stimuli, at least for
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9 to 14 year old children. Of course, this result does not imply that this bias is a 
maintaining factor in childhood GAD, since it could be a consequence of anxiety rather 
than a cause. Nor does it speak to GAD in children under the age of 9. So, clearly more 
research into this issue is required. If possible, this should involve a longitudinal study 
of children thought to be vulnerable to GAD, in which their cognitive-biases and beliefs 
are periodically assessed. The cognitive-behavioural model would then be supported if 
the development of anxiety-related beliefs and biases was found to precede the onset of 
GAD. Nevertheless, the current finding is still consistent with the cognitive-behavioural 
hypothesis.
Another source of support is provided by a study in which 79 children, aged between 7 
and 14 and with a diagnosis of an Anxiety Disorder, were randomly allocated to a 
group-based cognitive-behavioural treatment or a waiting-list control condition (Barrett, 
Dadds & Rapee, 1996). The treatment primarily involved exposure to feared stimuli and 
restructuring of cognitive beliefs and biases. Post-treatment reassessment of the 
children, by clinicians who were blind to the their treatment condition, suggested that 
significantly more of the cognitive-behavioural group no longer had an Anxiety 
Disorder than the control group (57.1% vs. 26.0%). This treatment gain did not reliably 
vary with the type of Anxiety Disorder and was maintained at a 12-month follow-up. 
Obviously, more research is required to elucidate the active ingredients of this treatment, 
preferably with separate conditions for GAD and a wider age-range. Nevertheless, the 
current result suggests that the cognitive-behavioural theory and therapy of childhood 
Anxiety Disorders, including GAD, is a useful approach to these conditions for at least 
some children over the age of 7.
From the previous discussion it is clear that there are substantial differences between the 
cognitive-behavioural approach to childhood GAD and Wells’ theory and therapy of 
adult GAD. Perhaps the most notable of these is the suggestion that type II worry (i.e. 
worry about worry) plays a central role in the aetiology of adult but not childhood 
GAD. Indeed, the developmental literature could be taken to support a distinction of this 
form, at least between young children and adults, because it suggests that young 
children are unlikely to have the capacity to worry about worry (Carr, 1999, chap. 1). 
However, this remains speculation until the role of type II worry in childhood GAD has 
been more directly, empirically examined. And, more generally, the incompleteness of 
the evidence-bases for both the cognitive-behavioural approach to adulthood GAD and 
to childhood GAD means that it is currently unclear whether the intra-psychic 
psychological processes underlying the two actually fundamentally differ.
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However, a substantial difference between cognitive-behavioural approaches to 
childhood and adult GAD that currently has some empirical support concerns the role of 
the family in treatment. Specifically, in the randomised control trial of a group-based 
cognitive-behavioural intervention for childhood Anxiety Disorders, detailed above 
there was an extra treatment condition. This comprised the cognitive-behaviour 
intervention and also involved teaching the children’s families how to support the 
treatment (Barrett et al., 1996). It was found that, for children aged 7 to 10, this 
intervention was significantly more effective at reducing symptoms than cognitive- 
behaviour group-therapy alone. No reliable difference was observed for older children 
(11-14). From this it seems reasonable to conclude that the treatment of Anxiety 
Disorders, including GAD, in younger children should place substantially more 
emphasis on family factors than interventions with older children (and so, by 
extrapolation, than interventions with adults).
In sum, the current dearth of evidence makes it difficult to say whether the intra-psychic 
psychological processes underlying childhood and adult GAD fundamentally differ. 
However, there is a suggestion that family factors may play a greater role in GAD for 
younger children.
A Comparison o f Neuro-Psychiatric Approaches to Childhood and Adult GAD
Neuro psychiatrie approaches will be considered in less detail since they fall more 
within the domain of psychiatry than psychology. An influential neuro psychiatrie 
model of adult Anxiety Disorders^ including GAD, is Gray’s (1982) theoiy (Jetty, 
Charney & Goddard, 2001; Rapee & Barlow, 2001). On the basis of this, GAD can be 
viewed as arising from abnormal functioning in the septo-hippocampal region of the 
brain, which is hypothesised to be involved in the generation of anxiety (Rapee & 
Barlow, 2001). Consistent with this, medications that are thought to reduce septo- 
hippocampal activity appear to alleviate adult GAD, at least in the short-term (Jetty et 
al., 2001; Rapee & Barlow, 2001). Unfortunately, a detailed discussion of this and 
other evidence pertaining to Gray’s model is beyond the scope of this essay (but see 
Jetty et al., 2001, for a review).
Turning to childhood GAD, initial functional magnetic-resonance imaging data suggest 
that in 8 to 16 year olds with GAD the brain regions involved may be similar to those in 
adults (De Beilis et al., 2000). However, this finding requires replication because of the 
small sample-size (n=12) and incomplete age range of the study. With regard to the 
effects of adult GAD medications, a double-blind randomised control trial conducted on
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8 to 16 year olds found only a non significant trend for improvement in anxiety 
symptoms following treatment with a benzodiazapine (Simeon et al., 1992). However, 
this failure to achieve significance could have been due to the small sample size (n=30) 
and relatively short length of treatment (cf. Wagner, 2001). Therefore, more research is 
needed to establish whether Gray’s model and its associated interventions are also 
applicable to childhood GAD.
Summary o f the Comparison o f Childhood and Adult GAD
To summarise, childhood and adult GAD have many symptoms in common, and the 
apparent differences between them in terms of gender-balance and worry-content do not 
appear to be fundamental. While the currently most prominent cognitive-behavioural 
approaches to childhood and adult GAD do substantially differ, the only material 
difference that is presently supported empirically is that the treatment of younger 
children should include a greater involvement of their family. Finally, more research is 
required to determine whether there are fundamental neuro psychiatrie differences 
between childhood and adult GAD.
Conclusions
The aim of this essay has been to examine whether GAD and OCD fundamentally differ 
between childhood and adulthood. It has been argued that the childhood versions of 
these disorders share many symptoms with their adult counterparts by virtue of the fact 
they are classified as the same disorders. And, the apparent differences in 
phenomenology between the adulthood and childhood conditions need not imply 
fundamental differences in underlying processes. Furthermore, while current cognitive- 
behaviour theories and therapies for OCD and GAD do substantially differ between 
childhood and adulthood, it remains a matter for future research to determine whether 
these differences are empirically justified. The exception to this is the finding that 
cognitive-behavioural interventions for younger children with Anxiety Disorders benefit 
from greater family involvement; something that is most likely a reflection of the greater 
dependence of a young child on their family. This can be viewed as a fundamental 
difference between the treatment of younger children and other sufferers, since it 
significantly impacts upon the effectiveness of the intervention.
( With regard to neuro psychiatrie approaches, which are the other prominent class of 
theoiy in the literature, for OCD as yet there is little evidence of a fundamental 
difference in the neurological processes underlying the disorder in children and adults.
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Furthermore, both groups appear benefit from serotonin agonists; although, extra 
regard needs to be paid to the side-effects of these medications in children. As for GAD, 
there is currently insufficient research into the neuro psychiatry of the childhood 
condition to permit even preliminary conclusions regarding any differences with 
adulthood. These neuro psychiatrie approaches should be seen as complementary to 
psychological ones, and will hopefully be meaningfully integrated with them, 
eventually.
Finally, given that, in general, development occurs gradually over childhood, rather 
than suddenly at the age of 18, a more meaningful direction for future research will be 
to examine how GAD, OCD and other Anxiety Disorders change over the course of 
childhood, and how interventions should be varied to reflect these changes. Moreover, 
assessment methods should be better developed to establish which forms of 
intervention, be they cognitive, behavioural, systemic or pharmacological, will be most 
effective for a particular client. In this way, we will hopefully become more effective 
and efficient at alleviating the prevalent and often debilitating conditions that are the 
Anxiety Disorders.
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NEUROPSYCHOLOGY SPECIALIST ESSAY:
’A client's performance on any particular neuropsychological test, or 
sub-test, will be influenced by a variety of mental processes. 
Furthermore, their performance will be affected by extraneous 
factors, such as culture, test anxiety, and how much sleep they have 
had. Therefore, it is not possible to accurately infer an impairment in 
a specific mental process from a client's performance on such 
measures.' Critically discuss this proposition with reference to the 
evidence base for the use of two or more common neuropsychological
measures.
July 2002
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Introduction
Many different conditions, including cerebral vascular accident, head injury, 
dementia, infection and psychiatric illness, can lead to deficits in brain functioning 
(Lezak, 1995). One role of the clinical neuropsychologist is to determine the nature of 
the resulting deficits (and, as importantly, those processes that have been spared), 
since such information may be useful to plan and monitor rehabilitation, for legal 
purposes, or in identifying the underlying aetiology, if it has not been established (cf. 
Vanderploeg, 2000a). Typically, a neuropsychological assessment will draw on the 
patient’s history, their behaviour during the assessment, and their performance on 
various psychometric measures, to determine whether there are deficits in their mental 
processes; on occasion, information from other sources, including carers or relatives, 
scans and in vivo observations may also be used (Lincoln & Brooks, 1992; 
Vanderploeg, 2000a).
If the findings of a neuropsychological assessment are inaccurate then the detrimental 
consequences could include rehabilitation programmes being inappropriate, patients 
suffering from needless psychological distress because they have been given an over 
pessimistic prognosis, or courts being misinformed and so coming to unjust verdicts in 
compensation cases. It is therefore concerning that there are a number of possible, 
prima facie valid, reasons to question the accuracy of neuropsychological assessments. 
Firstly, a sceptic might argue that our understanding of brain functioning is so poor 
that it is not possible to accurately identify a deficit in a particular process, because we 
do not know what processes exist or how they interrelate; an examination of the 
diversity of conflicting psychological and neuropsychological theories that are 
currently prevalent in the literature should be sufficient to convince the reader that this 
is not a trivial concern. A sceptic might further argue that, even if our current 
understanding of brain functioning is a sufficiently good approximation to be 
clinically useful, performance on any one neuropsychological measure is invariably 
influenced by a variety mental processes (cf. Cimino, 2000), making it difficult to 
accurately decide which specific process has been impaired. Worse still, they might 
argue that a patient’s test performance is so clouded by extraneous factors, like test
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anxiety (cf. Dutke & Joachim, 2001), cultural bias (cf. Reynolds, 2000) and whether 
they are having an 'off day', that it is rendered virtually meaningless.
Clearly then, there are sufficient prima facie concerns, over whether it is possible for a 
neuropsychological assessment to accurately identify a deficit in a specific mental 
process, to warrant the more detailed examination of this issue that will be embarked 
upon here. This examination will focus on three main issues: first, whether we have 
sufficiently good models of brain functioning to make it reasonable to assume that 
certain mental processes ‘exist’; second, the reliability and validity with which some 
of the most commonly used neuropsychological tests can identify deficits in these 
assumed processes; and third, the reliability and validity of clinical 
neuropsychologists’ interpretative skills. These issues will now be considered in turn.
Are our models of brain function adequate to support neuropsychological 
assessments?
A necessary prerequisite to determining whether a patient has a deficit in a specific 
mental process is to have a satisfactory model of the processes that they may have 
deficits in. Clearly, a detailed discussion of all the evidence that pertains to 
neuropsychological models of brain functioning is well beyond the scope of this 
essay. Therefore, the focus here will be on one specific example, in the hope that this 
will convince the reader that it is, in principle, possible to use the existing evidence- 
base to come to clinically useful hypotheses concerning the delineation of different 
processes in the ‘normal’ brain. This example is the widely accepted distinction 
between a short-term memory, that is thought to typically store information for a few 
seconds (and is sometimes also called ‘working’ memory or ‘primary’ memory), and a 
memory processes that stores information over the longer-term (e.g. Baddeley, 1997, 
chap. 3; Hodges, 1994, p6; Kapur, 1997).
Some of the earliest good evidence for the short-term/long-term distinction came from 
the ‘free-recair task (Postman & Phillips, 1965). In this task the participants are read 
or shown a list of words, and then asked to recall them in any order. If the recall phase 
immediately follows the presentation phase then the participants are found to be
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particularly good at remembering the last few words on the list; this is known as the 
‘recency-effect’ (Baddeley, 1997, chap. 3). However, the recency-effect is observed to 
disappear if the participants have to perform an irrelevant distracter task for 15 
seconds in between the presentation of the words and being asked to recall them 
(Postman & Phillips, 1965).
This finding can be explained if it is assumed the words are initially stored in a short­
term memory for a few seconds, before becoming consolidated in a longer-term 
memory. According to this account, the recency effect occurs because the last few 
words in the list are still held in short-term memory when subjects are required to 
immediately recall them. And, it explains why the recency effect does not occur on 
delayed recall, because the short-term memory is not able to hold the words over a 
longer delay, when rehearsal is prevented by a distracter task.'
Further evidence for the short-term/long-term distinction is provided by a double­
dissociation in the effects that brain lesions can have on these hypothesised aspects of 
memory. Specifically, following brain damage to hippocampal and neighbouring 
regions, some patients have been found to be impaired on delayed recall, while 
showing a normal recency effect (Baddeley & Warrington, 1970). And, the reverse 
pattern of impairment has been observed in other patients, who have neocortical 
lesions (e.g. KF; Shallice & Warrington, 1970). The most obvious account of this 
data is that in the former cases the patients’ long-term memory was damaged and their 
short-term memory spared, while in the latter case the reverse had occurred. 
Furthermore, while such evidence in isolation is open to the criticism that we cannot 
confidently generalise from damaged brains to normal ones, taken together with the 
previously mentioned studies that used participants without brain damage it provides a
‘ This is not the only possible explanation, since a unitary memory system in which 
memory traces decay exponentially could also produce a recency-effect. Specifically, 
if the memory traces of the words in the list exponentially decayed (cf. McClelland & 
Rumelhart, 1986) then it would be predicted that the last few words in the list would 
be better remembered on immediate recall because they would have decayed the least. 
And, the disappearance of the recency effect over a delay would be explained by the 
fact that traces for the last few words would also have decayed during the delay. 
However, this unitary system cannot explain the double-dissociation that will shortly 
be discussed.
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reasonably convincing case for a distinction between a short-term and long-term 
memory store.
This discussion may have seemed somewhat removed from the work of the clinical 
neuropsychologist. However, it is of central importance, because it demonstrates that 
it is possible to use the existing evidence base to come to reasonable working 
hypotheses about how the brain is functionally and anatomically delineated into 
different processes. And, working hypotheses of this sort are vital to the clinical 
neuropsychologist because they provide a framework within which to understand the 
cognitive deficits and strengths shown by patients. That said, it is also worth noting 
that there is substantial disagreement in the literature as to the precise nature of many 
aspects of brain functioning. Therefore, clinical neuropsychological conclusions about 
deficits in particular processes should always have the status of evidence-based 
working hypotheses, rather than ‘facts’.
The accuracy of neuropsychological measures of mental processes.
Thus, having rebutted the first concern raised by our hypothetical sceptic, we can 
move on to address their second argument, which was that neuropsychological tests 
are not able to accurately detect a deficit in a particular mental process, because 
performance on any one neuropsychological measure is invariably influenced by a 
variety mental processes and by extraneous factors, like test anxiety, cultural bias and 
whether the patient is having ‘an off day’. Due to space constraints, the focus here will 
be on examining the veracity of these claims in relation to two of the most widely 
used, and heavily researched, batteries of tests: the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 
Third Edition (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997a), and the Wechsler Memory Scale, Third 
Edition (WMS-III; Wechsler, 1997b). To set the context for this discussion, it is worth 
first briefly describing these batteries and how they are used clinically.
The WAIS-III and WMS-III in clinical practice
The WAlS-111 comprises thirteen sub-tests, which measure the examinee’s ability in a 
variety of domains that are thought to reflect different aspects of ‘intelligence’, while
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the WMS-III comprises sub-tests that are supposed to assay different aspects of 
memory. In both cases, the examinee’s raw score on each sub-test can be compared to 
the performance of people in their age band in the standardization sample, by 
converting it to an age-scaled score. The sub-tests’ age-scaled scores can also be used 
to calculate a variety of index scores and quotients, which purport to reflect different 
aspects of intelligence or memory (Wechsler, 1997a; 1997b).
In order to identify deficits in the functioning of their patient’s mental processes, the 
clinical neuropsychologist will typically use the WAIS-III or WMS-III in two ways, 
(cf. Lezak, 1995, chap. 4). First, they will look at the discrepancies between their 
patient’s performances on the different sub-tests (or index scores), to see if their 
performance on one or more of the sub-tests (or index scores) is abnormally below 
that for the remainder of the battery (cf. Kaufman & Lichtenberger, 1999). They can 
then use this data to generate hypotheses about which of their patient’s mental 
process(es) are likely to be impaired. In addition, the clinical neuropsychologist can 
compare their patient’s performance on the sub-tests, index scores and quotients, to 
their premorbid level of functioning, to see if it has significantly declined in any areas 
(Lezak, 1995, chap. 4). Ideally, the premorbid baseline will comprise an earlier 
administration of the same test. In the absence of this, the patient’s educational and 
occupational history, and their post-morbid performance on tests that are less sensitive 
to brain damage (e.g. the National Adult Reading Test; Nelson, 1982), can be used to 
estimate their premorbid level of functioning (Schinka & Vanderploeg, 2000). As 
before, if the performance comparison produces a pattern of deficits, the clinical 
neuropsychologist can then generate hypotheses as to what underlying mental 
processes may be impaired.
Reliability o f the WMS-III and WAIS-III
Having described how, in theory, the WAIS-III and WMS-III can be used to identify 
deficits in mental processes, we are now in a position to consider whether our 
hypothetical sceptic is justified to doubt the accuracy these methods. In order to be 
considered accurate, the first criterion that a measure needs to pass is that it must be 
reliable (Kline, 1986, chap. 1). Specifically, the items that comprise the measure
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should be internally consistent (inter-item reliability), the measure should give similar 
results when it is reapplied to the same examinee at a later date (test-retest reliability), 
and the measure should give similar results when used by different examiners on the 
same examinee (inter-rater reliability). For the Wechsler scales, it is appropriate to 
consider these forms of reliability for each sub-test separately, since each sub-test is 
measuring performance on a different type of task.
The inter-item reliability for the majority of the sub-tests was calculated using the data 
generated by giving the WMS-III and WAIS-III to large samples (1000-h) that were 
representative of the United States population, as judged by comparison to census data 
(Psychological Corporation, 1997, chap. 2). Each examinee’s data from a sub-test was 
divided into odd and even numbered items and the correlation in performance between 
these pools was calculated. These correlations provide an estimate of inter-item 
reliability since the examinee’s would be expected to perform similarly on the odd and 
even numbered items within a sub-test, if that sub-test is internally consistent. The 
resulting inter-item reliabilities for the WMS-III and WAIS-III sub-tests were equal to 
or above the .7 level that is conventionally regarded as being satisfactory 
(Psychological Corporation, 1997, chap. 3). For a few sub-tests, inter-item reliability 
was not calculated because performance on the items was not expected to be internally 
consistent (Psychological Corporation, 1997, chap. 3); for example, on the WMS-III 
sub-tests that involved a recognition phase, examinee’s would not necessarily be 
expected to perform similarly on the recognition trials when a target stimulus was 
presented as on the trials when a distracter stimulus was presented.
The second form of reliability, namely test-retest reliability, was calculated for the 
sub-test scaled scores, index-scores and quotients, by giving the batteries twice to a 
smaller sample of examinees, and calculating the correlations between the scores on 
the two occasions. The index-scores and quotients showed high correlations and the 
majority of the sub-test scaled scores reached the level conventionally considered as 
satisfactory (Psychological Corporation, 1997, chap. 3). However, high correlations 
alone do not imply good test-retest reliability, since high test-retest correlations can 
occur when the absolute levels of the scores on the two tests are different, as explained 
in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 : A graph illustrating how the test-retest correlation o f  a measure can be 
perfect (i.e. 1) even if  there is a practice effect. The filled squares represent a 
hypothetical case in which the test scores produced by the ten participants are the 
same when they are tested at time one and time two. Clearly, in this case the 
correlation between the two sets o f  test scores is 1. However, the test-retest 
correlation is also 1 for the case illustrated by the open circles, in which all the 
participants scored 10 points better the second time they were tested, due to practice. 
The correlation is I in both cases because the points fall perfectly on the line.
80
Furthermore, closer examination of the WMS-III and WAIS-III reveals that there was 
a trend for examinees to perform better the second time they were tested than the first, 
presumably because they had become practised at the sub-tests. However, from a 
clinical point of view this is not a fatal flaw, since some allowance can be made for 
the effects of practice in the interpretation of the scores, by using the data reported in 
the scales’ technical manual (Psychological Corporation, 1997, chap. 3).
The third form of reliability is inter-rater reliability. The was assessed by giving the 
WMS-III and WAIS-III test protocols from a sub set of the standardization sample to 
multiple examiners to independently score. The correlation between the different 
scorers was very high (i.e. >.9). One caveat is that the scorers who participated in this 
study were highly experienced and had received specialist training (Psychological 
Corporation, 1997, chap. 3). It would be interesting to see if such high correlations 
were obtained between clinicians in the field. Nevertheless, based on the current 
evidence there is little reason to doubt the inter-rater reliability of the WMS-III and 
WAIS-III.
To summarise, by and large the sub-test scaled scores, indices and quotients produced 
by the WAIS-III and WMS-III show satisfactory levels of inter-item, test-retest and 
inter-rater reliability. That said, even with a satisfactory reliability coefficient of .7, 
over half the variance in the scores is due to error (since 1-.7^=.51; Howell, 1992, p. 
239). This is not surprising, given the extraneous factors, like test-anxiety and culture, 
could have affected the performance of examinees in the standardization sample.
However, this degree of error is not so great a concern, because the WMS-III and 
WAIS-III provide confidence intervals for the indexes and quotients, and provide data 
to determine whether discrepancies between sub-tests reach significance. Therefore, 
provided that the clinical neuropsychologist utilises these statistics, and provided that 
the level of extraneous factors is similar to that which occurred in the standardization 
sample, our sceptic is wrong to think that extraneous factors render the results of the 
WMS-III and WAIS-III virtually meaningless. The implications for clinical practice 
of this are that the clinical neuropsychologist should use the confidence intervals when 
they interpret the WAIS-III and WMS-III, and that they should be especially cautious
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in their interpretation when the extraneous factors fall outside the range that probably 
occurred in the standardization sample (e.g. if someone is highly anxious during 
testing or if they do not have English as their first language^).
Validity o f the WMS-III and WAIS-III
The sceptic could still argue that, even if the WMS-III and WAIS-III are reliable with 
common levels of extraneous factors, it remains to be demonstrated that they actually 
measure what they purport to measure; rephrased in the language of psychometrics, it 
needs to be shown they are ‘valid’ (Kline, 1986, chap. I). It is difficult to demonstrate 
test validity directly, because if it were possible to validate the WAIS-III and WMS- 
III against fully satisfactory measures of the mental process concerned, then the 
WAIS-III and WMS-III would not have been developed since those measures could 
have been used instead. Therefore, demonstrating validity is a process of 
accumulating convergent indirect evidence from different sources (cf. Kline, 1986, 
chap. I). For the Wechsler scales the main sources of evidence are ‘construct- 
validity’, ‘convergent/divergent-validity’ and ‘sensitivity’ (Psychological Corporation, 
1997, chap. 4). These will be considered in turn.
‘Construct-validity’ refers to the extent to which the pattern of performance on the test 
is consistent with the hypotheses about mental processes upon which its design was 
constructed (Kline, 1986, chap. 1). One of the ways in which this was assessed for the 
Wechsler batteries was by using confirmatory factor analysis (Psychological 
Corporation, 1997, chap. 4). This is a statistical procedure that examines the 
correlations between performances on the different sub-tests, to determine whether the 
pattern of inter-relationships is consistent with the predictions that were made while 
the test was being designed (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1992).
For example, recall that evidence was presented earlier to suggest that it is a 
reasonable working hypothesis that people have both a working (or short-term)
 ^The effect of cultural factors on neuropsychological assessment is a huge area, which 
it is not possible to do justice to here, due to space constraints (but see Fletcher- 
Janzen, Strickland & Reynolds, 2000).
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memory and a longer-term memory. The construction of the WMS-III drew upon this 
hypothesis, because some sub-tests were deliberately included to measure working- 
memory and some were designed to assay various forms of longer-term memory. 
Therefore, in order for the test to show construct-validity with respect to this 
hypothesis, performance on the sub-tests designed to measure working-memory 
should be highly inter-correlated, but show lower correlations with performance on 
the other sub-tests. A confirmatory factor analysis, on the data from the 
standardization of the WMS-III, demonstrated that this was the case, and thus 
provided support for the construct validity of the WMS-III with regard to this 
hypothesis (Psychological Corporation, 1997, chap. 4).
In addition, based on the theoretical and experimental literature on memory, and 
studies of the precursor battery to the WMS-III (i.e. the WMS-R), the designers of the 
WMS-III hypothesised that it would also assay auditory (verbal) immediate memory, 
auditory (verbal) delayed memory, visual immediate memory and visual delayed 
memory (Psychological Corporation, 1997, chap. 4). By and large the factor analysis 
confirmed that inter-correlations between performances on the various sub-tests were 
consistent with these predicted factors, lending further support to the construct 
validity of the WMS-III
Turning to the WAIS-III, largely based on the factor structures of preceding Wechsler 
intelligence scales (i.e. the WAIS and WAIS-R), it was predicted that the sub-tests of 
this battery would group into four factors, entitled: ‘verbal-comprehension’, 
‘perceptual-organization’, ‘working-memory’ and ‘processing-speed’. At least for 
most age bands of the standardization sample, this four-factor model provided the best 
fit to the data of all the factor models that were tested (Psychological Corporation, 
1997, chap. 4).
However, while the factor analytic approach generally supports the construct-validity 
of the Wechsler scales, it has a number of limitations. First, for both the WMS-III and 
the WAIS-III, alternative models of the underlying factors were also compatible with 
the data from the standardization sample (e.g. Psychological Corporation, 1997, p. 
112-114). Second, even if performance on a group of sub-tests is highly inter­
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correlated, the sub-tests do not have to be measuring the same underlying mental 
process(es). An alternative is that the inter-correlated sub-tests are each sensitive to a 
different set of mental processes, but performance on the sub-tests correlates because 
all of the underlying mental processes have been similarly effected by a common 
influence, for example level of education (cf. Mackintosh, 1998). Third, given the last 
point, it is therefore important that the theoretical and empirical basis upon which the 
factors were predicted is strong. However, it is arguable that this was not the case for 
the WAIS-III, since the predicted factors were largely based on the factor structure of 
previous Wechsler intelligence scales, rather than theoretical models about cognitive 
processes (Psychological Corporation, 1997, chap. 4). Furthermore, even with the 
WMS-III, the choice of predicted factors would depend, to some extent, upon which 
theories of memory you favour. Therefore, the results of the factor analyses only 
provide limited support for the construct-validity of the WAIS-III and WMS-III. 
However, this is not a fatal problem, since test validity can be demonstrated through 
the convergence of various strands of evidence, that by themselves are inconclusive.
The second ‘strand’ of validity, which has been calculated for the index-scores of the 
Wechsler scales, is ‘convergent/divergent-validity’. In order for a measure to show 
satisfactory convergent/divergent-validity, the examinees’ scores on it should 
correlate with their performance on other psychometric tests that are thought to be 
assaying the same mental processes, and correlate to a lesser extent with their 
performance on tests thought to be measuring different processes (Psychological 
Corporation, 1997, chap. 4). For the WMS-III, the convergent/divergent-validity was 
assessed by calculating correlations between examinees’ index scores and their 
performance on a variety of tests, including the attention/mental-control index of the 
MicroCog (Powell, Kaplan, Whitla, Weintraub, Gatlin & Funkenstein, 1993), the 
California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT; Delis, Kramer, Kaplan & Ober, 1987) and 
the Rey-O (Rey, 1959; cited in Psychological Corporation, 1997, chap. 4).
For the working-memory index of the WMS-III to show good convergent/divergent- 
validity, it should correlate relatively highly with the attention/mental-control index of
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the MicroCog, since this is though to be sensitive to aspects of working-memory^, and 
have lower correlations with CVLT and Rey-O, since these are thought to be sensitive 
to other forms of memory (Psychological Corporation, 1997, chap. 4). The results 
were consistent with this prediction, and thus support the convergent/di vergent- 
validity of the working-memory index of the WMS-III. S im ilarly, the 
convergent/divergent-validity of the auditory (verbal) memory indices was supported 
because they correlated more strongly with the scores from the CVLT, which is 
supposed to be a test of verbal memory, than the other tests. However, the visual- 
memory indices did not correlate more highly with the supposed test of visual- 
memory (i.e. the Rey-O) than the other index scores did. This does not necessarily 
mean that the visual-memory indices are poor measures of visual-memory, because it 
may be that the Rey-O is not a good measure of visual-memory (Psychological 
Corporation, 1997, chap. 4). However, it does mean that more research is needed in 
order to establish the convergent/divergent-validity of the visual-memory indices of 
the WMS-III.
When the convergent/divergent-validity of the WAIS-III was investigated in a similar 
manner, the results also largely supported the validity of its four primary index scores 
(for details see: Psychological Corporation, 1997, chap. 4). Thus, apart from the 
visual-memory indices in the WMS-III, the index scores of these Wechsler scales 
show satisfactory convergent/divergent-validity.
A few studies have also investigated the convergent/divergent-validity of some of the 
sub-tests of the WMS-III and WAIS-III; which is important because some clinical 
neuropsychologists use the sub-tests as measures of mental processes (cf. Kaufman, & 
Lichtenberger, 1999). For example, Groth-Marnat and Teal (2000) have shown that 
performance on the block design sub-test correlates moderately well with performance 
on tests of everyday spatial abilities (e.g. the Standardized Road Map Test of 
Direction Sense; Money, 1976), while a test of language (i.e. the National Adult
 ^At first sight it may appear odd for a measure of ‘attention and mental control’ to be 
sensitive to working memory. However, Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) model of 
working memory contains a ‘central-executive’, which controls mental operations and 
has an attentional system.
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Reading Test; Nelson, 1982) does not. However, the convergent/divergent-validity of 
many of the WAIS-III and WMS-III sub-tests has yet to be adequately investigated 
(Groth-Marnat & Teal, 2000). Therefore, more research is needed to establish the 
convergent/divergent-validity of the Wechsler scales at the sub-test level, and, in the 
meantime, clinicians should interpret individual sub-tests scores with considerable 
caution.
The final ‘strand’ of validity that will be considered here concerns the Wechsler 
scales’ sensitivity to the impairments in mental processes that accompany a number of 
neurological conditions. One condition that was analysed was Alzheimer’s disease, 
the early-stage symptoms of which can include impairment in the ability to learn new 
information, while old learning is relatively spared (Macciochi & Barth, 1996). The 
Wechsler scales demonstrated sensitivity to these symptoms, since a sample of 
examinees diagnosed with probable Alzheimer’s disease showed a substantial 
impairment in their performance on the WMS-III indices (which are sensitive to new 
learning) while their performance on the verbal-comprehension index of the WAIS-III 
(which predominantly depends on old learning) was relatively spared. The WMS-III 
and WAIS-III showed similar sensitivity to the primary symptoms of Huntingdon’s 
disease, Parkinson’s disease and Korsakoff’s syndrome, and to the sequelae of 
traumatic brain injury (Psychological Corporation, 1997, chap. 4).
However, the results from these samples of examinees with neurological disorders 
have to be treated with some caution, for a number of reasons. First, the sample sizes 
were quite small for each condition (<36), so the samples may not have been 
representative. Second, for some of the conditions, for example Alzheimer’s disease, 
it was not certain that the entire sample had the condition, due to the fact that a 
definitive diagnosis could only be made on post-mortem. And, third, the premorbid 
level of functioning of the participants was not estimated in much detail. Therefore, 
while the results suggest that the WAIS-III and WMS-III are sensitive to some of the 
deficits in mental processes caused by neurological conditions, more research is 
required to overcome the methodological problems that have been identified.
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To summarise, factor analyses provided only limited support for the construct-validity 
of the WAIS-III and WMS-III index scores; the main problem being the lack of 
generally agreed models of memory and intelligence upon which predictions about the 
factor structure could be based. In contrast, apart from the visual-memory indices in 
the WMS-III, the index scores of the WMS-III and WAIS-III showed satisfactory 
convergent/divergent-validity, though further research is required to investigate the 
convergent/divergent-validity of individual sub-tests. Finally, initial explorations 
suggest that the Wechsler scales are sensitive to some of the main cognitive deficits 
produced by a variety of neurological conditions, though these findings need to be 
replicated on larger, more representative samples.
Given this, to what extent is our sceptic correct to claim that the WMS-III and WAIS- 
III cannot be used to accurately identify impairment in a specific mental process? 
Well, clearly a deficit in performance on a WMS-III or WAIS-III index score or sub­
test cannot be automatically taken to imply impairment in a particular mental process. 
This is because performance on each index score or sub-test is obviously dependent 
on a number of mental processes. For example, a deficit on the working-memory 
index of the WMS-III could occur because the examinee has an impaired working 
memory or, amongst other possibilities, because of visual problems, since one of the 
sub-tests that contributes to the index has a visual component (Psychological 
Corporation, chap. 2). Therefore, the three strands of validity taken together suggest 
that, apart from the visual-memory indices, the index scores provide meaningful 
information about the functioning of sets of mental processes.
The clinical implication of this is that it is not sufficient to rely upon one index score 
to identify a deficit in a particular mental process. Rather, hypotheses about which 
mental processes have been impaired need to draw on information from a variety of 
sources, including the patient’s history and performance on other psychometric 
instruments, whose validity and reliability has been established in a similar manner to 
that described above (Vanderploeg, 2000b). These hypotheses should then be tested, 
by making predictions about how the patient should perform on other psychometric 
tests and seeing if these are confirmed.
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Clearly then, the interpretative skills of the clinical neuropsychologist play a critical 
role in the assessment process. Therefore, in order to convince our sceptic of the 
accuracy of such assessments, we need to provide evidence for the reliability and 
validity of these skills.
The reliability and validity of clinical neuropsychologists ' interpretative skills.
Considering reliability first, Heaton, Grant, Anthony and Lehman (1981) measured 
this by giving two clinical neuropsychologists WAIS, and other, test results for 150 
patients, some of whom had a verified brain lesion and some of whom had no 
detectible lesion. Both neuropsychologists were independently asked interpret the test 
results for each patient, and to judge whether they had a cognitive impairment or not. 
Garb and Schramke’s (1996) reanalysis of the data revealed that the inter-rater 
reliability was high (.86).
The extent to which we can generalise from these findings is limited, since only two 
clinical neuropsychologists were involved and they were only making one type of 
judgement with one class patient. However, this problem is to some extent mitigated 
by the fact that studies employing other neuropsychologists, making other judgement, 
have shown similar levels reliability (for a review see Garb & Schramke, 1996).
Turning to validity, in a meta-analysis of studies that employed similar designs to 
Heaton et al., it was found that neuropsychologists were able to identify patients with 
verified brain lesions with a relatively high accuracy (>78% correct; Garb & 
Schramke, 1996). However, both the validity and reliability results must still be 
treated with some caution, because it is unclear whether the skill levels of the clinical 
neuropsychologists in these studies are equivalent to those of clinical 
neuropsychologists in general, and whether the fact that their interpretations were 
being analysed made them put more care into the process than they otherwise would. 
Thus, more research is required to establish the applicability of these findings to 
clinical neuropsychologists in general. But the existing evidence does supports the 
quality of clinical neuropsychologists’ judgements.
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Conclusions
In conclusion, current evidence does not support the position that was advanced by 
our hypothetical sceptic in the introduction. Rather, it suggests that there is sufficient 
consensus in the neuropsychology literature to support clinically useful hypotheses 
about how to functionally and anatomically delineate mental processes; that the 
majority of the WMS-III and WAIS-III index scores are reliable and valid measures of 
sets of mental processes; and that there is some support for the validity and reliability 
of the interpretations that clinical neuropsychologists make. Thus, it is reasonable to 
conclude that clinical neuropsychologists should be able to generate clinically useful 
working hypotheses about which mental process(es) their patients have deficits in, so 
long as they follow a hypothesis-testing approach that draws on information from a 
variety of sources, use confidence intervals in the interpretation of test scores and do 
not rely too heavily on scores whose reliability or validity has not been demonstrated 
(e.g. WMS-III and WAIS-III sub-test scores). Finally, as has been identified at many 
points in this essay, more research is required. Perhaps the most important task for this 
research is to establish what factors improve the reliability and validity of 
neuropsychological assessments; since such information could provide the basis for 
making improvements in the quality of service that neuropsychological patients 
receive.
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PART TWO:
SUMMARY OF CLINICAL DOSSIER
94
OVERVIEW OF CLINICAL EXPERIENCE
95
The names of supervisors and placement locations have been omitted from this 
summary to maintain confidentiality. They may be found in Volume Two.
Adult Mental Health Placement
Dates: October 2000 to March 2001.
Setting: A specialist psychology department for people with recurrent depression
and obsessive-compulsive disorder.
Main Models: Cognitive-behavioural, systemic and neuropsychological.
Cases Seen: I observed my supervisor and other clinicians working with 17 different
clients, including people with depression, anxiety, personality disorders, 
sexual problems, schizophrenia, alcoholism and eating disorders.
I observed family therapy.
I conducted cognitive-behavioural therapy with nine different clients, 
including people with depression, anxiety, social anxiety, anger 
problems, sexual problems, schizophrenia and panic attacks.
I also worked jointly with a consultant neuropsychologist to assess 
someone who had complained of memory problems.
Meetings: I participated in psychology team meetings and case allocation meetings.
I met with various mental health professionals to learn about their roles. 
Research: My Service Related Research Project was conducted on this placement.
People with Learning Disabilities Placement
Dates: Apri12001 to September 2001.
Setting: A psychology service that provides input to a community learning
disabilities team.
Main Models: Cognitive-behavioural, behavioural, systemic and psychodynamic.
Cases Seen: I observed my supervisor and other clinicians working with six different
cases. This included direct work with people with learning disabilities 
and indirect work with staff teams and carers.
My caseload comprised ten people with learning disabilities, with 
problems including depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
challenging behaviour and being unsafe in the community. This work 
included psychometric assessments, facilitating a psycho-educational 
group and working directly with clients and indirectly with staff teams. 
Meetings: I participated in team meetings, attended training events and met with
various professionals to learn about their roles.
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Research: My Major Research Project was conducted on this placement.
Child Placement
Dates: October 2001 to March 2002.
Setting: A child psychology service that provides input to a child and adolescent
mental health service team.
Main Models: Cognitive-behavioural, systemic, neuropsychological and attachment 
theory.
Cases Seen: I observed my supervisor and other clinicians working directly and
indirectly with seven different clients, including children with 
behavioural, adjustment and developmental problems.
I worked with twelve cases, including children with behavioural 
problems, trauma, separation anxiety, suspected Asperger's disorder, 
and eating problems. I worked both directly with children and indirectly 
with families, and used psychometric measures where appropriate.
Meetings: I participated in and presented at team meetings, attended a training event
and met with various professionals to learn about their roles.
Research: I conducted an audit of the waiting list.
Neuropsychological Assessment Specialist Placement
Dates: April 2002 to September 2002.
Setting: An adult neuropsychology service that is part of a regional neurological
centre.
Main Models: Neuropsychological and cognitive-behavioural.
Cases Seen: I observed my supervisor conduct three neuropsychological assessments
and also observed during a neurologist's outpatients clinic.
I conducted twelve neuropsychological assessments, using measures 
including the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III, the Adult Memory 
and Information Processing Battery, the Hayling and Brixton, and the 
Trail-Making Test, amongst others. The presenting problems of my 
clients included word finding difficulties, concentration and memory 
problems, depression and suspected dementia. I was able to continue 
seeing a number of these clients for limited rehabilitation work.
Meetings: I attended a neuropsychology special interest group, visited a local
daycentre for people with brain injuries and attended some of the weekly 
hospital clinical presentations.
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Older People Placement
Dates: October 2002 to March 2003.
Setting: A community mental health team for older people.
Main Models: Cognitive-behavioural, behavioural, systemic and neuropsychological.
Cases Seen: I observed my supervisor and other clinicians working with four older
people, who had problems including dementia, cognitive problems, 
anxiety and depression.
I worked with eight cases, both individually and jointly with my 
supervisor. The presenting problems included anxiety, depression, 
challenging behaviour, obsessive perfectionism and physical disabilities. 
The majority of the interventions were cognitive-behavioural and one of 
the assessments included a neuropsychological assessment.
Meetings: I participated in team meetings and ward rounds, attended training events
and met with various professionals to learn about their roles.
Neuropsychological Rehabilitation Specialist Placement
Dates: April 2003 to September 2003.
Setting: An adult neuropsychology service that is part of a regional neurological
centre.
Main Models: Neuropsychological, cognitive-behavioural, behavioural, psycho- 
educational and systemic.
Cases Seen: I observed my supervisor with eleven patients and also observed a
physiotherapist, speech and language therapist and occupational 
therapist.
I conducted, or shared in conducting, eight neuropsychological 
assessments, using measures including the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale III, the Adult Memory and Information Processing Battery, the 
Hayling and Brixton, and the Trail-Making Test, amongst others. The 
presenting problems of the clients included word finding difficulties, 
concentration and memoiy problems, anger, depression and anxiety. I 
saw eight clients for rehabilitation work.
Meetings: I attended a neuropsychology special interest group and visited a
supported living unit and two units specialising in neuropsychological 
rehabilitation.
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ADULT MENTAL HEALTH CASE REPORT SUMMARY:
A Cognitive-Behavioural Assessment and Intervention with a 
Twenty-Four Year Old Woman who Suffered from Recurrent 
Major Depressive Disorder % ‘Social Phobia’, ‘Panic Disorder 
Without Agoraphobia’ and Migraine.
March 2000
Note: Some of the details in this report have been changed to preserve the
anonymity of the client.
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Reason for Referral
Sonia Graham was referred by her community psychiatric nurse, primarily because she 
suffered from recurrent depression that various anti-depressant medications had only 
had a limited impact upon.
Format of the Assessment
The author’s placement supervisor observed during the first session, while the author 
carried out the second session and the subsequent intervention individually.
Background
Sonia Graham was twenty-four and had a son. Her relationship with his father was 
intermittent. Sonia worked as a part-time cleaner and was on Income Support.
Presenting Problems
Sonia suffered from depression, with symptoms including nearly continuous low 
mood, reduced motivation, lack of interest in previously enjoyable activities, lethargy, 
difficulty concentrating, decreased appetite, and sleep disturbance. Sonia’s Beck 
Depression Inventory II (BDI-II) score of 30 suggested that her depression was in the 
‘severe’ range (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996). While depressed, Sonia’s thoughts often 
centred on her belief that she would always be ‘mentally ill’. Although Sonia reported 
suicidal ideation, she said that she had not previously attempted to commit suicide, that 
she did not have a plan and that she could not leave her son to face the world without a 
mother.
Sonia was highly anxious in the presence of people who knew her well. In such social 
situations she would blush and sweat, and this caused her acute embarrassment because 
she believed that: ‘people would think that Ishe wasl guilty, stupid or a pathetic fool’. 
Sonia appeared to suffer from recurrent, apparently randomly occurring, panic attacks; 
with her Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) score of 35 indicating that she was ‘severely’ 
anxious (Beck & Steer, 1993). During an attack Sonia’s thoughts included: ‘I might go 
mad, lose control and attack people’. Finally, Sonia reported suffering from migraines, 
at a rate of approximately one a month.
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Relevant History
Sonia identified three factors from her early life that she felt were particularly 
significant: her mother was very protective; she was repeatedly physically assaulted by 
her middle brother (e.g. being shot with an air-gun); and her uncle was hospitalised 
after having a ‘mental break down’. As a teenager, Sonia experienced a series of 
traumatic events, including being raped and experiencing a ‘bad-trip’ while on magic 
mushrooms, during which she became paranoid and tried to strangle someone. 
Following this Sonia experienced her first significant bout of derealization and started 
suffering from intrusive recollections of the traumatic events. Her first significant 
episode of depression followed this, and then her panic attacks slowly became more 
frequent and her social anxiety grew.
Strengths
Sonia said she was honest, warm and caring, friendly, a good mother, courageous, 
resilient, inquisitive and was prepared to take responsibility to improve her situation.
Preliminary Formulation
Sonia was diagnosed as having Recurrent Major Depressive Disorder, Panic Disorder 
Without Agoraphobia, and Social Phobia. Based on this, a preliminaiy formulation 
was developed within a cognitive-behavioural framework (e.g. Beck, 1995; Hawton, 
Salkovskis, Kirk & Clark, 1989). It was hypothesised that the root of Sonia’s panic 
attacks were her catastrophic over-estimations of the threat posed by panic symptoms 
and that these ‘catastrophic’ beliefs were maintained by Sonia’s safety behaviours (cf. 
Clark, 1996). Sonia’s Social Phobia was thought to be maintained by a fear that her 
anxiety symptoms (blushing etc.) would be interpreted by others to indicate that she 
was ‘pathetic or guilty’ (cf. Clark & Wells, 1995), and it was hypothesised that 
negative automatic thoughts, like ‘I will always be mentally ill’, helped maintain Sonia’s 
depressed mood (cf. Beck, 1967).
Action Plan
It was planned to try to build a strong therapeutic alliance; maintain firm boundaries; 
empower Sonia and offer her control and choice; continue the assessment of Sonia’s 
problems and strengths; socialise her to the formulation; address the Panic Disorder,
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before moving onto other problems; and provide Sonia with a set of cognitive and 
behavioural skills that she could apply to novel psychological problems.
Implementation
The intervention comprised 19 weekly sessions, 17 of which had been completed by the 
time of writing. The trainee’s supervisor sat in on the first assessment. Rogerian 
principles of genuineness, unconditional positive regard and accurate empathy (Roger, 
1957) were employed throughout the therapy. Sonia was socialised to the formulation 
through guided discovery and didactic presentation.
The trainee attempted to reduce the strength of Sonia's panic maintaining beliefs using 
cognitive approaches and through behavioural experiments, including inducing a panic 
attack whilst she was not doing safety behaviours (cf. Wells, 1997). Sonia’s social 
phobia briefly became the focus for cognitive-behavioural intervention when the 
treatment for panic appeared to have run its course. The last two session of Sonia’s 
therapy with the trainee will take place after the completion of the case report, and 
during these it is intended to explore issues surrounding the transfer of Sonia from the 
trainee to his supervisor.
Other Interventions
During the second week of therapy, Sonia decided to accept her consultant 
psychiatrist’s recommendation to start the anti-depressant Venlafaxine.
Outcome
Every week, Sonia completed a BAI and BDI-II and rated her panic. The BAI and BDI- 
II scores were not significantly correlated with the session number, but the level of 
panic had significantly decreased over the course of treatment (r^=- 0.66, p<.05). This 
concurred with Sonia’s reports that she now felt substantially less frightened of panic 
attacks. To what extent the improvement was due to the change in medication is unclear.
Prognosis
The author thought that the prognosis was good, because Sonia had made substantial 
progress overcoming her Panic Disorder and would continue to receive therapy from the 
author’s supervisor.
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Reformulation
The reformulation elaborates on the possible aetiology of Sonia's panic attacks, by 
including feelings of derealization as a triggering factor.
Critique
It would have been better to have used standardised measures to index Sonia’s panic 
attacks and to have obtained a stable pre-intervention baseline. The trainee should have 
maintained more stringent time boundaries, since some sessions over ran, and during 
guided discovery the trainee should probably have been less ‘guiding’ and allowed the 
client more time and space to ‘discover’ things for themselves (cf. Beck, 1995).
References
Beck, A.T. (1967). Depression: Causes and treatment. Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press.
Beck, A.T., & Steer, R.A. (1993). Beck anxiety inventory. Manual. San Antonio: 
Psychological Corporation.
Beck, A.T., Steer, R.A., & Brown, G.K. (\996). Beck depression inventory. Second 
edition. Manual. San Antonio: Psychological Corporation.
Beck, J.S. (1995). Cognitive therapy: Basics and beyond. New York: Guilford Press. 
Clark, D.M. (1986). A cognitive model of panic. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 24, 
461-470.
Clark, D.M. (1996). Panic disorder: From theory to therapy. In P. M. Salkovskis 
(Ed.), Frontiers o f cognitive therapy {pp. 75-96). New York: Guilford Press.
Clark, D.M., & Wells, A. (1995). A cognitive model of social phobia. In R. Heimberg, 
M. Liebowitz, D.A. Hope & F.R. Schneier (Eds.), Social phobia: Diagnosis, 
assessment and treatment. New York: Guilford Press.
103
Hawton, K., Salkovskis, P. M., Kirk, J., & Clark, D. M. (Eds.). (1989). Cognitive 
behaviour therapy for psychiatric problems. A practical guide. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Rogers, C.R. (1957). The necessary and sufficient conditions of therapeutic personality 
Journal o f Consulting Psychology, 21, 95-103.
Wells, A. (1997). Cognitive therapy o f anxiety disorders: a practice manual and 
conceptual guide. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
104
PEOPLE WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES CASE 
REPORT SUMMARY:
A Psychometric Assessment of the Cognitive Abilities and Daily 
Living Skills of a Twenty-Five Year Old Man with a Severe
Learning Disability.
September 2001
Note: Some of the details in this report have been changed to preserve the
anonymity of the client.
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Reason for Referral
Mr. Khan was referred for a cognitive and daily living skills assessment by the manager 
of his group-home.
Format of the Initial Assessment
The initial assessment comprised a review of Mr. Khan’s Community Learning 
Disability Team file and an interview with his key worker at the group-home.
Current Situation
Background
Mr. Khan lives in a voluntary-sector, staffed group-home, with five people with mild to 
moderate learning disabilities.
Family
Mr. Khan has older brothers, who do not have a disability. His father is a non­
practising Muslim, of Indian descent, and mother is a Caucasian, non-practising 
member of the Church of England. At least once a week, Mr. Khan either speaks to his 
family by telephone or visits them for dinner.
Cognitive Abilities
Mr. Khan has difficulty with simple tasks such as laying the table, and he apparently 
shows little progress when staff try to teach him new skills.
Expressive and Receptive Communication
English is Mr. Khan’s first language. In conversations he often uses a limited set of 
phrases, sometimes inappropriately. Staff feel that he frequently does not understand 
what is said to him.
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Social Skills and Behaviours
Mr. Khan mainly interacts with staff and not with people with learning disabilities. The 
staff find him to be generally very friendly and sociable.
Physical Health and Physical Disabilities
Mr. Khan has kyphoscoliosis (a hunched and twisted spine) and a deformed right-hand. 
Consequently, he requires some help bathing, drying himself and with buttons, belts 
and shoelaces.
Other Daily Living Skills
Due to concerns about his safety, Mr. Khan is always supervised outside of the house.
Mental Health
When he is with very familiar staff, Mr. Khan sometimes appears sullen and withdrawn 
or clings to them. He has difficulty sleeping at night and variable appetite.
History
Developmental and Medical History
Mr. Khan has partial trisomy 17, which appears to have resulted in kyphoscoliosis, a 
deformed hand and an abnormally small brain, with the latter causing his learning 
disability. No information about the course or onset of his possible mood problems was 
available.
Accommodation History
Mr. Khan was moved out of the family home at the age of eleven, when his father had 
heart surgery and became much less active. Since then he has stayed in a variety of 
staffed homes.
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Preliminary Formulation
It was hypothesised that Mr. Khan has substantial cognitive, communications and daily 
living skills deficits that people can tend to underestimate because of his sociable 
demeanour. It was also thought that he may be suffering from depression.
Action Plan
It was decided to measure Mr. Khan's cognitive and daily living skills using the 
standardized tests detailed below, and to refer him for a Speech and Language Therapy 
assessment. It was also planned to observe Mr. Khan at a daycentre and to interview 
him about his mood, using drawings of the facial expressions associated with various 
emotions to aid his understanding.
Implementation
Timing and Setting
Each of the measures was administered during a separate session, to try to maximise 
Mr. Khan’s performance. The setting was a daycentre or his residential home.
Consent
At the beginning of each session Mr. Khan’s consent was obtained.
Behaviour During Testing
Mr. Khan’s behaviour in the sessions fitted the description obtained during the initial 
assessment.
Results
Standardised Tests
According to the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Long Form), Mr. Khan's receptive 
language age was between 3 years 3 months and 4 years 1 month. His performances on 
the Raven’s Colour Progressive Matrices and Leiter International Performance Scale 
were at the floor of the tests, giving him an estimated IQ below 35-40. According to the
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Rivermead Behavioural Memoiy Test, his memory was in the ‘severely impaired’ 
range, and the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale suggested that his communication 
and daily living skills were 'profoundly' impaired and his socialization was 'severely' 
impaired.
Observation o f Mr. Khan in a Drama Group
With promoting, Mr. Khan was able to remember many aspects of the play he was 
performing in a group.
Assessment o f Mr. Khan’s Mood
Mr. Khan denied ever being sad. Staff said that his mood improved after a holiday 
abroad in between assessment sessions.
Speech and Language Therapist’s Assessment
Mr. Khan can understand and use single words, but has difficulty comprehending the 
impact that small grammatical words have on the meaning of phrases.
Discussion of the Results and a Reformulation of Mr. Khan’s Case
Mr. Khan has substantial cognitive and daily living skills deficits, as well as substantial 
deficits in expressive and receptive communication and memory. The degree of Mr. 
Khan's deficits may be masked in eveiyday life by his superficial social skills. Mr. 
Khan may have been depressed at the start of the assessment process, but not been 
prepared to admit this during the assessment. However, it seems that his mood 
improved after a holiday abroad.
Drawing on the work of Szivos and Griffiths’ (1990), it can be hypothesised that Mr. 
Khan does not accept that he has a disability. By this account, this denial strategy is at 
least partially maintained by the positive reaction that he often receives when he adopts a 
façade of being happy and coping, and may make him vulnerable to depression because 
of the disparity between his desired and actual self.
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Future Plans
At the time of writing, a report summarising the previously described assessment 
findings and their implications is being prepared. This will be discussed at a meeting 
with Mr. Khan and the staff from his home and daycentre. Mr. Khan will then be 
offered an opportunity to work with another psychologist, who will take on the 
intervention from the trainee.
Critique
If time constraints had allowed, it would have been preferable for the author to conduct 
the intervention, since he already had a relationship with Mr. Khan. Mr. Khan's parents 
could have been interviewed, to obtain their impression of his situation and involve 
them in the process since they might be an important part of the intervention. This work 
is further critiqued in the main case report.
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CHILD CASE REPORT SUMMARY:
A Report of an Assessment and Systemic Intervention with a Four 
Year Old Male who Presented with Hyperactivity and Behaviour
Problems.
March 2002
Note: Some of the details in this report have been changed to preserve the
anonymity of the client.
I l l
Introduction
Roger was a four-year-old boy, who lived with his maternal-grandmother and older- 
sister, and attended a playgroup three days a week. Roger was in his grandmother’s 
care because his parents were both abusing drugs.
Reason for Referral
A paediatrician referred Roger, because he felt that he exhibited features of Attention- 
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).
Format of the Assessment
The assessment comprised interviews with Roger’s grandmother and a discussion 
with a pre-school education service visitor.
Presenting Problems and Current Situation
Roger's grandmother described him as a ‘bright’, ‘lovely’ child, who enjoyed being 
cuddled and who could concentrate on tasks if he thought no-one else had her 
attention. His problem behaviours included throwing objects and swearing, when the 
Grandmother gave her attention to someone else. The pre-school education service 
visitor agreed with this description. According to a report from a supervisor at Roger’s 
playgroup, Roger preferred to interact one-to-one with adults and could become 
disruptive during group activities.
Developmental and Family History
Roger’s mother took heroin while pregnant, but the birth was normal and no problems 
were detected. Roger's primary carer alternated between his grandmother and mother, 
depending upon whether his mother was taking drugs. Roger’s problem behaviours 
with his grandmother were worst just after she took him back from his mother. At the
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time of the assessment, Roger’s grandmother was in the process of obtaining legal 
custody of Roger, and both him and his sister lived with her.
Cognitive Assessment
Roger was assessed using the Griffiths Mental Development Scales (Griffiths, 1971; 
1984) by the referring paediatrician, on which he achieved a mental age one month 
above his chronological age.
Baseline Measure
Roger was rated as having a ‘Health of the Nation Outcome Scale for Child and 
Adolescent Mental Health’ (HoNOSCA; Gowers et al., 1998) score of 17 out of 60, 
which is within the typical range for referrals to psychiatric services.
Initial Formulation
Roger was diagnosed with Reactive Attachment Disorder of Infancy or Early 
Childhood (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Drawing on attachment theory 
(Bowlby, 1998; Holmes, 1997; Ladnier & Massanari, 2000), it was hypothesised that 
Roger’s mother did not consistently comfort and protect him when she was his 
primary caregiver, partly as a consequence of her drug abuse, and that Roger would 
also have experienced his grandmother’s nurturing as inconsistent, because he was 
transferred from her to his mother on several occasion. Consequently, it was thought 
that Roger had formed an insecure-ambivalent attachment to his grandmother, and that 
this explained his pattern of behaviour.
Action Plan
It was decided to initially work indirectly with Roger through his grandmother (cf. 
Ladnier & Massanari, 2000) and to use Rogerian techniques (Rogers, 1957) to build 
the relationship between the trainee and her. It was planned to socialise her to the
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formulation and then help her to make Roger feel more secure, and also help her feel 
less stressed.
Intervention
At the time of writing, the intervention had comprised three telephone sessions 
between the trainee and Roger’s grandmother, since she found it difficult to find the 
time to visit the clinic. A therapeutic alliance was built using Rogerian techniques 
(Rogers, 1957). She was then socialised to the formulation, which she appeared to 
largely accept and understand. The importance of Roger having secure relationships 
was discussed; by the end of this she had decide that Roger would stay with her for 
the foreseeable future.
The trainee suggested to the Grandmother that she should explain what she had 
decided in simple, but truthful, terms to Roger; that she should do this on repeated 
occasions; and that each time she explained it she should question Roger to check that 
he understood what she had said. In the following session, Roger’s grandmother 
reported that she had done this and that Roger had demonstrated that he understood. 
Ways in which the Grandmother could look after her own mental health were also 
explored, and Roger was referred to a dietician because Roger’s grandmother asked 
for more information about the effect that food could have on his behaviour.
It became clear that Sarah, Roger’s sister, was becoming quite upset and angry about 
the fact that, because of his behaviour, Roger received far more of the Grandmother’s 
attention than she did. During discussion, the Grandmother decided that she would try 
to spend at least 15 minutes a night with Sarah after Roger had gone to bed. This 
appeared to be an effective strategy.
Outcome
During the third intervention session, which was the final one before this report was 
written, Roger’s grandmother reported that his behaviour at the playschool had 
improved to the extent that they were prepared to allow him to attend for a fourth
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morning a week. She also reported that he had been able to play with the children of 
one of her friends for half an hour without causing trouble.
Roger’s HoNOSCA score was recalculated as 11. This was a drop of six points since 
the initial assessment. In descriptive terms, an improvement of this size corresponds to 
the range between ‘better’ and ‘much better’ (Gower et al., 1997).
Future Plans
It was planned to continue the intervention along the existing lines for a further 
session. In addition, because the trainee’s placement was drawing to a close, it was 
planned that the trainee would brief the clinical psychologist who was taking over the 
case from him.
Reformulation
The initial formulation was further developed to include Sarah's understandable 
feelings jealous and the impact that these had.
Critique
Some might argue that Roger should have been seen, in order to obtain his view and 
to make an independent assessment of his behaviour. However, asking Roger to attend 
a psychiatric service could have been an ordeal for him that could have given him the 
message ‘you are not normal’. Furthermore, two other professionals had seen Roger 
and there was consistency between the assessment information provided by the 
different sources. Further critical discussion may be found in the main case report.
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NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT SPECIALIST 
CASE REPORT SUMMARY:
A Report of a Neuropsychological Assessment with a Fifty-Six Year 
Old, Right Handed Male who Presented with Memory Problems, 
Chronic Pain and Depression Following a Road Traffic Accident and
Viral Encephalitis.
September 2002
Note: Some of the details in this report have been changed to preserve the
anonymity of the client.
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Introduction
Mr. Davidson lived alone, was unemployed and suffered from chronic pain, memory 
problems and periodic depression, following a road traffic accident (RTA) and 
encephalitis.
Reason for Referral
A pain-management psychologist referred Mr. Davidson for help with his memory 
problems and for neuropsychological guidance for their pain management 
intervention. The assessment comprised two 2-hour sessions, during which the trainee 
saw Mr. Davidson alone.
Presenting Problems
Mr. Davidson suffered daily from severe shooting pains in his neck and head, had 
difficulty sleeping, and had problems remembering appointments and what had 
happened yesterday. In addition, he said he periodically suffered from depression, but 
denied being suicidal.
History of the Presenting Problems
Mr. Davidson’s problems began after an RTA in 1976. During the crash he lost 
consciousness for only a few seconds, and had a good memory for events immediately 
before and after he was unconscious. He did not notice any memory problems, but he 
did have ‘waking-nightmares’ of the accident. Within a few weeks, he collapsed in 
convulsions and was admitted to hospital unconscious with encephalitis. Bilateral 
frontal burr holes had to be drilled through his skull in order to reduce the pressure on 
his brain.
Following this, his ‘waking-nightmares’ stopped, but the pain, and sleep and memory 
problems began. Mr. Davidson said that his memory had continued to deteriorate until
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about five years ago, and then stabilized. He did not have any convulsions after the 
operation, but did suffer from periodic depression.
Medical History
Hospital notes, detailing the encephalitis, were not available. At the time of the 
assessment, Mr. Davidson was taking a variety of analgesics and a hypnotic.
Personal History
Mr. Davidson was right-handed for all activities. He left school at 14 with no 
qualifications, and subsequent jobs included being a factory worker and a clothing 
company area-manager.
Hypothesis-T esting
Two broad hypotheses were made:
Hypothesis One: Mr. Davidson’s memory problems were caused by some 
combination of his sleep deprivation, chronic pain, depression and medication. These 
factors should not produce a marked asymmetry between visual and verbal memory, 
but could impair attention, mental processing speed and motor-speed in addition to his 
memory (cf. Hart, Martelli & Zasler, 2000; Lezak, 1995).
Hypothesis Two: His memory problems were predominantly caused by brain damage 
resulting from the encephalitis. This could produce an asymmetry between visual and 
verbal memory, as well as impairing other aspects of cognitive functioning (cf. Lezak, 
1995).
In addition to testing these hypotheses, a second aim of the formal assessment was to 
establish a clearer picture of Mr. Davidson’s strengths and deficits, as a basis for 
intervention.
119
Test Choice
To meet these aims, the trainee administered standardised tests including the Doors 
and People test (Baddeley, Emslie & Nimmo-Smith, 1994), sub-tests of the Adult 
Memory and Information Processing Battery (AMIPB; Goughian & Hollows, 1985), 
sub-tests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Third Edition (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 
1997), the Trail Making test (e.g. Spreen & Strauss, 1998), the Controlled Oral Word 
Association test (COWA; Ruff, Light, Parker & Levin, 1996), and the Wechsler Test 
of Adult Reading (WTAR; Psychological Corporation, 2001).
Presentation During the Assessment
During testing Mr. Davidson did not appear to be overly anxious and seemed to be 
making an effort on the tasks. On a number of occasions he forgot where he had put 
things.
Findings
According to the WTAR and his educational level, Mr. Davidson’s premorbid 
intellectual level was 'average'. His frontal-executive functioning, as measured by the 
Trail-Making test and COWA, was not substantially below this estimate. According to 
the WAIS-III, his problem solving abilities were also consistent with this, as were his 
mental processing speed and immediate recall of visual material, as measured by the 
AMIPB. However, his attention span on the WAIS-III was slightly below the estimate 
of his premorbid level, and his recall of visual material after a longer delay and his 
recall of verbal material both immediately and after a delay were clearly impaired, 
according to the AMIPB.
Discussion
The finding of a substantial asymmetry between Mr. Davidson’s immediate visual- 
memory and immediate verbal-memory suggested that encephalitis was the main 
cause of his impairments. However, it was possible that the combination of chronic
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pain, sleep deprivation, periodic depression and medication also had some detrimental 
impact on his memory functioning. These findings and their implications were 
explained to Mr. Davidson in person and in a letter (as an aid to his memory); he said 
that he understood them.
Intervention and Recommendations
Mr. Davidson declined the offer of further sessions that would focus on rehabilitation. 
He was given details of a charity that worked with people with head injuries, and the 
referrer was provided with guidance to use in planning pain management work with 
Mr. Davidson. Recommendations to the referrer included encouraging Mr. Davidson 
to ask for information to be repeated if necessary, providing him with tape recordings 
of sessions or handouts as memory aids, teaching him in an errorless manner and 
giving him signs, lists or labels that he could stick around his house to act as prompts 
for any home-work that he had to do. Further recommendations may be found in the 
main case report.
Critique
Mr. Davidson’s GP could have been contacted to see if there were more details about 
the RTA, encephalitis and surgery on record. The medical records could have also 
provided more precise details about the different medications that Mr. Davidson was 
taking and when he started and stopped taking them. This information would have 
been useful in helping to establish the extent to which the side-effects of medication 
may have played a causal role in Mr. Davidson’s memory problems. In addition, it 
would have been useful to have talked to someone who had known Mr. Davidson well 
since before the RTA, to get an independent perspective of the changes that had 
occurred to him. Furthermore, it would probably have helped Mr. Davidson to have 
conducted the feedback session at his home, given the difficulty that he had travelling.
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OLDER PEOPLE CASE REPORT SUMMARY:
A Report of an Assessment and Cognitive-Behavioural Intervention 
with a Seventy-Five Year Old Woman who Presented with 
Obsessional Perfectionism, Social Isolation and Depression.
March 2003
Note: Some of the details in this report have been changed to preserve the
anonymity of the client.
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Introduction
Glenda Howard was a 75 year-old Caucasian woman, who was retired and had never 
married or had children. She lived with a male friend, William; their relationship was 
platonic. Glenda had a long history of depression and obsessive perfectionism.
The Referral
Glenda had asked her GP to refer her for psychotherapy for these problems, after 
suffering side-effects from psychotropic medication.
Assessment Format
The assessment comprised an initial one-hour session at the hospital and two further 
one-hour assessments sessions at Glenda's home.
Presenting Problems
Glenda was obsessed with imperfections in her possessions. This problem was worst 
when she was low in mood and was not otherwise occupied. Glenda also reported 
having depressed mood, reduced appetite and sleep problems. Her negative thoughts 
included: Tm a failure' and 'no-one cares about me'. In addition, Glenda felt lonely, 
since she had few close friends, and she regretted having not married and had a 
family. She said she did not have the courage to kill herself.
History of These Problems
Glenda had become concerned with imperfections in objects as a child, apparently 
because she had not wanted the things her mother bought to be flawed, because she 
was very poor. The problem had been particularly bad since she retired at 60. She also 
had a long history of depression starting in her twenties. Her most recent period of 
depression appeared to have been precipitated, nine years before this assessment, by
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the death of the youngest of her older sisters, who she described as being her 'second 
mother'.
Family and Personal History
Glenda said that her father had shown little interest in her, but that her mother had 
been 'wonderful'. She lived with her mother for most of her life, until her mother died 
unexpectedly from heart disease when Glenda was 50. She then moved in with a man 
who suffered from alcoholism, before moving in with William. Her sister acted as a 
'second-mother' to her, until she died when Glenda was 66.
Protective Factors
Protective factors included Glenda appearing to be cognitively and physically intact, 
and being able to access some of her automatic thoughts and feelings.
Psychometrics
Glenda's Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) score of 
36 suggested that her depression was 'severe', while her Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; 
Beck & Steer, 1993) score of 17 corresponded to a 'mild to moderate' anxiety 
problem.
Behaviour During the Assessment
Glenda appeared to be well orientated and to have insight into her problems. Her 
affect appeared consistent with the content of the history that she gave.
Initial Formulation
Glenda's symptoms met the criteria for Recurrent Major Depressive Disorder and 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Beck's 
(1967) cognitive-behavioural theory of depression and Salkovskis’ (1985; 1999)
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cognitive-behavioural model of obsessive-compulsive disorder were used to generate 
the formulation. It was hypothesised that Glenda's depression was maintained by her 
negative automatic thoughts, which usually revolved around themes of being unloved, 
worthless and vulnerable, and by a reduction in activity and greater social isolation. In 
addition, it was formulated that her obsession was maintained by her catastrophic 
misinterpretation of imperfections. See the main case report for further details.
Action Plan
It was planned to build a therapeutic alliance with Glenda and to socialise her to the 
formulation. Following this, it was planned to use a cognitive-behavioural approach to 
first tackle her depression and then her obsessional problem (cf. Blackburn & 
Davison, 1995).
Intervention
The intervention comprised eleven sessions held weekly at Glenda's home. The 
trainee drew upon the Rogerian principles (Rogers, 1957) of accurate empathy, 
unconditional positive regard and genuineness to try to build and maintain a strong 
therapeutic alliance with Glenda. Glenda was socialised to the formulation using 
guided discovery (cf. Wells, 1997), and she appeared to understand and accept it. The 
first few intervention sessions mainly focused on a behavioural approach to her 
depression, namely increasing her level of activity and reducing her social isolation. 
Then a cognitive approach was adopted, which involved helping her to identify the 
main negative automatic thoughts that were maintaining her depression and challenge 
them. Glenda's obsessional problem reduced as her depression lifted. Given this and 
time constraints, it was never directly addressed.
During the penultimate session, the trainee and Glenda together drew up a 
maintenance plan, and in the last two sessions the trainee and Glenda cognitively 
challenged some of her negative automatic thoughts about ending.
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Outcome
Following treatment Glenda no longer met the criteria for Major Depressive Disorder 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000), and her BDI-II and BAI scores had 
decreased by a statistically significantly amount to a non-mentally ill level. Even 
though Glenda's obsession with imperfection was not directly addressed, she said that 
she had been less obsessed during the latter stages of treatment.
Reformulation
The initial formulation was modified to take into account some of Glenda's anxieties 
that had become apparent during the intervention. For details see the main case report.
Critique
The apparent success of this intervention has helped the trainee to learn that 
substantial change is possible in older clients who have a longstanding history of 
mental health problems.
However, there were a number of ways in which this work could have been improved. 
Firstly, if there had been time, the trainee would have liked to work in a schema- 
focussed manner with Glenda, to try to reduce her predisposition to depression and 
anxiety. Second, the trainee would have liked to try to maintain the treatment gains 
using booster sessions, at progressively lengthening intervals. Third, the trainee has 
learnt to become more delicate at raising issues around endings early in therapy, since 
the therapeutic alliance in this case may have been weakened when the trainee very 
early on discussed in detail the time-limited nature of the therapy.
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PART THREE: 
RESEARCH DOSSIER
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RESEARCH LOG
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R esearch
S kill
Description of Research Skill D ates
Conduct a
literatu re
search
I conducted computerised literature searches using Medline, 
BIDS and Psychlnfo for all my essays, case reports and 
research projects. This allowed me to refine and develop my 
ability to use these search engines.
Nov. 2000 
to
June 2003
C ritically  
review the 
literatu re
All my essays and research projects included a critical 
review of the literature. This experience allowed me to 
further develop my critical analysis skills, especially as 
applied to clinical studies.
Nov. 2000 
to
June 2003
Form ulate a 
specific  
research  
question
I had to formulate specific research questions for both my 
service related research project and major research project. I 
was already experienced at doing this from my Ph.D.
Nov. 2000 
to
Sept. 2002
W rite brief 
and  detailed 
research  
p ro p o sa ls
I wrote a brief research proposal for a waiting-1 ist audit I 
conducted on my child placement. I wrote both brief and 
detailed proposals for both my service related research 
project and major research project. I learnt to tailor the 
different proposals for the different readerships.
Nov. 2000 
to
Sept. 2002
O btain 
appropriate  
superv is io n  
for research
I was supervised for all the research projects I conducted on 
this course, and recruited the supervisors myself for the 
major research project.
Nov. 2000 
to
June 2003
W rite a
partic ipan t
inform ation
sheet and
consen t
form
I prepared an information sheet for participants in my service 
related research project, and information sheets and consent 
forms for the participants in my major research project. This 
was a valuable learning experience since it was something 
that I had not had to do for previous research.
Nov. 2000 
to
June 2003
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Judge  
ethical 
issues in 
research and 
am end plans 
accord ing ly
For my service related research project, 1 discussed ethica 
issues with the Trust’s research and development manager, 
and consequently changed from a telephone survey to a 
postal one. For my major research project, 1 discussed with 
my supervisors how to ensure that the participants with 
learning disabilities gave informed consent. Following the 
discussion 1 added symbols to the information sheets to aie 
the participants’ understanding. These experiences 
reinforced my belief in the value of consulting others about 
research plans.
Nov. 2000 
to
Sept. 2002
O btain
approval
from  a
research
eth ics
com m ittee
For my service related research project 1 obtained ‘Caldicott’ 
approval by submitting a proposal to the Trust’s Caldicott 
guardian. For my major research 1 obtained ethical approval 
both from the Health Authority’s Local Research Ethics 
Committee and the University’s ethics committee. These 
were valuable learning experiences, since I had not done any 
of these things before.
Nov. 2000 
to
Sept. 2002
Collect data  
from  
research  
partic ipan ts
I collected data from the questionnaires returned by post by 
the participants in my service related research project, and 
recorded data on the reading performance of the participants 
that I saw as part of my major research project. In addition, I 
used a semi-structured interview to collect data from a 
participant, as part of a group qualitative research project. 
The latter was a particularly useful learning experience, as I 
had not previously conducted qualitative work.
Nov. 2000 
to
June 2003
Set up a data 
file
For both the service related and major research projects I 
created SPSS data files. I already had experience at doing 
this from my Ph.D.
Nov. 2000 
to
June 2003
A nalyse
quantitative
data
Quantitative data analysis in my service related project 
involved carrying out survey methods, t-tests, chi-squared 
tests and logistic regressions. For my major research project 
I mainly used non-parametric tests. Conducting the logistic 
regression was a useful learning experience, since I had not 
performed one before.
Nov. 2000 
to
June 2003
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A nalyse
qualita tive
data
1 leamt how to analyse qualitative data as part of a group 
qualitative research project that employed interpretative 
phenomenological analysis.
Feb 2002 
to
May 2002
Sum m arise 
results in 
figures or 
g rap h s
Results were summarised in figures and graphs in my 
service related and major research projects. 1 was already 
experienced at doing this from my Ph.D.
Mar. 2001 
to
June 2003
In te rp re t 
resu lts from  
da ta  analysis
Quantitative results were interpreted in my service related 
and major research projects. 1 was already experienced at 
doing this from my Ph.D. In addition, during the course 1 
leamt to interpret qualitative results.
Mar. 2001 
to
June 2003
P resen t 
research  
findings and 
plans to an 
audience
1 presented the findings of my service related research 
project back to the service, to my fellow students and to the 
British Psychological Society's Annual Conference (as a 
poster). During the course, 1 presented some of my previous 
Ph.D. research to a conference.
May 2001 
to
Sept. 2002
Produce a 
w ritten  
repo rt on a 
research  
p ro ject
1 produced written reports on my service related, major and 
qualitative research projects as part of the course 
requirements. 1 also wrote and submitted a paper to a journal 
about work that 1 conducted during my Ph.D.
May 2001 
to
July 2003
D efend 
research  
project a t an 
o ral
exam ination
This will occur during my Psych.D. viva. 1 have previously 
defended research during a Ph.D. viva.
Sept. 2003
Subm it 
research  
rep o rt for 
publication  
in a
jo u rn a l/b o o k
1 submitted an abstract, detailing my service related research 
project, to the British Psychological Society's Annual 
Conference. 1 am in the process of writing up my service 
related and major research projects for journal publication. 1 
have published work from my Ph.D. in ajournai.
Jan 2001 
to
Sept. 2003
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Apply
research 
findings to 
clinical 
practice 
(give
examples of
3 papers
published
during your
training
which
influenced
your
practice).
During the people with learning disabilities placement, 
used a paper by Long and Holmes (in press), which 
described the design of a ‘keeping safe group’, to help set 
up a new ‘keeping safe group’.
On my child placement, 1 used Ladnier and Massanari’s 
(2000) model of the relationship between attachment 
problems and ADHD to help formulate a client.
On my older people placement, 1 used a paper by Jefferson, 
Powers and Pope (2001) to help me interpret Beck 
Depression Inventory 11 results that 1 had for some of my 
elderly patients.
References:
Jefferson, A.L., Powers, D.V., & Pope, M. (2001). Beck 
depression inventory-11 (BDl-11) and the geriatric depression 
scale (CDS) in older women. Clinical Gerontologist, 22, 3- 
12 .
Long, K., & Holmes, N. (in press). A group for adults with 
a learning disability on keeping safe in the local community. 
Report of group design, development and evaluation. 
British Journal o f Learning Disabilities.
Ladnier, R.D., & Massanari, A.E. (2000). Treating ADHD 
as attachment deficit hyperactivity disorder. In T.M. Levy 
(Ed.), Handbook o f attachment interventions. London, UK: 
Academic Press.
Sept. 2000 
to
July 2003
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SERVICE RELATED RESEARCH PROJECT:
An Investigation into the Causes of Client ‘Drop-Out’ from Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy, in an Outpatient Service for Adults with 
Recurrent Depression and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.
June 2001
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Abstract
This research investigated the causes of adult client drop-out (premature termination) 
from cognitive behaviour therapy at a National Health Service psychology department 
that specialises in obsessive-compulsive disorder and recurrent depression. The study 
comprised two parts. First, the data on file concerning 102 cases closed between the 
initiation of the service and March 2001 were analysed. For each case the information 
entered into the analysis included: whether the client dropped out, their gender, their 
age, the waiting time, the inter-session interval, the treatment location, whether they 
returned an ‘opt in’ form, their psychologist’s identity, their primary presenting 
problem, whether they had an additional diagnosis, their referrer’s identity and the 
distance between their home and the clinic. Both pair-wise comparisons and a direct 
logistic regression analysis revealed that age was the only one of these measures to be 
associated with drop-out. Specifically, older clients were more likely to continue with 
therapy. In the second part of the study, a postal questionnaire was sent to the 52 
clients who had dropped out within the same period. The questionnaire comprised a 
list of 16 reasons why they might have dropped out, and the participants were required 
the rate the extent to which each reason applied to them. Open ended questions were 
also included. Nine usable replies were obtained. The reasons selected varied, with 
practical issues being the most frequently cited. However, the low response rate limits 
the meaningfulness of these findings. The implication of the results and a possible 
direction for future research is discussed.
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Introduction
A number of clinical psychologists working for a British National Health Service 
(NHS) specialist psychology department expressed concern at the high level of ‘drop­
outs’ from the cognitive behaviour therapy that it offered. By ‘drop-outs’ they meant 
clients who had started therapy but failed to attend a later session and subsequently 
did not request another appointment when contacted (cf. Pekarik, 1992; Trepka, 
1986). Client drop-out is a concern for any psychology service because: first, it means 
that the clients who drop-out are not receiving the help that they probably need; 
second, it wastes scarce resources, since the missed appointments could have been 
allocated to different clients; and third, it can demoralise the therapists (Hughes, 1995; 
Tweed & Salter, 2000).
Moreover, the service was already implementing the only method of reducing drop­
out which has proven effective; namely, sending clients an opt-in form prior to the 
first appointment (Keen, Blakey & Peaker, 1996; Startup, 1994). Therefore, they 
wanted to establish the causes behind their perceived high drop-out rate, as a first step 
towards taking additional measures to reduce it.
Unsurprisingly given its importance, much research has already been carried out to 
determine the factors leading to drop-out in psychology services (cf. Garfield, 1994). 
However, due to space constraints the emphasis here will be on those studies 
employing a British NHS sample, because it is not clear to what extent United States 
psychotherapy results generalise to an NHS setting (cf. Hughes, 1995). At least two 
main research approaches can be identified.
The first involves collecting a range of information about clients and then comparing 
drop-outs and non-drop-outs to see if they differ on any measures. Trepka (1986) 
carried out one of the few studies of this type to employ an NHS sample. He reported 
that clients who dropped out were more likely to be unemployed, come from a more 
disadvantaged social class, have a more serious psychological disorder and have been 
referred by a professional who had less contact with psychology services. 
Unfortunately however, Trepka did not adjust his significance levels to control for the
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fact that he had carried out multiple statistical comparisons (cf. Howell, 1992, chap. 
12). When the Bonferroni correction (cf. Howell, 1992, chap. 12) is applied to his data 
to compensate for this, the only effect that remains reliable is that drop-outs were 
more likely to have been referred by clinicians who had less contact with the 
psychology service. Though, of course, the failure of other factors to achieve 
significance could have been because of insufficient statistical power.
Weighill, Hodge and Peck (1983) have also tried to differentiate between clients who 
did and did not drop-out, in an NHS sample. However, they too failed to control for 
multiple comparisons. Moreover, in this case it is not possible to retrospectively apply 
a correction because the total number of measures they compared clients on is not 
apparent from their paper.
The second, and perhaps more direct way of determining the causes of drop-out, is to 
ask the clients why they dropped out. This approach does not appear to have been 
widely employed. However, an exception is Hughes’ (1995) study, in which adult, 
NHS clients who had dropped out were provided with a list of potential reasons 
behind their decision to drop-out and asked them to rate how much each was an actual 
reason. They were also given some more open-ended questions. Hughes found that the 
most frequently cited reasons for dropping out were that the ‘therapy was touching on 
painful topics’, that the therapy was ‘getting nowhere’ and that the ‘therapy was 
dealing with things that seemed irrelevant’. A desire for ‘more structure’ and a ‘more 
practical approach’ was also relatively prominent. Unfortunately however, as he 
acknowledges, the small sample size of 26, the low response rate of 32% and the 
relatively wide variability in the clients’ answers limits the degree to which these 
results can be generalised.
In addition to these problems, the specialist psychology service under consideration 
appears to be relatively unique, in that it only accepts referrals of adult clients with 
obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) or recurrent, non-psychotic, depression, to 
whom it offers a cognitive behavioural intervention of usually no more than 15 
sessions. These idiosyncrasies raise further concerns as to whether the previously 
discussed findings generalise to this service. Therefore, new research was required to
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establish some of the causes of client drop-out in this specific service. To this end, the 
previously closed cases were analysed to determine if there were any recorded factors 
that predicted drop out, and a questionnaire was sent to clients who had dropped out. 
These approaches will be considered in turn.
Part I -An analysis of closed cases.
Method
Participants:
The criteria for inclusion of a client’s details in the analysis were that:
(i) their treatment occurred between the inception of the service, in April 
1999, and the time of the study, in March 2001 ;
(ii) they had attended at least one appointment with a psychologist (clients
who never attended were excluded, because evidence suggests that they 
may form a different population to clients who drop-out (e.g. Trepka, 
1986));
(iii) they had finished treatment by March 2001, either because they dropped
out or the treatment had run its course;
(iv) their file contained all the data listed below in the ‘measures’ section (10
cases were excluded because of missing data).
The resulting sample comprised 102 cases, and its characteristics are considered in the 
results section.
Measures:
The following data were collected for each eligible case.
(i) Whether the client dropped out (yes or no). A client was considered to
have dropped out if they failed to attend an arranged session and 
subsequently did not agree a new appointment time upon receipt of a 
reminder letter or telephone call (cf. Trepka, 1986). The alternative 
approach of relying upon the therapists’ judgement to decide whether
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clients had ended therapy prematurely (e.g. Pekarik, 1992) was not 
employed, because this information was not always clear from the files.
(ii) Gender (male or female).
(iii) Age at the time of referral (in years).
(iv) Waiting time, measured from the date the referral was received until the 
first appointment (in days).
(v) Mean gap between the sessions of therapy (in weeks).
(vi) Treatment location (clinic one or two).
(vii) Whether the client returned the confirmation form, to indicate that they 
would attend the first appointment (yes or no).
(viii) Psychologist’s identity (psychologist one, two or three).
(ix) DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) diagnosis of the 
class of the client’s primary presenting problem (OCD, other Anxiety 
Disorder, Mood Disorder, or other problem). Note that, while the service 
only accepted clients with OCD or recurrent, non-psychotic depression, 
these were not always the primary problem.
(x) Whether the client had an additional DSM-IV-TR diagnosis (yes or no).
(xi) Referrer’s identity (Community Psychiatric Nurse, Consultant Psychiatrist, 
other Psychiatrist, General Practitioner, Clinical Psychologist, Medical 
Officer (a military doctor), or other).
(xii) Shortest road distance between the client’s home and the treatment location 
(in miles; calculated using ‘AA Auto-route’’).
Other factors of potential interest (e.g. socio-economic group and the degree of 
contact the referrer had with the psychology service; Garfield, 1994, Trepka, 1986) 
were not included because such information was not recorded for the majority of 
clients. Furthermore, a division was not made between clients who dropped out after 
assessment and those who dropped out later, as has sometimes previously been done 
(e.g. Trepka, 1986). This was because of the relatively small sample size and because 
it was sometimes not clear exactly when the assessment ended and the intervention 
began.
Available at http://www.theAA.co.uk/
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Results
51% of the 102 cases analysed constituted drop-outs. For the continuous measures, t- 
tests were used to compare those clients who dropped out with those who completed 
treatment. For the nominal variables %^-tests were used. The results are shown in 
Tables 1 and 2. It can be seen that the only reliable group difference was that those 
clients who dropped out were younger than those who completed treatment.
Com pleted Treatment Dropped Out
Mean Stand.
Dev.
Range Mean Stand.
Dev.
Range t d f P
Inter-session gap (w eeks) 2.40 1.02 1 .00-5.06 3.24 4.57 0.83 - 33.33 1.27 100 n.s.
A ge at referral (years) 41.00 13.50 20.43 - 74.55 33.68 10.19 18.35 -59.29 3.10 100 <.05
W aiting tim e (days) 27.82 16.06 8 .0 0 -9 2 .0 0 30.33 22.65 7 .0 0 -  134.00 0.66 100 n.s.
Traveling distance (m iles) 4.84 4.80 0.00-17 .00 6.41 5.87 0.00 - 23.50 1.47 100 n.s.
Table I: A comparison o f the clients who dropped out with those who completed treatment, on the 
continuous measures using t-tests. The p-values have been adjusted for multiple comparisons using the 
Bonferroni correction (i.e. the p-values were multiplied by the total number o f comparisons, 11). 
However, even when this relatively conservative correction (cf. Howell, 1992, chap. 12) was not 
applied, ‘age at referral’ was still the only significant variable.
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Counts
d f PCompleted
Treatment
Dropped
Out
Gender
Male 21 21 0.00* 1 n.s.
Female 29 31
Referrer’s Identity
Community Psychiatric Nurse 6 10
Consultant Psychiatrist 8 14
Other Psychiatrist 6 7
General Practitioner 14 7 7.92 6 n.s.
Clinical Psychologist 10 6
M edical Officer 1 4
Other 5 4
P sychologist’s Identity
One 15 26
T w o 19 14 4 .24 2 n.s.
Three 16 12
T reatment Location
One 11 17 0.98* 1 n.s.
T w o 39 35
Confirmation Form Returned
Y es 33 25 2.65* 1 n.s.
N o 17 27
Primary Presenting Problem
OCD 8 13
Other A nxiety Disorder 9 8 1.29 3 n.s.
M ood Disorder 25 23
Other 8 8
Additional D iagnosis
Y es 20 23 0.05* 1 n.s.
N o 30 29
Table 2: A comparison o f  the clients who dropped out with those who completed treatment, on the 
nominal measures using ^ -tes ts . The Bonferroni correction was used to control fo r  multiple 
comparisons (i.e. the p-values were multiplied by the total number o f comparisons, II).  However, even 
without the application o f this relatively conservative correction none o f  the factors reached  
significance. An asterisk indicates that Yates’s correction fo r  continuity was applied, because the 
contingency table was 2x2 (Howell, 1992, pp .135-136).
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In addition, a direct logistic regression was performed to determine which of the 
measures predicted drop-out. This technique was employed because it was compatible 
with the fact that the criterion variable (drop-out) was nominal and the predictor 
variables (the other 11 measures) were both nominal and continuous (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001, p. 517). The nominal predictor variables with more than two categories 
were recoded into dichotomous dummy variables following the convention outlined in 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2001, pp. 546-547; see Appendix 1 for details). Furthermore, 
all the predictors were entered at the first step of the regression, since the cases to 
predictors ratio was too low for a stepwise procedure (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001, pp. 
521-522). The resulting regression equation correctly predicted the criterion variable 
(drop-out or treatment completion) for 75.5% of the clients, as shown in Table 3.
Actual Data Percent Correct
M odel’s Predictions Dropped Out Completed Treatment
Dropped Out 41 11 78 .8
Com pleted Treatment 14 36 72 .0
Total 75 .5
Table 3: A breakdown o f the accuracy o f the equation produced by the logistic regression.
This constituted a significantly better fit than when only the constant was included in 
the model (x^(19)=32.62, p<.05). The values of the coefficients in the regression 
equation, and their significance levels are given in Table 4. Consistent with the 
previous analysis, ‘age at referral’ was the only factor to reliably predict drop-out, 
with the positive coefficient indicating that younger clients were more likely to drop­
out. Moreover, the regression did not appear to be compromised by multicoilinearity, 
because the coefficients and their standard errors were not exceptionally large (cf. 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001, p. 522-523).
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Predictor Variable Coefficient Standard
Error
Wald df P
Gender 0.297 0.554 0.287 1 n.s.
Referrer’s Identity (combined) 6.407 6 n.s.
Other Psychiatrist (dummy) 0.884 1.401 0.398 n.s.
Community Psychiatrist Nurse (dummy) 1.185 1.427 0.690 1 n.s.
Consultant Psychiatrist (dummy) 0.566 1.343 0.178 1 n.s.
General Practitioner (dummy) 1.954 1.350 2.096 1 n.s.
Clinical Psychologist (dummy) 2.139 1.385 2.385 1 n.s.
Other (dummy) 1.482 1.561 0.901 1 n.s.
Psychologist’s Identity (combined) 4.119 n.s.
One (dummy) -1.005 0.688 2.138 1 n.s.
Two (dummy) 0.456 0.815 0.313 1 n.s.
Treatment Location -0.735 0.779 0.892 1 n.s.
Inter-Session Gap -0.375 0.255 2.165 1 n.s.
Confirmation Form Returned -0.325 0.543 0.359 1 n.s.
Primary Presenting Problem (combined) 2.726 n.s.
Mood Disorder (dummy) 1.075 0.885 1.476 1 n.s.
Other (dummy) 1.392 1.033 1.815 1 n.s.
Other Anxiety Disorder (dummy) 1.723 1.116 2.382 1 n.s.
Additional Diagnosis 0.455 0.571 0.634 1 n.s.
Age at Referral 0.062 0.025 6.246 1 <.05
Waiting Time 0.004 0.014 0.104 1 n.s.
Traveling Distance -0.066 0.052 1.649 1 n.s.
Constant -3.277 2.041 2.578 1 n.s.
Table 4: The values o f the coefficients in the logistic regression equation, and their significance as 
measured by the Wald test. For those predictors that were recoded into dummy variables, both the 
significance o f  the individual dummy variables and their combined reliability is shown. (Note that fo r  
the recoded variables, the number o f  dummy variables is one less than the number o f  categories 
because the final category is coded by zeros on all the dummy variables. So, fo r example, there is no 
"Medical Officer’ dummy variable in ‘Referrer Identity’. See Appendix I for details.)
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Finally, to visualize the relationship between age and drop-out see Figure 1.
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Figure I: An illustration o f the variation in drop-out with age.
Discussion
To summarise, according to both analyses, age was the only factor of those measured 
that reliably predicted whether clients dropped out; older clients being significantly 
more likely to complete treatment. Of course, it may be that some of the other 
variables failed to reach significance due to a lack of power; something that is difficult 
to assess since it is unclear what effect sizes the analyses needed to detect. Moreover, 
previous work suggests that factors not included in this study, because they were not 
consistently recorded in the clients’ files, may also be predictive of drop-out (e.g. the 
degree of contact the referrer has with the psychology service; Trepka, 1986). 
Nevertheless, neither of these points cast doubt on the finding of an association 
between age and drop-out.
Another problem is that the sample was biased towards clients who dropped out. This 
is because it excluded clients who were still continuing with therapy after March 
2001, but included ones who had been referred on similar dates but had dropped out 
prior to the cut-off. One way to avoid this bias would have been to only include clients
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referred before a specified date, with this date being set such that entire sample had 
either dropped out or completed therapy. However, the fact that the clinic only started 
in April 1999 made it impossible to achieve a reasonable sample size in this way. As 
an alternative, to try to establish whether the results had been affected by the bias, the 
logistic regression analysis was repeated with the inclusion of those clients still 
continuing with therapy. They were classified as non-drop-outs. The results are 
detailed in Appendix 2. Suffice to say here that, while the inclusion reduced the 
calculated drop-out rate to 28.0% (which is much closer to the figure of around 1/3 
suggested in the literature; Hughes, 1995), ‘age at referral’ was still the only 
significant predictor. Therefore, the association between age and drop-out would not 
appear to be an artefact of the bias.
As outlined in the introduction, a relationship between age and drop-out has not 
previously been reported in the relevant literature. However, the influence of age has 
not always been investigated in previous studies (e.g. Trepka, 1986). Moreover, there 
is evidence to suggest that older clients are more likely to attend their first 
appointment with a clinical psychologist (e.g. Henry, Ball & Williams, 1998; 
Loumidis & Shropshire, 1997). This lends some support to the genuineness of the 
results presented here, and opens the possibility that they may generalise beyond the 
idiosyncratic psychology service that was the setting for this study.
Of course, this study does not explain why there is an association between age at 
referral and drop-out, nor whether or how age plays a causal role in drop-out. These 
issues will be returned to after the clients’ explanations of why they dropped-out have 
been considered.
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Part II -A  postal questionnaire to clients who dropped out.
Method
Participants:
The questionnaire was sent to the 52 clients who were identified as drop-outs in the 
previous analysis.
Design:
In a similar fashion to Hughes’ (1995) design, the questionnaire comprised a list of 16 
possible reasons why the clients may have ‘ended therapy early’. These reasons are 
listed in Table 5; they were presented in a random order on the questionnaire.
The participants were asked to rate the importance of each reason on the following 
four point scale: ‘A very important reason’; ‘a fairly important reason’; ‘a minor 
reason’; ‘not a reason at all’. In addition, they were given a ‘not sure’ option, and they 
were asked to provide extra details about each list item that they indicated played 
some role in their decision to ‘end therapy early’. An open-ended question was also 
included to capture any reasons not on the list. A copy of the questionnaire can be 
found in Appendix 3.
In order to maximise the response rate, the questionnaire was sent a second time to 
those who had not responded to the first posting, and participants were given the 
option of replying anonymously. Moreover, they were told that only a combined 
summary of all the results would be fed-back to service. Finally, clients were given 
the service’s telephone number, so that they could contact it about restarting treatment 
if they wished.
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Results
7 out of the 52 questionnaires were returned unopened because the participants had 
moved, and 12 were returned fully or partial completed. Of this 12, one referred to a 
psychiatrist rather than psychologist, and 2 had their list of reasons ignored. The 
ratings of the listed reasons on the remaining 9 replies were analysed by assigning the 
following values to each point on the scale: ‘A very important reason’=3; ‘a fairly 
important reason’=2; ‘a minor reason’=1; ‘not a reason at air=0. (No participant ever 
selected ‘not sure’.) The mean values for each listed reason are shown in Table 5. 
Means were calculated rather than medians, because even though strictly speaking the 
data were ordinal, the majority of the medians were 0 and thus they did not provide 
much useful information. Table 5 also shows the number of respondents who selected 
each item as a reason (irrespective of ‘very important’, ‘fairly important’ or ‘minor’).
Mean
Rating
Standard
Deviation
Number 
of Times 
Selected
It was difficult to travel to the hospital. 1.22 1.48 4
The appointments were not at convenient times. 0.89 1.27 4
1 found the hospital or its surroundings unpleasant. 0.78 1.20 3
1 did not feel that 1 had control over the direction of therapy. 0.67 1.12 3
The therapy did not seem to be having any impact upon my 
problems.
0.67 1.12 3
The gap between the sessions was too long. 0.67 1.12 3
1 could not spare the time needed for therapy. 0.56 1.01 3
The therapy differed from what 1 expected. 0.56 0.73 4
The therapy was touching on painful topics. 0.44 1.01 2
A specific event led me to end therapy. 0.33 1.00 1
1 found a more effective alternative to psychological therapy. 0.33 1.00 1
My problems had reduced. 0.22 0.67 1
The therapist did not seem to know what they were doing. O.ll 0.33 1
The therapy seemed to be dealing with unimportant issues. 0.11 0.33 1
1 was uncomfortable with my therapist. 0.00 0.00 0
1 did not want to discuss private information. 0.00 0.00 0
Table 5: The mean ratings o f each listed reason, the associated standard deviations and the number o f  
times it was selected as some form o f reason. The higher the mean rating the greater the role the 
reason played in the decision to drop-out. The reasons have been ordered according to their ratings. 
(The means and standard deviations should be treated with caution given that strictly speaking the data 
were ordinal; see main text.)
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It can be seen that the highest mean rated, and most commonly cited, reasons 
concerned practical issues, like difficulty travelling to the hospital and finding 
convenient times for appointments. However, it is worth pointing out that even these 
were only selected by 4 people (which constitutes less than 8% of the original sample 
of 52).
With regard to the open ended questions, in the majority of cases the respondents 
simply gave more details about the list reasons they had selected. However, two 
clients produced reasons not included on the list, namely: ‘the doctor decided it was 
not working’ and I felt that my problem required me to change myself’.
Discussion
As with Hughes (1995), who employed a similar methodology, the low response rate 
to the postal questionnaire makes it hard to determine whether the respondents are 
representative of the whole sample and difficult to generalise the results. That said, 
clearly some clients felt that practical issues caused them to drop-out. This is 
consistent with previous work in the United States (e.g. Pekarik, 1992). However, a 
possible concern is that some of the clients may have not been willing to admit 
(perhaps even to themselves) the real reasons why they dropped out (cf. Pekarik, 
1992). Moreover, the emphasis on practical issues contrasts with Hughes (1995) 
finding that NHS clients most frequently cited ‘therapy was touching on painful 
topics’ as the reason for dropping out. Though, of course, this discrepancy may simply 
be a function of the unreliability of the two studies given their low sample sizes.
However, one conclusion that it would seem reasonable to draw is it that there appear 
to be a number of different reasons why clients drop-out (cf. Pekarik, 1992).
General Discussion
To summarise, a specialist psychology service was concerned about its perceived high 
rate of client drop-out, non-least because it was already implementing an opt-in 
system; the only method of reducing drop-out to be proven effective (Keen, Blakey &
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Peaker, 1996; Startup, 1994). Therefore, to provide a basis for devising an additional 
intervention to reduce this rate, the causes of drop-out were examined by comparing 
clients who dropped out with those who did not and through a postal questionnaire.
The former approach revealed that the clients who dropped out were significantly 
younger than the remainder, and this is consistent with the findings in the literature on 
non-attendance. There are many possible reasons for this current result (e.g. older 
people may have different expectations of therapy, they may be higher up the career 
ladder and so find it easier to find time for therapy, or their problems may have 
differed in ways that the measures employed here were not sensitive to). However, in 
order to establish the actual reason or reasons, and so provide a basis for intervention, 
further work is clearly required. This could involve interviewing clients early in 
therapy, before they drop out, about their experience of the therapy; the aim being to 
determine whether there is any systematic variation in response with age.
With regard to the postal questionnaire, the reasons clients cited for dropping out were 
varied, with practical issues being the most frequent. However, this latter result must 
be treated with some caution given the low response rate. Therefore, there would 
currently appear to be only weak justification for the implementation of measures to 
reduce the impact of these practical issues (e.g. having early morning or late evening 
appointments). However, again further work would seem to be warranted. Perhaps this 
might involve sending questionnaires to clients immediately after they drop-out, 
interviewing them by telephone immediate after, or interviewing clients early during 
therapy and so hopefully before they drop-out (if they do at all).
In conclusion, while it is not possible to suggest effective interventions to reduce 
drop-out on this basis of this research, it does at least hopefully provide a stepping 
stone towards the development of such interventions.
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Appendices
Appendix 1- How the categorical variables were coded in the logistic regression
analysis.
The following tables illustrate how the different categorical variables were represented 
in the logistic regression analysis. Where a variable had more than two categories it 
was recoded into a series of dichotomous dummy variables, following the standard 
technique described by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001, pp. 546-547). In such cases the 
number of dummy variables was one less than the number of categories, because the 
final category was coded as zeros on all the dummies (see the examples below). The 
representation of the continuous variables has not been illustrated since they did not 
need to be recoded.
Dummy Variables
Categories Other
Psychiatrist
Community
Psychiatrist
Nurse
Consultant
Psychiatrist
General
Practitioner
Clinical
Psychologist
Other
Other Psychiatrist
Community 
Psychiatrist Nurse
Consultant
Psychiatrist
General Practitioner
Clinical Psychologist
Other
Medical Officer
Table A 1.1: The coding o f ‘referrer identity'.
Dummy Variables
Categories Mood Disorder Other Other Anxiety
Disorder
Mood Disorder 1 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0
Other
Other Anxiety Disorder
OCD
Table A 1.2: The coding o f ‘primary presenting problem’.
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Dummy Variables
Categories Psychologist Psychologist 
One Two
Psychologist One 1 0 
0 1 
0 0
Psychologist Two
Psychologist Three
Table A l.3: The coding o / ‘psychologist’s identity’
Variable
Values
No 1
Yes 0
Table AI.4: The coding o f  ‘additional diagnosis’.
Variable
V alues
Female 1
Male 0
Table A 1.5: The coding o f  ‘gender’.
Variable
V alues
No 1
Yes 0
Table A 1.6: The coding o f  ‘confirmation form returned’.
Variable
V alues
Clinic One 1
Clinic Two 0
Table A 1.7: The coding o f  ‘treatment location’.
Variable
Values
No 1
Yes 0
Table A 1.7: The coding o f  ‘drop-out’.
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Appendix 2 -  A logistic regression analysis that includes data from those clients 
who were continuing to be seen in the service.
As outlined previously, to determine whether the exclusion of continuing clients had 
materially influenced the results, the logistic regression was repeated with them 
included. This increased the sample size to 186. The dependent variable comprised the 
categories drop-out and non-drop-out, with the latter including both clients who had 
completed treatment and ones who were continuing. This coding was chosen instead 
of a tripartite structure (i.e. ‘drop-out’ vs. ‘continuing’ vs. ‘completion’), since the 
latter might have lead to predictors that were significant not because of their 
relationship with drop-out but rather because of their effect on whether a client 
continued with treatment or completed it. (For example, different therapists might 
have different views as to the appropriate point at which to end treatment.) Finally, the 
inclusion of the extra cases required the addition of the category ‘mental health social 
worker’ to the variable ‘referrer identity’.
The resulting regression equation corrected predicted the dependent variable in 75.3% 
of cases, as illustrated in Table A2.1. This represented a significantly better fit than a 
constant-only model (x^(20)=38.63, p<.01). Furthermore, as before, ‘age at referral’ 
was the only significant predictor variable, with younger clients being more likely to 
drop-out (see Table A2.2). Thus, the inclusion of clients continuing with treatment did 
not materially alter the pattern of results, or call into question the previous 
conclusions.
Actual Data Percent Correct
M odel’s Predictions Dropped Out Continuing or
Completed
Dropped Out 17 35 32 .7
Continuing or Completed 11 123 91.8
Total 75 .3
Table A2.J: A breakdown o f the accuracy o f the equation produced by the logistic regression.
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Predictor Variable Coefficient Standard
Error
Wald df P
Gender 0.288 0.401 0.518 1 n.s.
Referrer’s Identity (combined) 7.218 7 n.s.
Other Psychiatrist (dummy) -6.819 18.213 0.140 1 n.s.
Community Psychiatrist Nurse (dummy) -7.330 18.211 0.162 1 n.s.
Consultant Psychiatrist (dummy) -6.831 18.211 0.141 1 n.s.
General Practitioner (dummy) -5.879 18.212 0.104 1 n.s.
Clinical Psychologist (dummy) -6.009 18.213 0.109 1 n.s.
Other (dummy) -6.655 18.216 0.133 1 n.s.
Medical Officer (dummy) -7.230 18.229 0.157 1
Psychologist’s Identity (combined) 4.330 n.s.
One (dummy) -0.701 0.504 1.937 1 n.s.
Two (dummy) 0.382 0.623 0.377 1 n.s.
Treatment Location 0.430 0.489 0.772 1 n.s. .
Inter-Session Gap -0.275 0.162 2.866 1 n.s.
Confirmation Form Returned -0.679 0.385 3.108 1 n.s.
Primary Presenting Problem (combined) 0.653 n.s.
Mood Disorder (dummy) -0.013 0.612 0.000 1 n.s.
Other (dummy) -0.436 0.736 0.351 1 n.s.
Other Anxiety Disorder (dummy) -0.261 0.720 0.131 1 n.s.
Additional Diagnosis -0.199 0.410 0.235 1 n.s.
Age at Referral 0.046 0.018 6.685 1 <05
Waiting Time -0.007 0.011 0.425 1 n.s.
Traveling Distance -0.024 0.039 0.365 1 n.s.
Constant 7.186 18.260 0.155 1 n.s.
Table A2.2: The values o f the coefficients in the logistic regression equation, and their significance as 
measured by the Wald test. For those predictors that were recoded into dummy variables, both the 
significance o f  the individual dummy variables and their combined reliability is shown. (Note that fo r  
the recoded variables, the number o f  dummy variables is one less than the number o f  categories 
because the final category is coded by zeros on all the dummy variables. So, fo r  example, there is no 
‘Mental Health Social Worker’ dummy variable in ‘Referrer Identity’.)
157
Appendix 3
A copy of the questionnaire that was sent to the clients who dropped out, and a copy 
of the covering letters that accompanied it (one for each posting). The questionnaire 
has been reduced from A3 to A4 so that it fits in this portfolio.
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VY o u r  N a m e  (o p t io n a l  - s e e  c o v e r in g  l e t te r ) : .
If you remember, t h e  n a m e  o f  th e  p s y c h o lo g i s t  you saw:_
If y o u  r e m e m b e r ,  th e  n a m e  o f  th e  h o s p i ta l  y o u  a t te n d e c j t_
B e lo w  is  a  lis t o f  s o m e  p o s s ib le  r e a s o n s  w h y  y o u  e n d e d  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  th e r a p y  e a r ly .  F o r  e a c h  s u g g e s t e d  r e a s o n ,  p l e a s e  in d ic a te  to  w h a t  e x te n t  it w a s  
a c tu a l ly  a  r e a s o n  b e h in d  y o u  e n d in g  th e r a p y  e a r ly ,  b y  p la c in g  a  t ic k  in  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  b o x . F o r  e x a m p le ,  fin d in g  it d iff ic u lt to  t r a v e l  to  th e  h o s p i ta l  m ig h t  
h a v e  b e e n  a  fa irly  im p o r ta n t  r e a s o n  i a y o u r  d e c i s io n  to  e n d  t h e r a p y  e a r ly . T h e re fo r e ,  y o u  w o u ld  p u t a  tic k  in  th e  'fa ir ly  im p o r ta n t  r e a s o n ’ c o lu m n  o p p o s i t e  th e  
s t a t e m e n t '1 fo u n d  it d iff ic u lt to  t r a v e l  to  t h e  h o s p i ta l ’.
If y o u  in d ic a te  th a t  a  s u g g e s t e d  r e a s o n  d id  p la y  s o m e  ro le  in  y o u r  d e c i s io n  to  e n d  th e ra p y  e a r ly , th e n  p l e a s e  g iv e  m o re  d e t a i l s  in  t h e  'e x t r a  d e t a i l s '  c o lu m n .  
F o r  e x a m p le ,  y o u  m ig h t  e x p la in  t h a t  y o u  fo u n d  it d iff ic u lt to  t r a v e l  to  th e  h o s p ita l  b e c a u s e  y o u  d id  n o t  h a v e  a  c a r  a n d  p u b lic  t r a n s p o r t  w a s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e .
P l e a s e  t ic k  o n e  o f  th e  fo llow ing  b o x e s  to  in d ic a te  h o w  
im p o r ta n t  e a c h  s u g g e s t e d  r e a s o n  a c tu a l ly  w a s  in y o u r  
d e c i s io n  to  e n d  th e r a p y  e a r ly . If y o u  h a v e  in d ic a te d  t h a t  a  s u g g e s t e d  r e a s o n  d id  
p la y  s o m e  ro le  in  y o u r  d e c i s i o n  to  e n d  t h e r a p y  
e a r ly  t h e n  p l e a s e  g iv e  e x t r a  d e t a i l s  h e r e .S u g g e s t e d  r e a s o n s  w h y  y o u  e n d e d  
p s y c h o lo g ic a l  t h e r a p y  e a r ly .
A  v e r y  
im p o r ta n t  
r e a s o n
A  fa irly  
im p o r ta n t  
r e a s o n
A  m in o r  
r e a s o n
N o t a  
r e a s o n  a t  
all
N o t s u r e
T h e  th e r a p y  s e e m e d  to  b e  d e a l in g  w ith  
u n im p o r ta n t  I s s u e s .
T h e  t h e r a p i s t  d id  n o t  s e e m  to  k n o w  w h a t  
th e y  w e r e  d o in g .
T h e  th e r a p y  d i f f e r e d  f ro m  w h a t  1 
e x p e c t e d .
1 fo u n d  t h e  h o s p ita l  o r  i ts  s u r r o u n d in g s  
u n p l e a s a n t .
1 fo u n d  a  m o r e  e f f e c t iv e  a l t e r n a t iv e  to  
p s y c h o lo g ic a l  th e r a p y .
T h e  g a p  b e tw e e n  th e  s e s s i o n s  w a s  to o  
lo n g .
1 d id  n o t  w a n t  to  d i s c u s s  p r iv a te  
in fo r m a tio n .
T h e  t h e r a p y  w a s  to u c h in g  o n  p a in fu l 
to p ic s .
I w a s  u n c o m f o r t a b le  w ith  m y  th e r a p i s t .
T h e  th e r a p y  d id  n o t  s e e m  to  b e  h a v in g  
a n y  im p a c t  u p o n  m y  p r o b le m s .
T h e  a p p o in tm e n ts  w e r e  n o t  a t  c o n v e n ie n t  
t im e s .
M y  p r o b le m s  h a d  r e d u c e d .
1 d id  n o t  fe e l  t h a t  1 h a d  c o n tro l  o v e r  th e  
d i r e c t io n  o f  t h e r a p y .
A  s p e c i f i c  e v e n t  l e a d  m e  to  e n d  th e r a p y  
e a r ly .
It w a s  d iff ic u lt to  t r a v e l  to  t h e  h o s p ita l .
1 c o u ld  n o t  s p a r e  t h e  t im e  n e e d e d  fo r  th e  
th e ra p y .
If th e r e  a r e  a n y  o th e r  r e a s o n s  w h y  y o u  e n d e d  th e r a p y  e a r ly ,  th e n  p l e a s e  g iv e  d e ta i l s  b e lo w :
If t h e r e  a r e  a n y  im p r o v e m e n t s  th a t  c o u ld  b e  m a d e  b y  t h e  p s y c h o lo g y  s e r v ic e  th e n  p l e a s e  g iv e  d e ta i l s  b e lo w :
T h a n k  y o u  fo r  y o u r  h e lp .  P l e a s e  u s e  th e  f r e e - p o s t  e n v e l o p e  t h a t  c a m e  w ith  th is  q u e s t io n n a i r e  to  re tu rn  it to  m e .
PLEASE HELP EVALUATE OUR SERVICE
Psychological Therapies Service would like to 
offer as good a service as possible to its clients. Therefore, they have asked 
me, a researcher from the University of Surrey, to find out why some people 
decide to end their treatment early.
Unless I have made a mistake, you decided to end your psychological 
therapy early. Therefore, I would be grateful if you could spend five minutes 
filling in the enclosed questionnaire, which asks you about the reasons 
behind your decision. This can be returned in the enclosed free-post 
envelope.
However, you are under no obligation to fill out this questionnaire. Any 
future treatment that you may receive from the service will not be 
affected by whether you return it.
If you do decide to fill in the questionnaire, your responses will only be seen 
by myself. I will give the service a summary of the combined results of all the 
questionnaires that are returned, with any details that could identify you being 
omitted.
It would help me if you would put your name on the questionnaire because 
then I know who has and has not replied. However, if you prefer, you can 
leave the name space blank.
If you have any concerns or questions about the questionnaire then please 
write to me using the enclosed free-post envelope.
Finally, if you are interested in re-starting your psychological therapy then 
please contact the Psychological Therapies Service directly on 
and they will be able to advise you on your options.
Thank you for your help.
Yours sincerely.
University of Surrey
I f  you have already returned the questionnaire about psychological 
therapy then please ignore this letter. (I could not tell who had 
already responded because some of the replies were anonymous.)
PLEASE HELP EVALUATE OUR SERVICE
I Psychological Therapies Service would like to 
offer as good a service as possible to its clients. Therefore, they have asked 
me, a researcher from the University of Surrey, to find out why some people 
decide to end their treatment early.
Unless I have made a mistake, you decided to end your psychological 
therapy early. Therefore, I would be grateful if you could spend five minutes 
filling in the enclosed questionnaire, which asks you about the reasons 
behind your decision. This can be returned in the enclosed free-post 
envelope.
However, you are under no obligation to fill out this questionnaire. Any 
future treatment that you may receive from the service will not be 
affected by whether you return it.
If you do decide to fill in the questionnaire, your responses will only be seen 
by myself. I will give the service a summary of the combined results of all the 
questionnaires that are returned, with any details that could identify you being 
omitted.
It would help me if you would put your name on the questionnaire because 
then I know who has and has not replied. However, if you prefer, you can 
leave the name space blank.
If you have any concerns or questions about the questionnaire then please 
write to me using the enclosed free-post envelope.
Finally, if you are interested in re-starting your psychological therapy then 
please contact the Psychological Therapies Service directly on 
# # # # »  and they will be able to advise you on your options.
Thank you for your help.
Yours sincerely.
University of Surrey
r?rs7L3
Appendix 4
A copy of a letter from the service to say that I have presented this research to them.
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NHS Trust
)b
Specialist Psychology Department
Specialist Psychological Therapies Service
Email:
Appendix 5
A copy of the ethical/Caldicott approval obtained for this research.
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NHS Trust
Trust Central Office
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Specialist Psychology Dept.
1 December 2000
Dear
Audit of the Psychotherapy Services
Thank you for your letter dated 30 November 2000. I read your proposed 
study with interest and I have also had an opportunity of discussing the 
proposal w i t h lH H t o ,  R&D Programme Manager.
The proposal is clearly part of a wider evaluation of psychotherapy services 
and will not require formal ethical application.
The first component of the study proposes to use data routinely collected from 
clients who Cropped out of therapy for the purpose of identifying factors 
predipting therapy drop-out. This does not raise any issues or concerns from 
the 'Caldicdtt' pbint of view.
It would be useful to clarify whether participation in the structured interviews 
by staff in the second component of the proposed study is voluntary. I would 
also strongly advise that you discuss with the service manager your 
appropriate action should you, in the extremely unlikely event, uncover unsafe 
practice in the course of your interviews with staff.
I also fee! that we can justify the use of patient name and addresses for the 
purpose of sending them a questionnaire to obtain user feedback. I very 
much support the use of a covering letter as described in your proposal.
Finally, as a trainee clinical psychologist, it is essential for you to discuss your 
evaluation project with your service manager/clinical supervisor. If you need 
further clarification in relation to the ethical issue on protection and use of 
patient information in this study, please dp not hesitate to contact, 
who assists me in these matters. ■' ♦s.
09/00 US'
look forward to reading the results of your study.
Y o u r s  s i n c e r e l y ,
Caldicott Guardian
c c I, Co Ordinator, Psychological Therapies 
Consultant Psychotherapist 
R&D Programme Manager
MAJOR RESEARCH PROJECT:
An exploration of the reading comprehension of adults with mild and
borderline learning disabilities.
July 2003
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Abstract
The global aim of this project was to generate information that could be used by 
clinicians and other professionals to make written material more comprehensible to 
adults with learning disabilities. Measures of reading comprehension were 
administered to 24 service-users of a metropolitan community learning disability team 
who had an estimated IQ of 50 or above, according to Raven's Coloured Progressives 
Matrices or their file. The Reading Comprehension sub-test of the Wechsler Objective 
Reading Dimensions battery (Rust, Golombok & Trickey, 1993) suggested that the 
sample had a median reading age of 6 1/2 years for the comprehension of written 
passages, with a range of 6 years (the test's floor) to 9 1/2 years. Moreover, data are 
presented concerning the sample's comprehension of written grammatical 
constructions, as assessed using a modified version of the Test for the Reception of 
Grammar (Bishop, 1989), and their comprehension of written single words, as assayed 
using a modified version of the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Dunn, Dunn & 
Whetton, 1982). An additional research aim was to establish whether adding Rebus 
symbols to written text, without providing any new symbol training, improved the 
comprehensibility of the message being conveyed. A within-subject, counterbalanced 
design was employed, in which the participants' comprehension of symbolised and 
non-symbolised passages from the Neale Analysis of Reading Ability Revised British 
Edition (Neale, Christophers & Whetton, 1989) was measured. The presence of Rebus 
symbols significantly improved the participants' comprehension. The theoretical and 
clinical implications of the results are discussed.
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Introduction
The focus of this research project is the reading comprehension of adults with mild 
and borderline learning disabilities. Before examining the existing empirical and 
theoretical work bearing upon this matter, it is useful to briefly consider some of the 
various definitions of 'learning disability' and set the clinical context for this piece of 
work.
What is a learning disability?
Three different definitions of learning disability that are in common usage both 
clinically and in research will be described. According to the British Psychological 
Society an individual has a learning disability if their intellectual and adaptive/social 
functioning are significantly impaired, and these impairments developed before 
adulthood (Professional Affairs Board of the British Psychological Society, 2000). 
They define an intellectual impairment is as an Intelligence Quotient (IQ) of 69 or 
below, but allow for clinical Judgement to be exercised around the cut-off because of 
the error inherent in measuring IQ. An individual is said to be impaired in 
adaptive/social functioning if they require substantial help from others in order to 
survive or to function as a social being. In addition, the British Psychological Society 
propose that people with learning disabilities can be further classified into those who 
have an IQ of 55 or above, which is described as a 'significant impairment of 
intellectual function', and those who have an IQ below 55, which is referred to as a 
'severe impairment of intellectual functioning' (Professional Affairs Board of the 
British Psychological Society, 2000).
A second commonly used definition is provided in the tenth edition of the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10; World Health Organisation, 1992), 
which uses the term 'mental retardation' rather than 'learning disability', though these 
two terms are synonymous. Following ICD-10, the criteria for mental retardation are 
an intellectual impairment, corresponding to an IQ below 70, and an impairment in 
adaptive functioning; both of these impairments should have arisen from incomplete 
mental development. Mental retardation is further sub-divided on the basis of
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intellectual functioning, into the categories 'profound' (IQ below 20), 'severe' (IQ from 
20 to 34), 'moderate' (35 to 49) and 'mild' (50 to 69).
The final definition that will be considered is that provided in the fourth edition, text 
revision, of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2000). According to this, someone has mental 
retardation if they have an IQ of approximately 70 or lower, an impairment in 
adaptive functioning and an age of onset in childhood. DSM-IV-TR also provides the 
following sub-classifications based on the extent of the intellectual deficit: 'mild' (IQ 
of 50-55 to approximately 70), 'moderate' (35-40 to 50-55), 'severe' (20-25 to 35-40) 
and 'profound' (IQ below 20-25); the boundaries have a five IQ point range in 
recognition of the measurement error in IQs.
While these definitions broadly overlap, there are differences between them, 
especially with regard to their systems of sub-classification. Therefore, where 
appropriate, attention will be drawn to the particular definition used in the studies 
discussed in the following literature review. However, throughout this write-up the 
term 'learning disability' will be used instead of 'mental retardation', since the former 
is more commonly used in this country and the latter can cause offence (cf. Finlay & 
Lyons, 2001). In addition, the term 'borderline learning disability' will also be used, 
since it is some times employed in clinical practice. Following Wechsler, Wycherley, 
Benjamin, Crawford and Mockler (1997), 'borderline' will be used to refer to an IQ 
between 70 and 79, inclusive.
The context for this project
It has been estimated that there are around 1.4 million people with learning disabilities 
in England (Department of Health, 2001). By definition, these people need to be 
supported to cope with every day life. However, the level of support available has 
often not been sufficient to prevent them from becoming socially excluded and having 
difficulty in accessing the appropriate services (Department of Health, 2001). Given 
that people with learning disabilities have an impaired intellectual functioning, it is 
reasonable to hypothesize that at least some of them may have difficulty reading.
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Therefore, it is possible that one of the reasons why they can find it hard to access 
services is because information about services is often provided in writing, examples 
being leaflets and appointment letters. The aim of this project is to develop a better 
understanding of the reading comprehension of adults with learning disabilities, since 
this knowledge could provide the basis for improving the way in which services 
communicate with them. To this end, the empirical work bearing on this matter will 
first be examined, followed by a consideration of the insights that are offered by 
psychological theory. In addition, the evidence-base for im proving the 
comprehensibility of writing by the addition symbols will be examined, since this 
practice is sometimes recommended (e.g. Abbott, 2000; Lindsey, 1998).
Empirical studies bearing on the reading comprehensions o f adults with learning 
disabilities
There do not appear to be any studies, published in English, of the reading 
comprehension of a representative sample of adults with learning disabilities. 
However, there are three indirect sources of evidence that could elucidate this issue, 
namely studies of reading skills other than comprehension of this population, studies 
of the reading comprehension of children with learning disabilities, and studies of the 
reading comprehension of adult sub-populations, such as people with Down 
syndrome.
Studies that have measured readings abilities other than comprehension will be 
considered first. Some useful information is provided by Conners, Rosenquist, Atwell 
and Klinger (2000) who compared the cognitive abilities of nine participants with 
Prader-Willi syndrome with of those of nine age and IQ matched control subjects. All 
the participants were aged 16 or above and their intellectual levels were in the ICD-10 
mildly learning disabled range or were borderline. They were given measures 
including sub-tests from the Woodcock Reading Mastery Test -Revised (WRMT-R; 
Woodcock, 1987a, cited in Conners et al., 2000) that assayed the accuracy of reading 
aloud and reading comprehension, with reasonable reliability and validity. 
Unfortunately, Conners et al. (2000) did not report the reading comprehension results 
separately, but only presented overall standard scores for the whole WRMT-R. The
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mean standard score for the Prader-Willi sample was 60.7 with a standard deviation 
26.9. The non-Prader-Willi, learning disabled group had a mean of 47.9 and standard 
deviation of 21.1. These results give an indication of the reading abilities of these 
samples relative to the general population, which on this standard score scale has a 
mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15, by definition.
Similar findings are reported by Nagle (1993), who gave the reading sub-test of the 
Wide Range Achievement Test -Revised (WRAT-R; Jastak, Wilkinson & Jastak, 
1984) to a sample of 78 adolescents (mean age 17.31; standard deviation .92) whose 
intellectual levels were probably either borderline or within the ICD-10 mildly 
learning disabled range.' The reading sub-test is a reasonably reliable and valid 
measure of the participants' ability to recognise and name written letters and words, 
but does not measure their reading comprehension (Jastak et al., 1984). The sample's 
mean standard score on this sub-test was 62.99, with a standard deviation of 9.06; 
again this compares to a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15 for the general 
population. This level of reading performance is consistent with that found by 
Conners et al, described above, given the size of the standard deviations. However, it 
would be wrong to use Nagle's and Conners et al.'s findings as the basis for strong 
claims about the reading comprehension of adults with learning disabilities. This is 
because, firstly, neither paper provides sufficient details of how representative their 
samples were of the wider population of people with learning disabilities; secondly, 
some of the samples included people under the age of 18; and thirdly, the studies do 
not provide data specifically measuring reading comprehension. Perhaps all that can 
safely be concluded is that it is likely that the reading comprehension of adults with 
learning disabilities is usually substantially below the average for the general 
population, given their apparent relative deficits in other reading abilities.
A second source of potential indirect evidence about the reading comprehension of 
adults with learning disabilities comes from studies on the reading comprehension of 
children with learning disabilities. One example is a study by Wood (1985), in which 
the sample was 38 children between the ages seven and eleven, whose intellectual
' It is not possible to state this for certain as N agle (1993) only reports that the sam ple had a mean IQ o f  
70.39 with a standard deviation o f  4 .74.
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levels were all in the ICD-10 mildly learning disabled range; no details about how 
representative this sample was of the population of children with learning disabilities 
were reported. The participants were administered a variety of measures including the 
Neale Analysis of Reading Ability (Neale, 1966), which provides a reasonably valid 
and reliable measure of the examinee's comprehension of written passages (Neale, 
1966; Neale, Christophers & Whetton, 1989; Netley, Rachman & Turner, 1965). 
Unfortunately, because it was not the primary focus of the paper, descriptive statistics 
concerning the participants' reading comprehension performance were not provided, 
other than the information that 63% of the sample had a score at the floor of the test 
and so had a reading comprehension that was at best equivalent to that of the typical 
five year old.
In a similar vein, Forness, Thornton and Horton (1981) assayed the reading of a 
sample of 30 participants whose ages were between 12 and 21, and whose IQ range 
was approximately 50 to 80' (p. 105), which is approximately ICD-10 mild to 
borderline; they do not explain how IQ was assessed. Their measure of reading 
comprehension was a sub-test of the California Achievement Test (Tiegs & Clark, 
1963, cited in Forness al., 1981), about which Forness, et al. (1981) do not report any 
reliability and validity data. According to this measure, the mean reading 
comprehension score of the sample corresponded to that of a typical pupil in the 
fourth grade at a United States (US) school, which approximately translates to a 
typical nine to ten year old. The standard deviation was 1.44 school grades. However, 
these finding must be treated with caution, not least because of the lack of detail about 
how IQ was calculated and the lack of information about the measure employed.
Finally, Mandes, Massimino and Mantis (1991) gave the reading comprehension sub­
test of the Peabody Individual Achievement Test, which has reasonable reliability and 
validity (Dunn & Markwardt Jr., 1970), to a sample of children and adults who were 
in the DSM-IV-TR mildly learning disabled range. Given that the main purpose of 
their research was to examine factors related to the participants' memory for designs, 
they divided the sample into those participants who made no errors on a design 
memory task and those who made some errors. The former group's mean reading 
comprehension score corresponded to what would be obtained by a typical pupil in
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grade five at a US school (i.e. approximately a ten to eleven year old), while the latter 
group's mean was typical for grade four (i.e. for a nine to ten year old); the standard 
deviation in the school grades was 2.30 for the former group and 2.57 for the latter 
group. These findings are similar to those reported in the previously described study 
by Forness, et al. (1981). However, it is difficult to draw unambiguous conclusions 
about adults with learning disabilities' reading comprehension from the three studies 
that have included children in their sample, which have just been discussed. This is 
primarily because it is not clear how to extrapolate their results to adults. For example, 
it cannot necessarily be assumed that a person with learning disabilities' reading 
comprehension will remain in the same percentile, relative to all of their age group, as 
they grow older. Furthermore, these studies have different inclusion criteria for their 
samples and do not provide sufficient information about how representative they are.
The third and final source of potential indirect evidence that will be considered here 
comes from studies that have examined the reading comprehension of adults with 
Down syndrome, which is frequently accompanied by a learning disability (Hatton, 
1998). In one such study, Moni and Jobling (2001) gave 18 adults with Down 
syndrome, whose ages ranged between 17 and 20, the Neale Analysis of Reading 
Ability -Revised (Neale, 1988, cited in Moni & Jobling, 2001); this is a reasonably 
reliable and valid measure of reading comprehension (Neale et al., 1989). Moni and 
Jobling report the age-equivalent comprehension scores for 9 of their 18 participants. 
The mean of these scores was 97 months (i.e. 8 years and I month) with a standard 
deviation of 25 months. However, this is likely to be an overestimate, because the 
scores for the remaining 9 participants were not presented because they were at or 
near the floor of the test; Moni and Jobling do not report the age-equivalent score 
associated with the test's floor. Other studies of the reading abilities of this population 
(e.g. Bochner, Outhred & Pieterse, 2001) present even less information specifically 
concerning comprehension. Furthermore, it is not clear that the limited findings from 
adults with Down syndrome can be generalised to the wider population of adults with 
learning disabilities, because it may be that the developmental and cognitive profile of 
people with Down syndrome differs to some extent from that of other people with 
learning disabilities (cf. Chapman, 1997).
176
In summary, previous research has examined the reading abilities other than 
comprehension of people with learning disabilities, and the reading comprehension of 
children with learning disabilities and adults with Down syndrome, which is 
associated with learning disabilities. However, it is difficult to draw substantive 
conclusions about the reading comprehension of adults with learning disabilities from 
these studies, because they have methodological problems, at least with respect to the 
use that they are being put to here, and because it is not clear how the results from 
them should be extrapolated. Perhaps all that can be safely concluded is that the 
reading comprehension of adults with learning disabilities is likely to be usually 
substantially below the average for the general population. To come to more detailed 
conclusions it would be necessarily to directly measure the reading comprehension of 
a representative sample of adults with learning disabilities. However, there do not 
appear to be any studies, published in English, that have done this. Therefore, there is 
a need for more research into this area.
Potential insights into reading comprehension provided by theoretical work
Given the lack of empirical work into the reading comprehension of adults with 
learning disabilities, it is useful to briefly consider whether current theories of reading 
can elucidate this matter. Many accounts of adult reading have focused on the 
translation of the printed word into speech (cf. Harley, 2001; Temple, 1997). A 
currently popular class of model suggests that this process can occur by three different 
pathways (Bub, 1996; Harley, 2001; Temple, 1997). An example of a three-route 
model is provided Patterson and Morton's (1985) account, which is illustrated in 
Figure 1. According to this, when literate adults read they break the words up into 
units called graphemes. Processing can then proceed through three routes. In the first 
route, a unit corresponding to the written word is activated in the adult's mental 
lexicon. This then directly retrieves the word's phonology, allowing it to be spoken; 
the word's meaning is not accessed in this case. The second pathway is similar to the 
first, except that the lexicon accesses the word's meaning, which in turn retrieves the 
phonology. In the final route, the written word is not treated as a whole entity, but 
rather the phonology of its constituent elements are separately retrieved and then 
combined to make the sound of the whole word. This last route is the one that people
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employ when they sound out unfamiliar words. For the two routes that do not pass 
through the semantic system, meaning may be accessed from the sound of the word 
after the phonology has been retrieved.
Writing
i
Graphemes
Route 3
Lexicon
Route 1
Route 2
Non-semantic reading Semantic system Sib-lexical recoding
Phonology
I
Speech
Figure I: An illustration o f  Patterson and Morton's (1985) three-route model o f reading. 
See the main text for an explanation. (Adapted from Figure 7.2 in Harley, 2001.)
Following Kintsch (1988), once the meaning of individual words has been activated in 
the semantic system, propositions are formed on the basis of them. When someone is 
reading a sentence or passage, these propositions are integrated with each other and 
with other contextual information, like general knowledge, in working memory to 
allow the reader to understand what has been written.
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Both the three-route aspect and Kintsch's (1988) part of this account are reasonably 
well supported by the evidence-base (Harley, 2001; Temple, 1997). Furthermore, it is 
possible to make a general prediction about the reading comprehension of people with 
learning disabilities from Kintsch's theory. Specifically, reading comprehension 
should be correlated with working memory capacity, since working memory is 
required to combine and integrate the propositions. When this is combined with the 
fact that IQ is positively correlated with working memory capacity (Mackintosh, 
1998), it can be predicted that there should be a positive correlation between IQ and 
level of reading comprehension in people with learning disabilities.
This prediction finds some support from a study in which a sample of French adults 
with borderline and ICD-10 mild learning disabilities were given tests of their ability 
to read words aloud and to match words and pictures (Cohen, Rivière, Plaza, 
Thompson, Chauvin, Hambourg et al., 2001). In addition, their IQ was assessed using 
the French version of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale -Revised (Wechsler, 
1974, cited in Cohen et al., 2001).^ Consistent with the prediction, Cohen et al. found 
that there was a significant positive correlation between IQ and the combined score on 
these tests of reading ability. However, because Cohen et al. combined the scores on 
the reading tests, more research is needed to confirm the prediction that reading 
comprehension on its own is correlated with IQ in people with learning disabilities.
It is less clear what predictions can be based on the three-route aspect of previous 
account of adult reading. However, this aspect will be valuable in discussing some of 
the results of this study.
 ^ U nfortunately, the original articles about the m easures em ployed by Cohen et al. (2 0 0 1 ) are in 
French, w hich the author cannot read. Therefore, the author is unable to com m ent on their reliability or 
validity.
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It is also worth briefly considering theoretical work on the development of reading, 
since it is possible that some people with learning disabilities may have a development 
delay or may not progress beyond a certain developmental stage. Ehri's (1992, 1999) 
model is one of the more commonly cited theories of reading development (e.g. 
Harley, 2001; Temple, 1997). Ehri was primarily concerned with the development of 
the lexical routes from print to speech (i.e. routes one and two in Figure 1), and argued 
that children tend to go through four phases in the creation of their lexicon. These 
phases are outlined in Figure 2.
PRE-ALPHABETIC PHASE
PARTIAL ALPHABETIC PHASE
I
FULL ALPHABETIC PHASE
I
CONSOLIDATED ALPHABETIC PHASE
Figure 2: The stages in Ehri's (1992, 1999) model o f reading development. See the main 
text for an explanation o f each stage. (This figure is adapted from Harley, 2001.)
First is the 'pre-alphabetic phase', during which children do not know the sounds of 
the different letters and so can only learn arbitrary associations between visual cues in - 
written words and their meaning or pronunciation; the arbitrary nature of these 
associations means that they do not generalise between different words. Next comes 
the 'partial alphabetic phase'. By this time the children are said to know the sounds of 
some of the letters. They are able to use this partial knowledge to help them sound out 
parts of words and, in particular, the first and last letter which are often more salient. 
They also learn to associate some, but not all, of the letters in particular words with 
the sounds of these words. Therefore, a child may make mispronunciations like saying
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'sun' when they are shown the word 'spoon' (Ehri, 1999), because they have learnt to 
associate the first letter 's' and last letter 'n' with the sound of 'sun'.
In the 'full alphabetic phase' the children know the sounds of all the letters and so can 
read using sub-lexical recoding (route three in Figure 1). This enables them to learn 
more fully the associations between the visual form of words and their sound and 
meaning, and so develop their lexicon. As the lexicon grows, children rely more on 
the lexical routes during reading because they tend to be faster than the sub-lexical 
route, at least when the child knows the word. Finally, once the child has reached the 
'consolidated alphabetic phase' their reading has reached an adult level, and they are 
aware of the sound and meaning of letter patterns that occur in a number of different 
words, for example the suffix '_ing' and prefix 're_'.
There is evidence consistent with this account (for a review see Ehri, 1999). 
Furthermore, it might be expected that some people with learning disabilities would 
progress through these stages more slowly than the majority of the population, since 
learning disabilities are sometimes associated with developmental delay (Clements, 
1998). However, the implications for the adult reading comprehension of people with 
learning disabilities are uncertain, since it remains unclear from the theory whether 
people with learning disabilities would be expected to complete all the stages, albeit 
more slowly, or not be able to pass a certain stage, and it is also not clear what sort of 
individual differences could be expected.
To summarise, it is possible to use theory to predict that reading comprehension will 
be correlated with IQ in people with learning disabilities. Moreover, the theories that 
have been discussed potentially provided a useful framework within which to discuss 
some of the findings of this project. However, empirical research still needs to be 
conducted in order to better understand the level, distribution and detail of the reading 
comprehension of adults with learning disabilities. The findings of such research 
should allow services to more appropriately tailor their written communications to 
adults with learning disabilities.
181
The effect on comprehension o f adding symbols to writing
A related issue is whether adding symbols to written information will improve its 
comprehensibility for adults with learning disabilities; if that were the case then 
services might be able to reduce the exclusion of this client group by adding symbols 
to their written communications. In the literature on communicating with people with 
learning disabilities, symbols are defined as graphical images that convey a single 
concept (Abbott, 2000; Detheridge & Detheridge, 2002). A number of different 
symbol systems have been developed including Blisssymbolis, Makaton symbols. 
Picture Communication Symbols and Rebus symbols, amongst others (for a review 
see Detheridge & Detheridge, 2002). In the majority of these systems, the symbols for 
concrete concepts tend to be very simple pictures from which the concept can be 
guessed. However, the meaning of symbols that represent more abstract concepts 
tends to be less obvious from just looking at them, since such concepts lend 
themselves less easily to pictorial description. For an illustration of this see Figure 3.
The bird made a nest.
Figure 3: An example o f some writing that is accompanied by Rebus symbols. This 
has been produced using the 'Writing with Symbols 2000' package (Widgit Software 
Ltd., 2000a). The meaning o f the symbols accompanying the concrete concepts 'bird' 
and 'nest' is more transparent than the meaning o f those accompanying the more 
abstract concepts o f 'the ' and 'a '.
Symbols have been employed in a variety of ways to attempt to help people overcome 
communication difficulties. For example, they have been used to try to help people 
with learning difficulties to learn to read (e.g. Sheehy, 2002), as a medium for 
expressive language for people who have difficulty speaking (e.g. Widgit Software
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Ltd, 2000b) and as a bridge to learning to write (e.g. Detheridge & Detheridge, 2002). 
However, of greatest relevance to helping adults with learning disabilities to 
understand written text is the suggestion by a number of authors that the addition of 
symbols to writing may improve the comprehensibility of the message that is being 
conveyed (e.g. Abbott, 2000; Lindsey, 1998; Moffatt, 1996; Widgit Software Ltd, 
2000b). Moreover, the advent of new computer software, like the 'Writing with 
Symbols 2000' package (Widgit Software Ltd, 2000a), has made this process more 
feasible. Therefore, it is worth considering whether there are theoretical or empirical 
reasons to suggest that the addition of symbols will improve adults with learning 
disabilities' understanding of the information conveyed by writing, in the absence of 
specific training about the symbols being employed.
One theory that could be used to support the addition of symbols to text is called 
'stimulus equivalence' (e.g. Carr & Felce, 2000; Sidman, 1990). According to this 
some stimuli, including words and symbols, can be substituted for each other in a 
particular context without meaning or functioning being substantially altered. For 
example, if the word 'bread' in the written sentence 'I want to eat some bread' is 
replaced by the word 'bread' being spoken or a drawing of some bread then the same 
meaning is still conveyed, provided that an individual understands these three means 
of communication; the spoken, written and graphical representations of 'bread' are said 
to be members of an equivalence class, in this context (cf. Carr & Felce, 2000). As for 
the mechanism by which stimulus equivalence could operate for symbols and words, 
some authors have suggested that both symbols and words access the same semantic 
system (e.g. Pylyshyn, 1980; Potter & Kroll, 1987; Potter, Kroll, Yachzel, Carpenter 
& Sherman, 1986). Thus, it is possible that symbols and words that belong to the same 
equivalence class can activate the same or similar semantic representations. On the 
basis of this, it can be argued that the addition of equivalent symbols to writing may 
improve its comprehensibility because, in cases where a word alone is insufficient to 
activate a semantic representation, the accompanying symbol may activate it instead. 
Thus the meaning of a sentence could be understood even when the reader has 
difficulty directly understanding the meaning of some of the words.
183
Unfortunately, to date little empirical research has been conducted to determine 
whether symbols can improve comprehensibility in this manner (cf. Abbott, 2000; 
Detheridge & Detheridge, 2002). However, indirect support is provided by some 
studies. For example, as part of a wider study. Mussel white and Ruscello (1984) gave 
children and adults, without learning disabilities, a thirty-item test. For every item 
each participant was shown four Rebus symbols and asked to say which one of them 
matched a word that was spoken to them. While Musselwhite and Ruscello did not 
compare their participants' scores to chance, it is possible to perform this comparison 
by conducting one sample t-tests on the data in their paper. These revealed that, for all 
age groups, the participants scored significantly above chance.^ Thus, for at least some 
of the words, the participants were able to identify a Rebus symbol that had an 
equivalent meaning.
Furthermore, this finding appears to generalise to people with learning disabilities. 
Specifically, Mirenda and Locke (1989) used a similar procedure with a sample of 
children and young adults with mild to severe learning disabilities. Again, a reanalysis 
of the data reveals that overall the participants were significantly better than chance at 
identifying the Rebus symbols that matched particular words that were spoken to 
them."  ^ However, while these findings are consistent with the possibility that some 
words and symbols can be used interchangeably to convey the same meaning, it 
would be wrong to conclude from them that the addition of symbols would necessarily 
improve the comprehensibility of written text. This is not least because in these tasks 
the participants had to select a symbol on the basis of a meaning, whereas we are 
interested in the reverse process of deriving a meaning from a symbol, and it is not 
clear that these two processes are of equal difficulty.
 ^ A ccording to M usselw hite and R uscello (1984), their sam ple o f  12 three-year olds had a m ean number 
o f  correct item s o f  13.8 and a standard deviation o f  3 .1 . A  one-sam ple t-test demonstrated that this w as 
sign ificantly  above 7 .5 , w hich  w as the average score that could be obtained by chance ( t ( l l )= 7 .0 4 ,  
p<.01). The sam ples o f  six-year olds, nine year-olds and eighteen to tw enty-one year o lds all had the 
sam e sam ple s ize , a larger mean and a low er standard deviation  than the three-year o ld  sam ple. 
Therefore, they were also significantly above chance (p<.01).
Mirenda and Locke (1989) reported that 23 out o f  29  participants scored 80% or better. T herefore, at 
least 23 out o f  29  participants had a score that w as above chance. A test w as used to com pare this 
proportion to the null hypothesis that 14.5 participants w ould score above chance and 14.5 b e low  
chance i f  the participants w ere guessin g  for all the item s. This revealed that the participants w ere  
performing significantly above chance (%^(1)=9.97, p<.01, N =29).
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The impact of adding symbols on comprehensibility was more directly explored by 
Strydom, Forster, Wilkie, Edwards and Hall (2001). They designed a sample medicine 
information leaflet for people with learning disabilities who were being prescribed 
psychiatric medication. Symbols were added to this leaflet using the 'Writing with 
Symbols' package (e.g. Widgit Software Ltd, 2000a) in an attempt to improve its 
comprehensibility. Four people with learning disabilities were then consulted about 
the leaflet and their understanding of the symbols was also tested. Strydom et al. 
(2001 ; p. 75) report that from these consultations they were able to conclude that the 
symbols' 'meanings were not clear to the consultants li.e. the people with learning 
disabilities! and they were not able to link the symbols to the text.' However, Strydom 
et al. provide no demographic information about the four participants and do not 
describe the method and results upon which they based their conclusions. Therefore, it 
is difficult to evaluate this research. Furthermore, even if the participants in this study 
could not understand the meaning of the symbols used, the results cannot be 
generalised to other people with learning disabilities, because of the lack of 
demographic information, nor to other symbols.
To summarise, a number of authors have suggested that the addition of symbols to 
writing may improve the comprehensibility of the message that is being conveyed. 
There is theoretical support for this proposition, but currently there is only indirect 
empirical evidence to support it. More empirical research on this issue needs to be 
conducted.
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Research Aims
As has already been discussed, people with learning disabilities are too often socially 
excluded and have difficulty accessing services (Department of Health, 2001). 
Therefore, it is crucial that service providers strive to be as inclusive of this population 
as possible. As part of this process, service providers need to try to maximise the 
comprehensibility of their written communications, like letters and information 
leaflets, to people with learning disabilities. However, from the previous review of the 
literature it is clear that there is currently a dearth of empirical and theoretical work to 
act as a guide to how this should be achieved. Therefore, the global aim of this 
research was to generate information that could be used by clinicians and other service 
providers to make written material more comprehensible to adults with mild or 
borderline learning disabilities.
It had been decided to initially just focus on adults with mild or borderline learning 
disabilities to make the project manageable in scope, and because service users within 
this range were more likely to be supplied with written material than service users 
with moderate or severe learning disabilities. The ICD-10 category 'mild' learning 
disability (World Health Organisation, 1992)^ was employed instead of the British 
Psychological Society's 'significant impairment' classification (Professional Affairs 
Board of the British Psychological Society, 2000), since the ICD-10 system was used 
by the community team that was the setting for this study and it was not possible to 
convert the results of their intellectual assessments to the new format, because in some 
cases they were only reported in terms of descriptive categories rather than IQs.
The global aim was sub-divided into several more specific research aims, none of 
which had been satisfactorily addressed by the existing literature. The first of these 
was to establish the distribution of ‘reading-ages’ for the comprehension of written 
passages across a sample of adults with mild and borderline learning disabilities. Such 
information could be particularly useful to clinicians, like some Speech and Language
 ^ In fact, as discussed  earlier, IC D-10 uses the term 'mental retardation' instead o f'learn in g  disability', 
but the tw o are synonym ous, with the latter being preferred in this country (Professional A ffairs Board 
o f  the British Psychological Society, 2000).
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Therapists and Clinical Psychologists, who have gained a sense of the level of writing 
that is understood by children of different ages from extensive experience working 
with children. This sense combined with a knowledge of the distribution of reading- 
ages for adults with mild and borderline learning disabilities should help them to 
judge the level of written communication that would be appropriate for their learning 
disabled clients.
However, not all professionals have an impression of the levels of writing that 
correspond to different reading-ages. Furthermore, there could be idiosyncrasies in the 
reading comprehension of adults with learning disabilities that would not be detected 
simply by generalising from children's reading. Therefore, the second and third 
research aims were to gain an indication of the range of written grammatical 
constructions (e.g. plurals, negatives, embedded sentences etc.) that were understood 
by the sample and to obtain an indication of the range of written single words whose 
meaning they understood. Such information should be useful in helping service- 
providers decide which words and grammatical constructions can be included in their 
written communications to people with learning disabilities.
As has been previously discussed, it has been suggested by a number of authors that 
the addition of symbols to writing may improve the comprehensibility of the message 
that is being conveyed to people with learning disabilities (e.g. Abbott, 2000; Lindsey, 
1998; Moffatt, 1996; Widgit Software Ltd, 2000b), but there is only indirect empirical 
evidence to support this. Therefore, the fourth research aim was to establish whether 
adding Rebus symbols (Widgit Software Ltd., 2000a) to written text, without 
providing any additional training about these symbols, would significantly improve 
the extent to which the sample understood the information that was being conveyed. 
Rebus symbols were selected for study because they were one of the more commonly 
used sets of symbols (W. Reed, personal communication, 2002). It was beyond the 
resources available to this research project to examine the efficacy of other forms of 
symbols. However, it was hoped that this initial study would stimulate such 
comparative research.
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Given that cognitive abilities vary across the population of people with learning 
disabilities (Clements, 1998), it is most probable that the level of reading 
comprehension also does. Therefore, it would be useful for professionals to know if 
they could estimate the level of reading comprehension of particular people with 
learning disabilities on the basis of other information that they had about them. A 
prime candidate to be a predictor is IQ, since theoretical and empirical evidence has 
already been presented to suggest that reading comprehension should be correlated 
with IQ. On the basis of this it can be predicted that there will be a significant positive 
correlation between reading comprehension and IQ in the current study. Therefore, the 
fifth research aim was to test this prediction. If this were found to be accurate then 
clinicians could use a person with learning disabilities' IQ to help them estimate their 
level of reading comprehension.
Finally, there do not appear to be any standardised tests have been specifically 
designed to measure the reading comprehension of adults with learning disabilities. 
Consequently, tests that had been standardised on other populations, and in some 
cases designed for other purposes, had to be used in this study. Therefore, the last 
research aim was to establish the split-half reliability and convergent validity of these 
tests for use as measures of the reading comprehension of adults with mild and 
borderline learning disabilities. Information about their reliability and validity is not 
only important to the interpretation of the results in this study, but should also allow 
clinicians to know whether these tests can be employed in clinical practice to assess 
the reading comprehension of people with learning disabilities.
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Method
Setting, recruitment and participants
This study was conducted in an adult community learning disabilities team that served 
a metropolitan borough. Once ethical approval had been obtained from the local 
Health Authority's and the University's ethics committees, the files of the service- 
users of the community team were examined. Some of these service-users had had a 
formal psychological assessment of the level of their learning disability, but a 
substantial proportion of the files only contained an informal estimate made by the 
service-user's care-manager. It had initially been intended to only invite to participate 
those service-users whose level of learning disability had been formally assessed as 
being in the mild or borderline range. The admissions criteria of the community team 
meant that all the service-users should have had impairments in their adaptive or 
social functioning and an onset of disability below the age of 18. Therefore, following 
the ICD-10 definition of 'mild' and Wechsler et al.'s (1997) definition of 'borderline', 
all the service-users whose IQ had been assessed as being between 50 and 79, 
inclusive, would have been eligible to participate in the study. However, it proved 
difficult to recruit the necessary number of participants. Therefore, the inclusion 
criterion was expanded to also include service-users whose level of learning disability 
had been informally assessed as being in the mild or borderline range, on the 
assumption that their data would excluded from the analyses if their IQ assessed 
during the study lay outside the 50 to 79 range.
According to the information recorded in their community team files 105 service- 
users met this inclusion criterion, and over the course of the study 43 of these were 
randomly selected; the number 43 was chosen because it resulted in a reasonable 
sample size after drop-outs. For each of the 43, the care-manager or another 
professional who was familiar with the service-user was approached to see whether he 
or she thought it would be appropriate to invite the service-user to participate in the 
study. In five cases the care manager or professional said that it would not be 
appropriate; reasons given included 'the service-user has too many professionals 
involved with them at the moment' and 'the service-user would become too anxious if
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they were contacted'. The author approached all 38 service-users for whom approval 
was given. Typically they were visited at a day-centre or at home, where they were 
given an information sheet and consent form (see Appendices 1 and 2 for copies). The 
service-users were asked if they would like to read the information sheet themselves 
or have it read to them. Once they had read or been read the sheet, the service-users 
were encouraged to discuss its contents with the author, staff members, family or 
friends before they made their decision, and they were told that they should take their 
time over the decision. Furthermore, to confirm that they did understand the key 
information contained in the sheet, the service-users were asked some questions about 
its contents; all the service-users who participated in the study answered these 
adequately. Twenty-four service-users gave informed consent and participated in the 
study, the remainder declined. The participants were started on the study as soon as 
they had consented. Those who declined to participate were not asked to explain why, 
since they had been told that they did not have to give reasons for their decision. A 
calculation of the statistical power afforded by this sample size was complicated by 
the fact that a variety of different statistical tests were performed and the Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons was applied. Therefore, power issues will be 
discussed in association with specific tests in the results section. It is sufficient to say 
here that the primary results of interest were statistically significant, and so the sample 
size clearly provided enough power in respect of these.
Demographic information (i.e. date of birth, gender, ethnic origin and level of learning 
disability) was collected from the files of those service-users who participated and 
also those who did not. An analysis of this information, to determine how 
representative the sample was, will be presented in the results section.
Design and procedure
Each participant had their intellectual level briefly assessed, using Raven's (1959) 
Coloured Progressive Matrices (CPM), and the adequacy of their eyesight for this 
study screened, using a newly designed test. In addition, every participant was given a 
number of measures of reading comprehension. These included a test that assessed 
their comprehension of written passages, namely the reading comprehension sub-test
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from the Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions (WORD) battery (Rust, Golombok 
& Trickey, 1993); a measure of their understanding of written grammatical 
constructions, namely a modified version of the Test for the Reception of Grammar 
(TROG; Bishop, 1989); and a test of their knowledge of the meaning of written single 
words, namely a modified version of the British Picture Vocabulary Scale, Long Form 
(BPVS; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Pintilie, 1982).
Furthermore, each participant was given two passages, and the associated 
comprehension questions, from each of the two parallel forms of the Neale Analysis 
of Reading Ability, Revised British Edition (henceforth referred to as the Neale-R; 
Neale et al., 1989). Following a within-subject counterbalanced design. Rebus 
symbols were added to the form-one passages for a random half of the participants 
and to the form-two passages for the remainder. The intention was to determine 
whether the participants’ comprehension scores were higher for the passages with the 
Rebus symbols added than for those presented as plain text.
The order of administration of these measures was first the eye-sight screening test, 
then Raven's CPM, then the WORD reading comprehension sub-test, followed by 
passages from the Neale-R alternating between the two forms, then the modified 
TROG, and finally the modified BPVS. In addition, the participants were asked 
whether English was their first language and whether, and roughly how often, they 
had previously seen symbols of the type used in the study. It took between one and 
three sessions to administer the measures to each participant, and the typical session 
lasted between one and two hours, with the exact length being left to each participant's 
discretion.
Measures
Eyesight screening test. This was a new test that was designed to measure whether the 
participants could adequately see the symbols and text used in the study. The test 
comprised eight items, each on a separate line (see Appendix 3). For each of the first 
four items, the participants were shown a target letter and then asked to point to the 
letter that matched this target in a group of four adjacent letters. The three distracter
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letters were chosen to be similar to the target letter. Furthermore, all the letters were 
similar in font and of an equivalent size to the smallest text used in the reading tests. 
The probability of a participant guessing the correct response to all four items was 
.004 (i.e. .25"^ ), which was smaller than the conventional .05 level of statistical 
significance. Therefore, if a participant responded correctly on all four items, it was 
reasonable to conclude that they were not guessing and that their eyesight was 
probably good enough to see the text used in the study. The second four items in the 
test followed exactly the same format as the first four, except that they comprised 
Rebus symbols that were equivalent in size to those that were added to the Neale-R. 
Following the same reasoning as above, if the participants correctly answered all four 
items then it was concluded that they could see the Rebus symbols used in the study in 
sufficient detail. If the participants had been prescribed reading glasses then they were 
asked to wear these during this test and for the rest of the study.
Raven's Coloured Progressive Matrices (Raven's CPM: Raven. 1959): Given that not 
all of the participants had had their intellectual level formally assessed. Raven's CPM 
was included as a brief, approximate measure of IQ. For each item in this test, the 
examinee is presented with a single, abstract, coloured pattern or a group of such 
patterns. In either case, there is a part missing and the examinee is asked to identify 
the missing piece from a range of six choices. The whole test comprises three sets of 
12 items, which progressively increase in difficulty within each set. For items in set A 
the examinee has to choose a piece to fill the gap in a single pattern, for set Ab they 
have to choose a piece that correctly completes a group of patterns, and set B is 
similar to set Ab but with a stronger analogical reasoning component (Raven, Court & 
Raven, 1984). The examinee's raw score over the three sets can be converted to an 
estimated range within which their IQ lies (Raven et al., 1984).
This particular measure of IQ was chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, it could be 
administered in a relatively short period of time (usually somewhere between ten 
minutes and half an hour), which met the time constraints of the project and probably 
resulted in the service-users being less deterred from participating by the amount of 
testing involved. Secondly, it had been standardised on a population of adults with 
intellectual disabilities and its IQ measurement range encompassed the inclusion
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criteria of 50 to 79 (Raven et al., 1984). Thirdly, it is a generally accepted measure of 
fluid intelligence (Mackintosh, 1998, chap. 6) that has been used to assay intellectual 
level in a number of studies (e.g. Agrawal, 1982; Bishop, 1982; Doubleday, King & 
Papageorgiou, 2002; Jaffe, Pringle & Anderson, 1985). Fourthly, it did not require a 
spoken response and so could be easily administered to participants who had difficulty 
speaking. Fifthly, following the criteria outlined in Clark-Carter (1997), it has 
satisfactory overall split-half reliability, Cronbach's alpha, and two to three week test- 
test reliability, since these were all greater than or equal to .8 (Raven et al, 1984). And 
finally, its criterion and construct validity had been demonstrated, including 'g- 
loadings' between .57 and .98 depending upon the cultural background and nature of 
the sample (Raven et al, 1984).
However, the age (Raven et al., 1984) of the norms for the Raven's CPM and the fact 
that the above-mentioned reliability statistics referred to a child sample meant that it 
was only an approximate measure of intellectual level. Nevertheless, it was 
sufficiently accurate that 82 percent of the participants who met the inclusion criterion 
of having an IQ between 50 and 79, according to a previous formal assessment, also 
met the criterion according to Raven's CPM. In the two cases where there was a 
disagreement, the Raven's CPM suggested that the participants had a higher 
intellectual level than the formal assessment. Such over-estimation would be expected, 
since performance on IQ tests has tended to improve generation on generation 
(Mackintosh, 1998, chap. 2), and so it should be harder to obtain a particular IQ on a 
recently standardised test than on one with older norms, like the Raven's CPM. Thus it 
seems likely that the Raven's CPM may have slightly over-estimated the intellectual 
level of the participants.
The results of the Raven's CPM only had to be used to determine if the inclusion 
criteria had been met for half of the participants, since the other half had already had a 
more thorough formal assessment of their intellectual level. Therefore, assuming that 
the 82 percent figure can be extrapolated, the decision about whether the participants 
met the inclusion criterion was 91 percent in agreement with the assignments that
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would have been made if they had all had a thorough formal assessment of their 
intellectual level.'
Reading comprehension sub-test of the Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions 
(WORD) batterv (Rust et al.. 1993): This test was included to provide an estimate of 
the participants' 'reading-age' for comprehension. It comprises 38 items, which 
progressively increase in difficulty. For each of the first eight items the examinee is 
asked to read a written sentence that is illustrated with a picture, and for all of the 
remaining items they are asked to read a longer, non-illustrated passage. Following 
each item the examiner asks one comprehension question, to which the examinee 
replies orally. For example, having been shown the sentence 'the dog was running to 
get his dinner', the examinee is asked 'why was the dog running?' The examinee is 
credited one point for each correct answer, and the test is stopped if they score zero on 
four consecutive items. The WORD was designed to assess the reading of children, 
and consequently was standardised on a sample of American children, and on a 
sample of British children between the ages of 6 and 16. The spilt-half and test-retest 
reliability of the reading comprehension sub-test exceeded .8 (Rust et al., 1993), 
which is satisfactory according to Clark-Carter (1997). Furthermore, this sub-test 
showed adequate levels of criterion-validity, since its correlations with other measures 
of reading comprehension ranged from .78 to .81 (Rust et al., 1993).
Even though the WORD had not been standardised on a sample of adults with 
learning disabilities, its reading comprehension sub-test was included in the study 
because one of the scores it provided was an age-equivalent for the examinee's reading 
comprehension. It was administered in a standardised manner, except that all the 
participants were started on item one, since the age-based start rules in the test manual 
were only meaningful when the test was being used on children. Furthermore, it was 
planned to estimate the sub-test's reliability and validity for a learning disabled 
population by calculating its split-half reliability and the convergent validity between 
the various measures of reading that were to be administered. That said, it is possible 
that the test may have underestimated the reading comprehension of some of the
The 91 percent figure arise because 50* 82/100 +  50 =  91.
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participants, because it required them to demonstrate their comprehension by orally 
answering questions and so their performance could have been impaired by expressive 
language problems (cf. Finlay & Lyons, 2001). However, it had not been possible to 
find an alternative reading comprehension test that was more suitable for use with 
adults with learning disabilities.
Passages from the Neale Analysis of Reading Ability. Revised British Edition tNeale- 
R: Neale et al.. 1989): The Neale-R is designed to assess the reading ability of 
children between the ages of 6 and 12. It has two parallel forms designed to be of a 
similar level of difficulty. Each form has six illustrated passages that progressively 
increase in difficulty and which are referred to as levels one to six; the illustrations are 
supposed to set the scene for each story rather than provide substantial information 
concerning the detail of its contents. During testing the examinee is asked to read 
aloud the passages from one of the forms. For each passage the reading errors that 
they make are classified and scored, and some prompting by the examiner is provided 
if necessary. In addition, following each passage the examiner asks a series of 
comprehension questions, which require an oral response. An excerpt from a passage 
and an example of a comprehension question are provided in Figure 4; note that unlike 
in this figure the passages in the Neale-R are not accompanied by symbols. 
Administration is stopped if the examinee's number of errors exceeds a certain 
criterion. The test was standardised on a sample of primary and secondary school 
children. The coefficient alphas for the reading comprehension part of the test were 
above .9 and the correlation between the parallel forms was above .84 for all age 
groups, indicating satisfactory reliability for a child population (cf. Clark-Carter, 
1997). In addition, the reading comprehension part of the test showed adequate 
validity, including correlations ranging from .61 to .80 between its score and other 
measures of reading.
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A bird hopped up to my window.
I gave her some bread
Figure 4: An excerpt from the symbolised version o f the level one passage from  form  
one o f the Neale-R. The excerpt has been reduced in size to fit. The original size 
specifications are given in the main text. One o f the comprehension questions relating 
to this excerpt was: ' where did the bird hop to?'
For the purpose of assessing whether the addition of Rebus symbols improved 
comprehension, each participant was given the level one and level two passages (i.e. 
the easiest two passages) from each of the two parallel forms; for all participants the 
order of administration was level one from form one, followed by level one from form 
two, then level two from form one and finally level two from form two. As outlined 
earlier, a random half of the participants saw the form one passages as plain text and 
the form two passages with Rebus symbols, while the reverse occurred for the 
remainder.
The plain text passages were reprinted in black ink on white paper using size 26 Arial 
font without the accompanying illustrations, in case these aided reading 
comprehension. For the symbolised versions the same size and arrangement of text 
was used. The Rebus symbols were added to this using the ‘Writing with Symbols 
2000 Version 2’ computer program and were taken from word-list 'RebusOO' (Widgit
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Software Ltd., 2000a; 2000b). The symbols were size 24 black line drawings, with a 
line thickness of one. The symbols were added under the supervision of a speech and 
language therapist who had been qualified for 22 years and who had worked with 
symbols for at least 15 years, and with the help of two other less experienced speech 
and language therapists. The involvement of these therapists was intended to try to 
ensure that the symbols were added to the text in the most appropriate way. The 
symbols chosen were not always those that were initially recommended by the 
computer programme. Rather the symbols were selected, as they would have been in 
clinical practice, in order to maximise the chances of the participants comprehending 
the information that was being conveyed by the passage. Furthermore, in cases where 
the researcher and therapists could not find a symbol that they thought would help 
comprehension, words or phrases were not symbolised. It was envisaged that if the 
addition of these symbols significantly improved comprehension then future research 
would develop detailed guidelines with regard to how best to add these symbols. It is 
also worth noting that the symbols were added to each passage before the researcher 
and the therapists looked at the comprehension questions that the participants would 
be asked, to ensure that the choice of symbols had not been specifically tailored to 
allow the comprehension questions to be answered. An example of piece of 
symbolised text is provided in Figure 4.
Given that only reading comprehension was of interest in this study, the accuracy of 
the participants' reading was not assessed and so they were not required to read aloud, 
though they could do so if they wished. Furthermore, unlike in the standard Neale-R, 
no prompting was provided in case it affected the comprehension scores. After 
reading each passage the participants were asked the associated comprehension 
questions and they were allowed to reread as much of the passage as they wished 
before they orally answered each question. There were four questions following each 
level one passage and eight questions following the longer level two passages. The 
criteria for correct answers outline in the Neale-R manual were followed and each 
correct answer scored one point. Thus, every participant had a comprehension score 
out of twelve for the symbolised passages and another score out of twelve for the non­
symbolised ones.
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In addition, since the Neale-R had not been standardised on adults with learning 
disabilities and was not being administered in the normal manner, the convergent 
validity of the plain text version with the other measures of reading used in this study 
was examined and the split-half reliability of both versions was calculated.
The modified Test for the Reception of Grammar (TROG: Bishop. 1989): The TROG 
is designed to assess children's or adults' comprehension of spoken grammatical 
constructions (Bishop, 1989). Each item in this test comprises a page with four simple 
cartoon illustrations on it. The examinee has to identify which one of the pictures 
matches the phrase or word that is spoken to them. The items are grouped into blocks 
of four, with each block including a more difficult grammatical construction than the 
last. Details of the grammatical constructions tested by each block are provided in 
Table 1. The examinee passes a block if they answer all four items correctly. Passing 
indicates that they are likely to understand the grammatical construction the block 
assesses, because the probability of them guessing correctly on all four items is .004 
(i.e. .25"^ ). Furthermore, even if they used a partial understanding of the phrases to 
exclude two of the multiple choices on each item, the probability of them guessing all 
four items correctly is still low (i.e. .5"^  which is .063; Bishop, 1989). Testing is 
discontinued when the examinee fails five consecutive blocks. In addition, a 
'vocabulary check' can also be administered. For each item of this the examinee is read 
one of the words used in the main test and then asked to select from a range of eight 
pictures the one that matches it. If the examinee fails items on the vocabulary check 
then a table in the test manual can be used to determine whether their errors on the 
TROG were due to this. Thus, failures due to poor vocabulary can be distinguished 
from those due to a lack of grammatical understanding.
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Block Grammatical Construction Being Tested An Example Item
A noun shoe
B verb eating
C adjective long
D two element combination The boy is running.
E negative The boy is not running.
F three element combination The boy is jumping over the box.
G singular/plural personal pronoun They are sitting on the table.
H reversible active The girl is pushing the horse.
I masculine/feminine personal pronoun She is sitting on the chair.
J singular/plural noun inflection The cats look at the ball.
K comparati ve/absol ute The knife is longer than the pencil.
L reversible passive The girl is chased by the horse.
M in and on The cup is in the box.
N postmodified subject The boy chasing the horse is fat.
O X but not Y The box but not the chair is red.
P above and below The pencil is above the flower.
Q not only X but also Y The box is not only big but also blue.
R relative clause The pencil is on the book that is yellow.
S neither X nor Y Neither the dog nor the ball is brown.
T embedded sentence The book the pencil is on is red.
Table 1 : A list o f the grammatical constructions measured by the Test fo r  the 
Reception o f Grammar, along with example items. This table has been adapted from  
Bishop (1989).
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To test the participants' understanding of written grammatical constructions, the 
TROG was administered with the modification that the phrases were presented as text 
(size 36 Times font) rather than orally. It had been used in this modality previously 
(Bishop, 1982), but norms were not available (D. Bishop, personal communication, 
October 30, 2002). Nevertheless, it was employed because no other more suitable 
measure of written grammatical comprehension could be found. Moreover, its split- 
half reliability and convergent validity would be calculated for the sample in this 
study. All the participants were started on the first block and stopped after failing five 
consecutive blocks. The vocabulary check was administered, in a written form, only to 
those participants who passed at least one block of the TROG, since there were 
concerns that it could have been upsetting for illiterate participants to have to endure 
all 48 items of the vocabulary check.
The modified British Picture Vocabulary Scale. Long Form TBPVS: Dunn, et al.. 
1982):  ^The BPVS is designed to measure children's understanding of single spoken 
words. In a similar fashion to the TROG, each of its 150 items comprises a page with 
four simple cartoon illustrations on it, and the examinee has to identify which one of 
the pictures illustrates the meaning of a word that is spoken to them. During the 
scoring, a 'basal' is defined as the highest eight consecutive items that the examinee 
got correct, and all items below the basal are scored as correct; this procedure means 
that all the items do not have to be administered to the more able examinees. Testing 
is discontinued if the examinee fails six out of any eight consecutive items, and the 
raw score is the total number of correct items. For a child sample, this measure 
showed good reliability, for example a median split-half reliability of .91 (Dunn et al., 
1982). Evidence for its predictive, concurrent or convergent validity is not presented 
in the test manual (Dunn et al., 1982); however it was planned to calculate the 
convergent validity and spilt-half reliability of the modified version of the BPVS used 
in this study.
’ The second edition o f  the BPVS w as not used because the psychology department that w as the setting  
for this research did not have a copy o f  this. H ow ever, the age o f  the first edition's norms (D unn et al., 
1982) w as not a problem  because the norm s w ere not used s in ce  it w as not adm in istered  in a 
standardised fashion.
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The modification was to present the words as text (size 36 Times font) rather than 
orally, in order to measure the participants' comprehension of written words. Given 
that the participants' word reading abilities were unknown, they were all started on 
item one. The discontinue rule and scoring procedure, including the use of a basal, 
were the same as in the standard version of the test. An appropriate alternative test that 
was specifically designed to assay understanding of written single words could not be 
found.
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Results
Apart from where it has been stated to the contrary, the following tests have been 
evaluated at a two-tailed level of significance.
The properties and representativeness o f the sample
English was the first language of all of the participants and they all passed all the 
items on the eyesight screening test. Therefore, none had to be excluded from the 
study due to poor eyesight. Half of the 24 participants had not had their intellectual 
level formally assessed prior to this study. According to the Raven's CPM, the IQ of 
five of these participants lay above the inclusion range of 50 to 79. However, it was 
decided that the data from these five participants should not be completely excluded 
from the analyses because they were still service-users of a community learning 
disability team. Therefore, all the analyses were performed on two samples, namely 
the 'full sample' containing all 24 service-users who participated in the study and a 
'restricted sample' that comprised only those 19 participants whose IQ lay in the range 
50 to 79, inclusive. The restricted sample was still roughly balanced with respect to 
the Neale-R counterbalancing, with 10 participants in one counterbalance group and 9 
in the other. The counterbalancing will be considered in more detail later.
Full sample: To gain an indication of the extent to which the results from the full 
sample could be generalised, some of its demographic properties were compared to 
those of the remainder of the population of service-users who were eligible to 
participate in the study; this included both those service-users who had declined to 
participate and those who had never been approached but who fulfilled the recruitment 
criteria. These service-users were divided into two groups depending upon whether 
their level of learning disability had been formally assessed by a psychologist or only 
informally assessed by a care-manager. The formally assessed group comprised 45 
service-users, while the informally assessed group included 48 service-users. Eleven 
service-users whose files were not available at the time of data collection were 
excluded.
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The variables for comparison were gender, age, ethnic group and intellectual level; no 
other demographic information was consistently recorded in the community team's 
files. To maintain the family-wise a  at .05 while four different variables were 
compared, the Bonferroni correction was applied, resulting in a level of a=.0125 for 
each comparison. G*Power (Buchner, Paul & Erdfelder, 1997) indicated that for this 
level of a  and a power of .95, the tests, which will be described shortly, had 
sufficient sample size to detect a 'large' effect but not a 'medium' effect (Cohen, 1988); 
Cohen (1988) recommends that the stringent target of a power of .95 is employed 
when trying to support the null hypothesis, as is the case here. For each variable of 
interest, an overall test comparing the three groups (i.e. the full sample, the 
formally assessed remainder and the informally assessed remainder) was performed in 
preference to three pair-wise comparisons, because the additional Bonferroni 
correction required for the latter would have made them less powerful. For clarity, the 
p values that are reported for the following tests are the Bonferroni corrected values 
(i.e. the original values multiplied by four), so p<.05 still indicates significance.
The numbers of males and females in the full sample, in the formally tested remainder 
of the population and in the informally tested remainder are given in Table 2. A three 
by two test revealed that the gender balance did not reliably differ between these 
three groups (x\2)= 0.17, n.s., N=117, Bonferroni corrected for four comparisons).
To compare the distribution of the service-users' ages, for each group a frequency 
distribution was calculated using the age bands 18-40,41-60, and 614-; for the service- 
users in the full sample their age on the first day of testing was employed, while for 
the other two groups age was calculated for the mid-point of the data collection phase 
of the study. The distributions are shown in Table 2. A three by three test on these 
data demonstrated that the age distributions did not significantly differ across the three 
groups (x^(4)= 10.89, n.s., N=I 17, Bonferroni corrected for four comparisons).
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Full Sample Formally Assessed 
Remainder
Inform ally Assessed 
Rem ainder
Gender
Male 14 28 28
Female 10 17 20
Age
18-40 9 30 28
41-60 14 10 13
60+ 1 5 7
Ethnicity
Data Missing 0 3 0
White British 22 29 41
White Other 2 4 4
Other 0 9 3
Intellectual Level
Mild 15 28 45
Borderline 4 7 1
> Borderline 5 10 2
Table 2: The number o f service-users in the fu ll sample and the comparable formally 
and informally assessed remainders who fe ll into each demographic category. 
Graphical representations o f these data can be found in Appendix 4.
The community team files used a variety of labels to categorise the ethnic origin of the 
service-users, including 'White British', 'White Other', 'Black Caribbean' and 'Indian' 
amongst others. However, due to the small number of participants from ethnic 
minorities, the ethnicity distribution for the three groups was calculated using the 
categories 'White British', 'White Other' and 'Other'. The frequencies are shown in
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Table 2. However, even with only three categories, it was not possible to conduct a yf 
test on these data due to the high number of expected values below five. Therefore, 
'White Other' was collapsed together with 'Other' and a two by three test was 
performed. This revealed that the ethnicity distribution did not reliably differ across 
the three groups (x^(2)=6.20, n.s., N=114, Bonferroni corrected for four comparisons).
To compare the distribution of intellectual levels across the three groups, the service- 
users were divided into the categories 'mild disability', 'borderline disability' and 
'above borderline' depending upon their intellectual level. Specifically, following ICD- 
10 (World Health Organisation, 1992), the service-users in the sample and formally 
assessed remainder whose IQ was in the range 50 to 69, inclusive, were classified as 
being 'mildly' disabled. The WAIS-III descriptor 'borderline' (Wechsler et al., 1997) 
was applied to those service-users whose IQ was above 69 and below 80, and the 
remainder were assigned the label 'above borderline'. For the sample, the IQ given by 
the Raven's CPM was only used to determine the intellectual level if a more thorough 
formal assessment was not available on file. The service-users in the informally 
assessed remainder were assigned a category based on the informal assessment of 
their intellectual level that the care manager had recorded in the file. Of course, the 
division of the service-users' intellectual levels into these three categories was 
somewhat arbitrary and it ignored the fact that IQs have a measurement error and 
therefore should be properly be quoted as a range rather than a single figure (Wechsler 
et al., 1997). Nevertheless, this procedure did allow the distribution of intellectual 
levels to be roughly compared between the groups. The distributions are illustrated in 
Table 2.
It was not possible to conduct a test on these data due to the proportion of expected 
values below five, so a three by two test was performed with the categories 
'borderline' and 'above borderline' collapsed together. This demonstrated that the 
distributions were not equivalent across the three groups (%^(2)=I5.00, p<.01, N=117, 
Bonferroni corrected for four comparisons). Subsequent pair-wise comparisons 
revealed that this difference arose, at least in part, because the relative proportion of 
service-users with a mild intellectual disability was significantly greater in the 
informally assessed remainder than the formally assessed remainder (%^(I)=11.87,
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p<01, N=93, Bonferroni corrected for the three potential pair-wise comparisons). The 
full sample did not reliably differ from the formally assessed remainder (x^(l)=0.00, 
p=l, N=69, Bonferroni corrected for three comparisons), and it was not possible to 
compare the sample with the informal remainder due to an expected value below five. 
Of course, the difference between the formally and informally assessed remainders 
may have been due to the different way in which intellectual level was measured for 
these two groups, rather represent a real difference. This matter will be returned to in 
the Discussion.
Restricted Sample: These analyses were repeated in order to assess how representative 
the restricted sample (N=19) was. In this case, service-users whose intellect had been 
assessed as being above the borderline level were excluded from the formally and 
informally assessed remainders, since they had also been excluded from the restricted 
sample. This resulted in a group size of 35 for the formally assessed remainder and 46 
for the informal group. Again, the Bonferroni correction for four comparisons was 
applied, resulting in tests powerful enough to detect a large but not medium effect.
The male to female balance in the restricted sample and in the comparable formally 
and informally assessed remainders are given in Table 3. A three by two test 
demonstrated that the male to female ratio did not significantly differ between these 
three groups (x^(2)=0.29, n.s., N=IOO, Bonferroni corrected for four comparisons).
When the age distributions were divided into the bands 18-40, 41-60, and 61+, which 
were used in the analysis of the full sample, it was not possible to conduct a three by 
three test due to the high proportion of expected values below five. Therefore, the 
age bands were altered to 18-50 and 51+, so that they bisected the age range, and a 
two by three test was performed. This showed that the age distribution did not reliably 
differ across the groups, at least when banded in this manner (x^(2)=3.00, n.s., N=IOO, 
Bonferroni corrected for four comparisons). The frequencies per age band and group 
are shown in Table 3.
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Restricted
Sample
Formally Assessed 
Remainder
Inform ally Assessed 
Rem ainder
Gender
Male 10 21 27
Female 9 14 19
Age
18-50 10 25 34
51 + 9 10 12
Ethnicity
Data Missing 0 3 0
White British 18 23 41
White Other 1 3 3
Other 0 6 2
Intellectual Level
Mild 15 28 45
Borderline 4 7 1
Table 3: The number o f service-users in the restricted sample and the comparable 
formally and informally assessed remainders who fe ll into each demographic 
category. Graphical representations o f these data can be found in Appendix 4.
The distribution of ethnicity across the three groups is shown in Table 3. 
Unfortunately however, it was not possible to conduct a test on these data due to 
the high number of expected values below five, and collapsing ’White Other' together 
with 'Other' did not change this situation.
The distribution of the different intellectual levels within the three groups is shown in 
Table 3. Again, the high number of expected values below five meant that it was not 
possible to perform a y^ test. Nor was it possible to meaningfully collapse categories.
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since there were already only two levels of intellectual disability, due to the fact that 
service-users with an intellectual level above borderline had not been included in the 
analysis because they were excluded from the restricted sample.
To summarise, the only evidence of a significant difference between the groups 
occurred when the distribution of intellectual levels was compared between the full 
sample and the comparable formally and informally assessed remainders, and this was 
at least in part driven by a reliable difference in distributions between the formal and 
informal remainders that may have arisen due to the different way in which the 
intellectual level of these two groups was measured. While none of the other 
comparisons involving the full or restricted sample reached significance, the tests 
were only powerful enough to detect a large effect size, and in some cases it was not 
even possible to perform a test due to the high number of expected values below five.
The split-half reliability and convergent validity o f the reading tests
The reading comprehension sub-test of the WORD, modified TROG, modified BPVS 
and Neale-R had not been standardised on a population of adults with mild or 
borderline learning disabilities. Therefore, before the participants' overall performance 
on these measures was considered, their reliability and validity for this population 
were examined. However, these were only exploratory analyses, since the sample size 
was substantially smaller than the 200 to 300 participants that has been recommended 
for such a purpose (Kline, 1986). Nonetheless they are worth reporting because, as 
will be seen, they were sufficiently powerful to suggest high levels of reliability and 
convergent validity.
It was not appropriate to calculate the WORD reading comprehension sub-test's 
reliability using measures, like Cronbach's alpha, that required inter-items 
correlations, since the discontinue rule meant that not all the test items were 
administered to every participant (cf. Dunn et al., 1982). Therefore, following the 
approach adopted in the analysis of the original standardization sample of the WORD 
(Rust et al., 1993), the split-half method was employed. To this end, for each 
participant a raw score was calculated for the odd numbered test items that they had
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completed and another score calculated for the completed even numbered items; an 
odd-even split was chosen because the items increased in difficulty. Given that for 
both the full and restricted samples these data were positively skewed, due in part to a 
floor effect, the correlations between them were calculated using Spearman’s rho. 
There was a significant positive correlation between the odd and even item scores, for 
both samples (full sample: rho=.94, p<.01, N=24; restricted sample: rho=.97, p<.01, 
N=19); the scatter-plots associated with these correlations can be found in Appendix 
5. The Spearman Brown prophecy formula was applied to these correlations to 
compute the reliability coefficients for the whole test (Crocher & Algina, 1986), 
giving a coefficient of .97 for the full sample and .98 for the restricted sample. 
Following Clark-Carter (1997), this is a satisfactory level of reliability, and it is 
similar to the levels reported in the WORD manual for its standardization sample 
(Rust et al., 1993).
The reliability of the symbolised and plain text versions of the Neale-R was also 
calculated using the odd-even split-half method. Separate reliabilities were calculated 
for each of the two forms of the two versions, and Spearman's rho was employed 
because the data deviated from normality. As can be seen from Table 4, both forms 
showed satisfactory split-half reliability (i.e. >.7; Clark-Carter, 1997) in both their 
plain text and symbolised versions. The scatter-plots associated with these correlations 
can be found in Appendix 5.
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Plain Text Version Symbolised Text Version
Form 1 Form 2 Form 1 Form 2
Full sample
N=12
rho=.88,
p<.01
r=.93
N=12 
rho=.77, p<.05
r=.87
N=12
rho=.88,
p<.01
r=.94
N=12
rho=.88,
p<.01
r=.94
Restricted sample
N=9
rho=.84,
p<.05
r=.91
N=10 
rho=.84, p<.01
r=.91
N=10
rho=.93,
p<.01
r=.96
N=9
rho=.93,
p<.01
r=.97
Table 4: The Spearman's correlations between odd and even numbered items fo r  the 
two versions and forms o f the Neale-R, along with the reliability coefficients (r) that 
were produced when the Spearman-Brown prophecy was used to correct fo r  test 
length. The p values associated with each correlation have been Bonferroni corrected 
(i.e. they are the original values multiplied by four), so p<.05 still indicates 
significance.
The same approach was used to assess the TROG's reliability. To allow comparison 
with the reliability scores in the TROG manual (Bishop, 1989), the raw scores used in 
the calculation were the number of odd blocks passed and the number of even blocks 
passed. Since these data deviated from normality due to a floor effect, Spearman's rho 
was used to calculate the correlations between them. For both the full and restricted 
samples, there was a significant positive correlation between the scores for the odd 
and even blocks (full sample: rho=.93, p<.01, N=24; restricted sample: rho=.92, 
p<.01, N=19); the scatter-plots may be found in Appendix 5. When the Spearman 
Brown prophecy formula was applied to these correlations it gave a reliability 
coefficient of .97 for the full sample and .96 for the restricted sample. These levels of 
reliability are satisfactory (Clark-Carter, 1997), and are higher than those reported for 
the TROG's original standardization sample (Bishop, 1989).
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Recall that the BPVS has both a basal (the highest correct eight consecutive items) 
and a ceiling, after which the administration is stopped. The split-half reliability 
reported in the test manual (Dunn et al., 1982) was only based on those items in 
between the floor item of the basal and the top item of the ceiling, inclusive. This was 
because they were the only items consistently administered during standardization, 
since items after the ceiling were not administered and for older examinees not all the 
items below the basal were administered. The same approach to calculating reliability 
was employed for the current BPVS data, both to allow comparison with the 
reliability quoted in the test manual and to produce a reliability that would be of use in 
future to clinicians who did not administer all the items below the basal. Given that 
the data deviated from normality, as a result of a floor effect, Spearman's rho was 
employed. This showed that there was a significant positive correlation between the 
odd and even item scores, for both samples (full sample: rho=.93, p<.01, N=24; 
restricted sample: rho=.96, p<01, N=19); the scatter-plots for these correlations are in 
Appendix 5. The Spearman Brown prophecy formula applied to these correlations 
gave reliability coefficients for the whole test of .97 for the full sample and .98 for the 
restricted sample. These are satisfactory reliability coefficients (Clark-Carter, 1997), 
and are slightly higher than those reported in the BPVS manual (Dunn et al., 1982).
Given that the WORD reading comprehension sub-test, the plain text version of the 
Neale-R, the TROG and the BPVS were all supposed to be measuring the same or 
highly related psychological constructs, their convergent validity was assessed by 
examining the correlations between the participants' performance on them. The scores 
used included the BPVS raw score, the number of blocks passed on the TROG, the 
raw score on the plain text version of the Neale-R and the age equivalent (in months) 
for the reading comprehension sub-test of the WORD. The age equivalent score was 
chosen for the WORD rather than the standard score because the test manual did not 
supply standard score norms for adults. It was appropriate to collapse across the two 
counterbalance groups of the Neale-R and treat the plain text scores of all the 
participants as if they were from the same measure because there were no reliable 
differences between the overall scores for two counterbalance conditions, as will be 
discussed in detail later. Scores on the symbolised version of the Neale-R were not 
included in the assessment of convergent validity, because the addition of symbols
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may have meant that these scores were influenced by additional psychological 
processes to those involved in reading comprehension.
An exploratory analysis revealed that, for both the full and restricted samples, the data 
from the WORD, BPVS, TROG and plain text version of the Neale-R were not 
normally distributed because of floor effects. Therefore, the inter-test correlations 
were calculated using Spearman's rho. Given that six correlations were conducted for 
each sample, their significance levels were adjusted using the Bonferroni correction 
for multiple tests. The correlations and their associated significance levels are 
presented in Table 5. The scatter-plots associated with these correlations can be found 
in Appendix 6.
W ORD Reading 
Comprehension A ge  
Equivalent (M onths)
N eale-R  Plain 
T ext Version  
(Raw Score)
TROG (Num ber 
o f B locks  
Passed)
B PV S Raw  
Score
W ORD Reading 
Com prehension A ge  
Equivalent 
(M onths)
h
rho=.84 
N=24, p<.01
rho=.88 
N=24, p<.01
rho=.91 
N=24, p<.01
N eale-R  Plain Text 
V ersion (Raw  
Score)
rho=.85 
N=19, p<.01
N | rho=.85 
0 0  N—24, p<.01
rho=.83 
N=24, p<.01
TROG (Num ber o f  
B locks Passed)
rho=.90
N=19,p<.01
rho=.84
N=19,p<.01
rho=.82
Y  " 1  N=24,p<.01
B PV S Raw Score rho=.94 
N=19, p<.01
rho=.87
N=19,p<.01
rho=.86 
N=19, p<.01
Table 5: The Spearman's correlations between the participants' scores on the various 
measures. The p values associated with each correlation have been Bonferroni 
corrected (i.e. they are the original values multiplied by six), so p<.05 still indicates 
significance. The results above the diagonal are those for the fu ll sample (N=24) and 
those below it, which are shaded grey, are for the restricted sample (N-19).
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It can be seen that for both samples all the measures showed reasonable convergent 
validity, since there were large, significant, positive correlations between them all (cf. 
Steering Committee on Test Standards, 1995).
To summarise, the WORD reading comprehension sub-test, modified TROG, 
modified BPVS, and Neale-R showed satisfactory levels of split-half reliability and 
convergent validity for both the full and restricted samples. It is therefore meaningful 
to consider the distributions of the participants' scores on these measures.
The distribution o f ‘reading-ages ’ fo r the comprehension o f written passages, as 
measured by the WORD Reading Comprehension sub-test
The participants' age equivalent scores from the WORD reading comprehension sub­
test are presented in Figure 5. For the full sample the scores ranged from 72 months 
(i.e. 6 years 0 months), which was the floor of the test, to 114 months (i.e. 9 years 6 
months), which was substantially below the test's ceiling of 204 months. The median 
was 78 months (i.e. 6 years 6 months) and the mode was the floor of the test (i.e. 72 
months). The scores for the restricted sample had the same maximum, minimum, 
median and mode. For both samples there was a notable floor effect. Means and 
standard deviations have not been presented because the distributions deviated from 
normality.
213
CO<u
CO
03U
O
<DJH
E3Z
80 85 90 95 100 105 110  1157570
WORD Reading Comprehension Age Equivalent (Months)
o
<D
E3z
85  9 0  95  100  105  110  11570 75  80
WORD Reading Comprehension Age Equivalent (Months)
Figure 5: Top: A histogram o f the fu ll sample's age equivalent scores on the reading 
comprehension sub-test o f the WORD. Bottom: The data for the restricted sample.
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The range o f written grammatical constructions understood by the sample, as 
measured by the TROG
The distributions of the participants' overall scores on the TROG, for both the full and 
restricted samples, are presented in Figure 6. Since they deviated from normality, 
these data will be described in non-parametric terms. For the full sample the number 
of blocks the participants passed ranged from 0 to 19 (the ceiling was 20), the median 
was 7.5 and the mode was 0. For the restricted sample the median was 7, the mode 
was 0 and the range was from 0 to 15. There was a floor effect in both samples.
These data were examined in more detail by calculating the number of participants 
who passed each block. The resulting bar charts are presented in Figure 7. When 
considering Figure 7, it is reasonable to assume that the majority of the participants 
who passed a particular block understood the written grammatical construction that 
was being tested by that block, given the low probability of passing by guess-work or 
using a partial understanding, which has already been discussed in the Method. 
However, it should not be assumed that failure on a particular block implies that a 
participant did not understand the grammatical construction, since the fact that all the 
items needed to be answered correctly in order to pass a block meant that some of the 
participants may simply have failed a block due to a concentration lapse on one item.
From Figure 7 it can be seen that there was a trend for more participants to pass the 
earlier blocks than the later ones. Given that the blocks were arranged in order of 
increasing difficulty of grammatical constructions for oral presentation, this trend is 
consistent with the possibility that their relative difficulty is similar for written 
presentation. However, it could also be an artefact, because the discontinuation rule 
means that fewer participants were tested on the later blocks than the earlier ones. 
This matter will be returned to in the Discussion.
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Number of blocks passed on the TROG (max. 20)
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Number of blocks passed on the TROG (max. 20)
Figure 6: Histograms showing the distributions o f the participants' overall scores on the 
TROG. Top: The data for the full sample. Bottom: The data for the restricted sample.
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Figure 7: Bar charts showing the participants' performance on each block o f the TROG. Top: 
The data for the fu ll sample. Bottom: The data for the restricted sample. The grammatical 
constructions measured by each block are listed on the horizontal axis o f  the bottom chart. 
('Postmod. subject' is short fo r 'Post-modified subject', while 'not only X  but ..' is short for  
"not only X but also Y'.)
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Finally, the participants’ errors on the TROG vocabulary check were compared to 
those that they made on the main test, in order to determine whether they could have 
failed any of the blocks as a result of a poor sight-vocabulary rather than poor 
grammar. This comparison suggested that, apart from those participants whose 
performance on the main test was so poor (i.e. at or near floor) that it was not 
meaningful to distinguish between vocabulary and grammatical errors, only one 
participant (who was a member of both samples) may have failed one block as a result 
of poor sight-vocabulary, rather than poor grammar.
Single word comprehension, as measured by the BPVS
The distributions of BPVS raw scores are presented in Figure 8; the raw scores had to 
be employed instead of standard scores because appropriate norms were not available. 
They will be described in non-parametric terms since they deviated from normality. 
For the full sample the median was 49.5, the mode was 1 and the scores ranged 
between 0 and 103, with the latter being substantially below the ceiling of 150. To 
make these scores more meaningful it is useful to consider what items they relate to 
on the BPVS. If a participant scored 0 then he or she was unable to comprehend 
words as basic as ’hand’ and ’money’, which were the first two items of the test. The 
49'^ and 50“’ items of the BPVS were ’wrist’ and ’waiter’, while the 103"“ item was 
’parallelogram’. Of course a participant who achieved a raw score of 103 did not 
necessarily pass the 103rd item and fail the subsequent items, since they may have 
failed some earlier items and passed some subsequent ones. However, the identity of 
these particular items gives a feel for the level of difficult that these scores correspond 
to. The minimum, maximum and mode for the restricted sample were the same as for 
the full sample, and its median was 38.0. The 38“’ item on the BPVS was the word 
’ankle’. As with the two previous measures, there was a marked floor effect in both 
samples.
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Figure 8: Histograms showing the distributions o f the participants' BPVS raw scores. Top: 
The data for the full sample. Bottom: The data for the restricted sample.
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To examine the data in more detail, the items were divided into blocks of five, with 
items one to five forming 'block A', items six to ten forming 'block B' and so on. A 
participant was considered to have passed a block only if they had got all of the items 
in that block correct. Figure 9 shows the number of participants who passed each 
'block' of the BPVS, for both the full and restricted samples. Given that for each item 
the participants were asked to select the correct answer from four choices, the 
probability of a participant passing a block if they were completely guessing was low 
(i.e. .25^ which is .001). Indeed, even if they used partial comprehension of the items, 
like knowledge of the beginning sounds of the words, to exclude two of the choices in 
some cases, the probability of them passing a block would still be below the level 
required for statistical significance, since .5  ^ is less than .05. Thus it is reasonable to 
assume that the majority of participants who passed a particular block were likely to 
have comprehended the meaning of at least some of the items that made up that block.
From Figure 9 it can be seen that there was a broad trend for more participants to pass 
the earlier blocks than the later ones. The items (and so the blocks) on the BPVS are 
arranged in order of increasing difficulty with respect to oral presentation. Therefore, 
one possible explanation of this trend is that the relative difficulty of the items is 
similar for written and oral presentation. However, as with the TROG, the trend could 
also be due to the fact that fewer participants were tested on the later blocks than the 
earlier ones due to the discontinuation rule. This matter will be returned to in the 
Discussion.
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Figure 9: Bar charts showing the participants' performance on each 'block' o f the BPVS. Top: 
The data for the full sample. Bottom: The data for the restricted sample.
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The effect on reading comprehension of adding Rebus symbols to text
Recall that each participant had their comprehension tested on passages from the two 
forms of the Neale-R, with the passages in one form being presented as plain text and 
those in the other form being accompanied by Rebus symbols. In each form the 
participants were asked twelve comprehension questions and were given one point for 
each correct answer. Thus each participant had a comprehension score out of twelve 
for the plain text and another score out of twelve for the symbolised text. An 
exploratory analysis of these scores indicated that they did not meet the parametric 
assumption of normality. Therefore, non-parametric tests were employed to analyse 
them.
The form of the Neale-R that was symbolised was counterbalanced between 
participants. To determine whether there was any difference in the difficulty of the 
two forms, the participants' plain text scores were divided into two groups, depending 
upon whether it was form one or two that they were given as plain text. Mann- 
Whitney U Tests revealed that the scores did not differ between these two groups, 
both for the full sample (U=67.0, n.s., N=24) and for the restricted sample (U=43.5, 
n.s., N=19). Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics that accompany this analysis; 
group one had been given passages from form one of the Neale-R as plain text, and 
passages from form two symbolised, and the reverse assignment occurred for group 
two. The means and standard deviations in Table 6 should be interpreted with caution 
because the data deviated from normality.
A similar analysis showed that, for both samples, the participants' comprehension 
scores for the symbolised text did not reliably differ between the two forms (full 
sample: U=71.0, n.s., N=24; restricted sample: U=45.0, n.s., N=19); see Table 6 for 
the descriptive statistics. In addition, to determine whether there was an interaction 
between the effect of adding the symbols to the text and the assignment of forms, a 
difference score was constructed for each participant by subtracting their plain text 
score from their symbolised text score, and Mann-Whitney U tests were used to 
compare these difference scores between the two counterbalance groups. Again, there 
was no reliable difference either for the full sample (U=50.5, n.s., N=24) or the
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restricted sample (U=33.5, n.s., N=19); see Table 6 for the descriptive statistics. Given 
that none of these tests were significant, the two counterbalance groups were 
collapsed into one group for the subsequent analyses.^
Sym bolised Text 
Score
Plain Text Score D ifference Score
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 G roup 1 G roup 2
Full
Sample
M edian 8.5 9.0 5.5 8.0 1.0 0.5
Range 1 to 12 1 to 11 Oto 12 Oto 11 Oto 5 -1 to 4
M ean 6.9 7.3 5.5 6.8 1.4 0.6
Standard
Deviation
4.3 3.5 5.2 3.9 1.6 1.7
Restricted
Sample
M edian 8.0 7.5 3.0 7.5 1.0 0.5
Range 1 to 11 1 to 11 Oto 11 Oto 10 0 to 5 -1 to 4
M ean 6.6 6.9 5.1 6.2 1.4 0.7
Standard
Deviation
4.5 3.6 5.2 4.1 1.7 1.8
Table 6: The descriptive statistics for the analyses that compared the separate 
counterbalance group. For the full sample the size o f both groups was 12, while fo r  
the restricted sample group one contained 9 participants and group two contained 10.
To establish whether adding the Rebus symbols to the text had improved the 
participants' comprehension of the information that was being conveyed, the 
comprehension scores for the symbolised and plain text were compared using the 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test for matched pairs. This revealed that overall the 
participants scored significantly better on the comprehension questions that followed 
the symbolised text than on those that followed the plain text, for both the full sample
* It is possib le that differences betw een the tw o counterbalance groups w ere not detected because o f  a 
lack o f  power, since according to Clark-Carter (1997) a sam ple size  o f  55 w ould be required to detect 
even a 'large' effect-size, for the conventional levels o f  a = .0 5  and P=.20 (Cohen, 1988). N evertheless, it 
w as reasonable to collap se across the counterbalance groups because o f  the random assign m en t o f  
participants to groups.
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(T=30; p<01, N=19 since there were five ties) and the restricted sample (T=18, p<05, 
N=15 since there were four ties). The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 7, 
and the distributions of scores are shown in Figure 10.
Full Sample Restricted Sample
Plain Text Symbolised Text Plain Text Symbolised Text
Median 8 9 7 8
Range Oto 12 1 to 12 Oto 11 1 to 11
Mean 6.1 7.1 5.7 6.7
Standard
Deviation
4.6 &8 4.5 3.9
Table 7: The descriptive statistics for the participants' comprehension scores (which 
have a maximum o f 12). The means and standard deviations should be treated with 
caution because the data deviated from normality.
To explore whether there was a relationship between the degree to which the 
participants benefited from the addition of symbols and their baseline level of reading 
comprehension, the difference between each participant’s symbolised and plain text 
score was plotted against their plain text score. The resulting scatter-graphs for the full 
and restricted samples are shown in Figure 11. It can be seen that in both samples 
there is a trend for poorer readers to show a greater benefit from the addition of 
symbols.
Spearman's rhos calculated on these data revealed that there was a significant negative 
correlation between the difference scores and the plain text scores, for both the full 
sample (rho=-.59, p<.01, N=24) and the restricted sample (rho=-.52, p<.05, N=19). 
However, these correlations may be artefactual, since the difference scores associated 
with the larger plain text scores could have been smaller because the symbolised text 
scores were closer to the measure's ceiling of 12 and so had less opportunity to vary. 
Therefore, these correlations must be treated with caution.
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Figure 10: Histograms comparing the distributions o f the participants' plain text and 
symbolised text comprehension scores. Top: The fu ll sample. Bottom: The restricted sample.
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Figure 11: Scatter-plots illustrating how the difference between the participants' reading 
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data for the restricted sample. In both cases, the number o f points is less than the sample size 
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To examine whether the effect of adding the symbols to the text was related to the 
level of prior experience that the participants had with symbols, the participants were 
divided into two groups, namely those that said they had not seen such symbols before 
and those with prior experience of them. The 'symbolised text minus plain text' 
difference scores were then compared between the two groups. As can be seen in 
Table 8, in both samples there was trend in the medians for those participants with 
some prior experience to show a greater improvement in comprehension with the 
addition of symbols. However, Mann-Whitney U tests revealed that neither of these 
trends was significant (full sample: U=41.5, n.s., N=24; restricted sample: U=12.0, 
n.s., N=19). This may have been due to a lack of power, since these tests were not 
powerful enough even to detect a large effect (see footnote 8, p. 223, for details).
Full Sample Restricted Sample
No experience Some experience No experience Some experience
N 6 18 4 15
Median 0.5 1.0 -0.5 1.0
Range -1 to 3 -1 to 5 -1 to 1 -1 to 5
Mean 0.5 1.2 -0.25 1.4
Standard
Deviation
1.5 1.7 1.0 1.7
Table 8: The descriptive statistics for the 'symbolised text minus plain text' difference 
scores, for the two levels o f prior experience with symbols. The means and standard 
deviations should be interpreted with caution because the data deviated from  
normality.
To summarise, overall the addition of Rebus symbols to the text significantly 
improved the participants' scores on the comprehension questions, for both samples. 
Those participants who had a lower baseline performance on the plain text version 
tended to show a greater benefit from the addition of symbols. However, this may
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have been an artefact due to a ceiling effect. Finally, there was no evidence that prior 
experience of symbols increased the degree to which they helped the participants' 
comprehension, though this may have been due to a lack of power.
The predictive value o f Raven's IQ
As you may recall, on the basis of Kintsch's (1988) theory and a study by Cohen et al. 
(2001), it was predicted that there would be a significant positive correlation between 
the participants' reading comprehension and their IQ. To test this prediction the 
associations between participants' IQs, according the Raven's CPM, and their scores 
on the WORD, Neale-R, TROG and BPVS were examined. The manual for the 
Raven's CPM only provides the raw scores that correspond to IQs of 50, 60, 70 and 
80, for each age band. Therefore, in some cases a participant's raw score had to be 
converted into an IQ range rather than a precise IQ. Given this, the IQ data was 
ranked; for example an IQ in between 60 and 70 was assigned a higher rank than an 
IQ of 60. Since the IQ data was ordinal, Spearman's rho was used to calculate the 
correlations between it and the reading test scores. Furthermore, because an evidence- 
based prediction as to the direction of the correlations had been made, their 
significance level was assessed at the one-tailed level (cf. Clark-Carter, 1997). Finally, 
one participant's data were excluded from the analyses because they had not wished to 
finish the Raven's CPM; they had nevertheless been included in the study because a 
previous formal assessment had suggested that they were in the mildly learning 
disabled range. The correlations and associated significance levels for both samples 
are shown in Table 9. The scatter-plots that accompany these correlations can be 
found in Appendix 7. It is worth noting that they show no obvious curvilinear trend in 
the data.
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W ORD Reading  
Comprehension A ge  
Equivalent (M onths)
N eale-R  Plain 
Text Version  
(Raw Score)
TROG (Num ber 
o f  B locks 
Passed)
B PV S Raw  
Score
Full sample rho=.43 rho=.43 rho=.38 rho=.36
N=23
p<05 p<05 p<.05 p<.05
one-tailed one-tailed one-tailed one-tailed
Restricted sample rho=.46 rho=.54 rho=.42 rho=.45
N=19 p<.05 p=.OI p<.05 p<.05
one-tailed one-tailed one-tailed one-tailed
Table 9: The Spearman's correlations between the participants' IQs, according to the 
Raven's CPM, and their scores on the measures o f reading comprehension.
It can be seen from Table 9 that all of the correlations attained significance. However, 
this finding must be treated with some caution because, when the Bonferonni 
correction for four comparisons was applied to the data, only the correlation between 
IQ and the Neale-R plain text score for the restricted sample remained significant. 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to completely dismiss these findings, because the 
Bonferonni correction is considered to be conservative (Clark-Carter, 1997). This 
matter will be returned to in the Discussion.
Subjective observations made by the experimenter
When conducting psychometric tests valuable, albeit more subjective, information can 
be obtained from observations of the examinees' behaviour (e.g. Hodges, 1994; 
Vanderploeg, 2000). Of particular note is the observation that it was not uncommon 
for participants to sound out words that they did not recognize. In some cases the 
participants would keep saying the constituent sounds in slightly different ways until
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they recognised the word from these sound, and their subsequent correct response to 
the test item suggested that they probably understood its meaning.
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Discussion
An aim for services for people with learning disabilities should be to maximise their 
accessibility to their service-users. As part of this process, service providers need to 
try to make their written communications, like letters and leaflets, as comprehensible 
as possible to people with learning disabilities, or find other means of communicating 
if writing is not going to be understood. However, the current literature provides little 
evidence-based guidance as to how to maximise the comprehensibility of writing. 
Therefore, the global aim of this research project was to generate information that 
could be used by clinicians and other service providers to make written material more 
comprehensible to adults with mild or borderline learning disabilities. To this end, a 
number of reading tests were given to a sample of adult service-users of a 
metropolitan community learning disabilities team. The results have been presented 
for a sample that was restricted to those service-users who were within the mild or 
borderline range, at least according to their Raven's IQ or data on file, and for the full 
sample that also included adults whose intellectual level was above borderline. Before 
discussing these results in detail, it is worth first examining the extent to which they 
can be generalised to other adults with learning disabilities.
To explore generalisability, the distributions of gender, age, ethnicity and intellectual 
level across the samples were compared to those across the remainder of the 
population of community team service-users whose intellectual level had been 
formally or informally assessed to be within the admission range for this study. The 
distribution of intellectual level did reliably differ between the formally and 
informally assessed population remainders, when service-users whose intellectual 
level was above the borderline category were included in the analysis (which was in 
the comparison involving the full sample). Specifically, the informally assessed 
remainder had a higher proportion of service-users assigned to the ICD-10 mildly 
learning disabled range. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that care- 
managers may have been more likely to underestimate intellectual level in their 
informal assessments, relative to the more accurate formal assessments.
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More importantly for our purposes, no significant differences were found between the 
samples and the comparable formally or informally assessed remainders of the 
population. Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest that the samples were 
unrepresentative of the population of community team service-users with regard to 
gender, age, ethnicity and intellectual level. Despite this, however, there are still a 
number of concerns regarding the samples' generalisability. Firstly, it was not possible 
to perform statistical tests for some of the comparisons because the data did not meet 
all the necessary assumptions. Secondly, in cases where tests were performed, the 
failure to detect significant demographic differences may have been because of a lack 
of power, since the sample sizes were only big enough to detect a 'large' effect. 
Thirdly, the intellectual level assigned to half of the service-users was only an 
approximation, since it was determined by an estimate from their Raven's IQ, rather 
than by a full formal assessment. Fourthly, samples of service-users known to a 
community learning disabilities team are not necessarily representative of the wider 
learning-disabled population, since the selection criteria for become a community 
team service-user could introduce a bias.
Finally, even if it had been unambiguously shown that the samples were sufficiently 
representative of community team service-users or the wider learning-disabled 
population with regard to demographic variables, this would not necessarily imply 
that they were representative with regard to reading skills. This is because the 
sampling was not random, since only 56 percent of those service-users who had been 
initially randomly selected actually participated in the study. It is possible that this 
introduced a bias into the reading abilities of the samples. For example, poorer readers 
may have been less willing to participate because they were embarrassed by their lack 
of reading ability. These concerns about the representativeness of the samples imply 
that the following results should only be generalised with caution. However, despite 
this, they are worth considering because they provide a useful first exploration of the 
reading comprehension of some adults with learning disabilities, and some indication 
of the range of ability levels across this population. Furthermore, a detailed discussion 
of the data will allow comparisons to be made between it and future research on other 
samples of people with learning disabilities; hopefully such comparisons will allow 
firmer conclusions to be reached about the generalisability of the current findings.
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Recall that the global purpose of this research was sub-divided into several more 
specific research aims. The results pertaining to each of these will be discussed in 
turn. The first aim was to establish the distributions across the samples of 'reading- 
ages" for the comprehension of written passages. To this end, the participants were 
given the reading comprehension sub-test of the WORD. For both the full and 
restricted samples, the median comprehension level was equivalent to that of a typical 
6 V2 year old. Furthermore, there was a relatively wide spread of comprehension levels, 
which ranged from a substantial proportion of the participants at the floor of the test to 
a participant whose reading-age for comprehension was 9 V2 years.
In order to make these reading ages more meaningful for readers who do not have a 
feel for the typical reading abilities of children of different ages, it is worth 
considering specific test items that they relate to. Some of the participants who scored 
at the floor of the test were unable to understand the meaning of the easiest item, 
which was: 'The bird sings in the tree' (Rust et al., 1993). At the other end of the 
range, the participant whose reading-age for comprehension was 9 V2 years was able to 
explain 'what happens before cloth is made' after reading the passage: 'Most of our 
clothes are made from huge bolts of cloth knitted or woven from long strings called 
yarn. Yarn is spun from short strands of plant or animal fibres or, in the case of nylon 
and other synthetics, from fibres made from petroleum' (Rust et al., 1993, reading 
comprehension sub-test item 31).
These results can be treated with some confidence as indicators of the samples' 
comprehension level, because the sub-test was found to have satisfactory split-half 
reliability and convergent validity for these samples. Furthermore, while there was the 
potential for this sub-test to have underestimated the reading-comprehension of some 
of the participants because it required them to make detailed oral responses to 
comprehension questions and so their performance could have been reduced if they 
had difficulty responding orally (cf. Finlay & Lyons, 2001), the author's impression 
from talking to the participants was that they were able to communicate sufficiently 
well orally for this not to be a major concern.
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One of the aspects of the WORD data that has clinical implications is the relatively 
wide range of reading-ages for comprehension in the samples. The range, of 
comprehension ages in the corresponding populations must be at least as wide as those 
in the samples. This relatively wide variation in the populations is perhaps not a 
surprise given the variety of different causes of learning disabilities (Hatton, 1998), 
the range of different cognitive profiles observed with this group (Clements, 1998), 
and the differences in education and other environment factors that people with 
learning disabilities may have experienced (Caine, Hatton & Emerson, 1998). A 
clinical implication of this variation is that, where possible, each service-user’s level 
of reading-comprehension should be individually formally or informally assessed 
before they are communicated with in writing.
The findings could also be useful to some clinicians in cases where it is not possible to 
conduct an individual reading assessment. This is because, while caution needs to be 
exercised when generalising these results for the reasons given above, the data from 
the restricted sample do provide an initial estimate of the median and distribution of 
reading-ages for comprehension for the wider population of people with mild and 
borderline learning disabilities. Such information should go some way to helping 
clinicians who have a sense of the level of writing that is understood by children of 
different ages, like Speech and Language Therapists, to tailor their written 
communications to their learning disabled clients. It could also help in the selection of 
reading material for people with learning disabilities, since some reading material is 
designed for particular reading-ages.
One limitation of these results is that the reading ability of a substantial proportion of 
the participants was not measured because they were at the floor of the test. Therefore, 
it will be useful for future research into this area to devise and employ measures of 
reading comprehension with a lower floor, to allow the reading-comprehension of this 
sub-group to be more accurately assessed. Such research will probably reveal that 
there is a proportion of adults with learning disabilities who are completely illiterate 
and should not be communicated with in writing. A second limitation is that 
knowledge of the median and range of reading-ages will not help professionals who 
do not have an accurate impression of the levels of writing that correspond to different
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reading-ages. Furthermore, there could be idiosyncrasies in the reading 
comprehension of adults with learning disabilities that would not be detected simply 
by generalising from children's reading. These latter two limitations were partly 
addressed by the second and third research aims.
The second research aim was to gain an indication of the range of written grammatical 
constructions that were understood by the samples. This was achieved by giving the 
participants a modified version of the TROG. Credence is given to the results 
produced using the TROG in this modified manner, by the fact that it showed 
satisfactory levels of split-half reliability and convergent validity. Again what was 
striking was the relatively wide range of comprehension levels across both samples. 
Specifically, some participants appeared to comprehend relatively complex 
grammatical constructions, like 'not only X but also Y', while others did not even 
understand the meaning of simple nouns or verbs. The range of grammatical 
comprehension must be at least as broad in the wider population of adults with mild 
and borderline learning disabilities, and this reinforces the conclusion drawn from the 
WORD data that reading comprehension needs to be assessed on an individual basis 
where possible.
When such an assessment has not been carried out, the percentages of participants 
who passed each block on the TROG, which are listed in Table 10, could be used by 
professionals to estimate the likelihood that a particular written grammatical 
construction will be understood by adults with learning disabilities of a corresponding 
level to those in either of the samples. This could help professionals to decide whether 
a particular grammatical construction should be used in their written material, or 
whether one that a higher proportion of the participants appear to have understood 
should replace it. For example, on the basis of the information in Table 10, it would 
seem sensible not to use embedded sentences, but rather convey the information in a 
larger number of simpler sentences.
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Grammatical Construction
Percentage of participants who 
demonstrated probable understanding
Full Sample Restricted Sample
simple noun 63 58
simple verb 63 58
simple adjective 63 58
two element combination 67 63
negative 54 53
three element combination 67 63
singular/plural personal pronoun 50 42
reversible active 54 47
masculine/feminine personal pronoun 42 37
singular/plural noun inflection 21 21
comparative/absolute 29 21
reversible passive 17 11
in and on 21 21
postmodified subject 4 0
X but not Y 21 16
above and below 17 11
not only X but also Y 25 26
relative clause 4 0
neither X nor Y 4 0
embedded sentence 0 0
Table 10: The percentage o f participants who demonstrated probable understanding 
o f the different grammatical constructions measured by the TROG.
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However, the data in Table 10 should only be used as estimate, because it has a 
number of limitations. Firstly, caution needs to be exercised when generalising the 
results from the samples to the corresponding populations for the reasons that have 
already been discussion. Secondly, it cannot be assumed that all those participants 
who failed a particular block did not understand the grammatical construction that it 
was testing, because they may simply have lost concentration on one item. Finally, the 
discontinue rule meant that participants were less likely to be tested on the later blocks 
and so automatically reduced the number of participants who passed them. Thus, 
lower percentages for the later grammatical constructions do not necessarily imply 
that they were more difficult constructions. (Despite imposing this limitation, the 
discontinue rule was applied because it was felt to be unethical to expose the 
participants to a large number of items that they would have most probably failed.) 
Given these limitations, valuable directions for future research would be to examine 
the generalisability of the current data by repeating the study on different samples of 
people with mild and borderline learning disabilities, and to explore the relative 
difficulty of written grammatical constructions for people with learning disabilities 
using a methodological that is not confounded by the application of a discontinue rule 
and is still ethical.
The third research aim was to obtain an indication of the range of written single words 
whose meaning was comprehended by the participants. To this end, they were given a 
modified form of the BPVS, which showed reasonable split-half reliability and 
convergent validity as a measure of the reading comprehension of both samples. 
Consistent with the results from the reading comprehension sub-test of the WORD 
and the modified TROG, a relatively wide range in performance was again observed 
in both samples, providing further support to the idea that reading should be assessed 
on an individual basis. The BPVS also provided information that could be used by 
professionals in the absence of such an assessment. Specifically, recall that the words 
were grouped into blocks of five and that a participant was said to have passed a block 
only if they got all five items correct, which they would be highly unlikely to achieve 
if they did not understand at least some of the words in the block.
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Block of words
Percentage of participants who 
demonstrated probable understanding
Full Sample Restricted Sample
hand, money, tortoise, reading, 
gate
58 53
boat, snake, drum, time, ladder 67 63
penguin, cow, neck, candle, bee 63 58
accident, feather, brushing, net, 
torch
42 42
spanner, broken, arrow, chopping, 
sharing 50
42
dentist, claw, horror, furry, 
delivering 29 26
liquid, forest, eagle, pasting, 
woolly
29 32
vegetable, diving, ankle, flask, 
delighted 46 37
tugging, anchor, teacher, fruit, 
dripping 29 26
disagreement, root, pair, wrist, 
waiter
38 26
bolt, surprise, sorting, grain, 
tubular 13 11
greeting, fern, ornament, 
entertainer, steam 8 11
plastering, balcony, seed, link, 
tusk
8 5
locket, snarling, weasel, isolation, 
bloom
4 5
emerging, grooming, swamp, 
applauding, stadium 8 5
predatory, wedge, scalp, 
engraving, triplet 0 0
archery, orbit, silhouette, 
adjustable, stunt
4 5
garment, easel, pyramid, 
archaeologist, parallel ' 4 5
perforated, lecturing, fragment, 
exhibition, catastrophe
4 5
Table 11: The percentage o f participants who demonstrated probable understanding 
o f the different blocks o f words in the BPVS.
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Therefore, the percentages of the samples that passed particular blocks of words, 
which are shown in Table 11, could be used as an estimate of the proportion of people 
in the comparable learning-disabled populations who would be likely to understand at 
least some of these words. This information could help guide decisions about which 
words to include and which to avoid in written communications to people with 
learning disabilities. However, the data in Table 11 should only be used as a loose 
estimate, since some of the limitations of the TROG data also apply to it. Specifically, 
the findings can only be generalised from the samples to the comparable populations 
with caution, for the reasons presented at the beginning of the Discussion, and the 
application of a discontinue rule may have introduced a bias because fewer 
participants attempted the later blocks. In addition, it is possible that participants who 
passed a block may have understood some of the words in the block and guessed on 
the others. For example, if a participant understood four words in a block and guessed 
for the fifth, there were would still be a .25 chance (i.e. lx lx lxlx .25) of them passing 
that block. (The same concern was not raised against the data from the blocks in the 
TROG, because all the items in those blocks were measuring the same grammatical 
construction, so it is likely that if the participants understood one item then they would 
have understood them all.)
Other limitations of the data in Table 11 include the fact that the reading 
comprehension of a number of the participants was not effectively measured because 
they scored at the floor of the test, and the range of words tested by the BPVS was 
limited, with many of them not being the sort of words that clinicians are likely to 
include in their written communications.
It would be useful for future research to address some of these limitations by firstly 
testing a wider range of words that includes words that will be more likely to be 
included in clinicians' written communications to people with learning disabilities; 
secondly testing a range of different learning-disabled samples to explore 
generalisability; and thirdly devising a method of testing the same word in multiple 
items in order to obtain a better estimate of the likelihood that participants understood 
that word. One way to do this would be to test the same word with different pictures 
and at different times during testing; if a participant passed all the items involving the
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same word then it could be stated with more confidence that they were likely to have 
understood that word.
The fourth research aim was to establish whether adding Rebus symbols to written 
text, without providing any additional training about these symbols, would 
significantly improve the extent to which the participants comprehended the 
information that was being conveyed. A within-subject counterbalanced design was 
employed, in which the participants' comprehension of symbolised and non­
symbolised passages from the Neale-R was measured. Overall, the addition of Rebus 
symbols to the text significantly improved the participants' scores on the 
comprehension questions, for both samples, though the improvement in scores was 
only of a small magnitude. The fact that the Neale-R may have underestimated 
reading comprehension, by assessing it through the participants' oral answers to 
questions (cf. Finlay & Lyons, 2001), does not affect the interpretation of this result, 
since there is no reason to think that this potential underestimation would have been 
different for the symbolised and non-symbolised scores. In addition, the fact that the 
Neale-R was being used in a non-standardized manner does not appear to have 
comprised its utility as a measure, since its spilt-half reliability and convergent 
validity were satisfactory for both samples. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that 
the reading comprehension of at least some adults with learning disabilities is 
improved by the addition of Rebus symbols.
One mechanism by which this improvement could occur has already being outlined in 
the introduction. To briefly recap, it has been suggested by some authors that symbols 
and words access the same semantic system (e.g. Pylyshyn, 1980; Potter & Kroll, 
1987; Potter et al., 1986). This would allow equivalent symbols and words to activate 
the same or similar semantic representations. Thus when participants cannot access 
meaning from a word, because they have difficulty reading it, they may still be able to 
access the meaning from the symbol that accompanies it. Furthermore, if the situation 
arose that a participant could not decide between several different possible meanings 
for a word then the symbol could provide extra information that allowed them to 
deduce the correct meaning. In either case, the participant's comprehension would 
have benefited from the presence of symbols.
240
When the data were examined in more detail it was found that those participants who 
had a lower baseline reading ability benefited more from the addition of the symbols. 
A possible explanation for this could be based on the assumption that the meaning of 
the Rebus symbols corresponding to more concrete words, like nouns, was more 
obvious from just looking at them than the meaning of symbols associated with more 
abstract words, which were less amenable to pictorial description. On this account, the 
participants with a lower reading ability had difficulty directly comprehending some 
of the concrete words and so benefited from the presence of the symbols 
accompanying these words, since their meaning was relatively easy to deduce. The 
more able readers, on the other hand, could already read the majority of the concrete 
words without problem and so the presence of symbols did not benefit their 
comprehension of these words to the same extent. Furthermore, neither groups' 
comprehension of the abstract words was helped by the symbols, because the meaning 
of the symbols accompanying these words was less transparent. Thus, overall, the 
poorer readers would have benefited more from the addition of symbols.
However, an alternative explanation of the negative correlation between baseline 
reading ability and benefit from symbols is that it is an artefact arising out of the fact 
that the comprehension scores of the more able readers were more constrained in the 
degree to which they could vary because they were nearer to the measure's ceiling. 
Therefore, further research is required to eliminate this possibility and to test the 
veracity of the above account. It would also be useful for future research to explore 
the relative benefits to comprehension of other symbol systems, like Makaton 
symbols, to develop detailed guidelines about how to most effectively add symbols to 
text, and to explore how individual differences, like culture, should influence the 
addition of symbols (cf. Huer, 2000). In addition, it would be interesting to see 
whether the finding that prior experience with symbols does not increase the degree to 
which they improve the participants' comprehension of text is replicated in a study 
that measures prior experience in a more sensitive manner and has greater power.
Therefore, the main implication of the current finding that Rebus symbols can benefit 
comprehension is that it suggests that more detailed research into this area is
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warranted. If this future research replicates this finding, finds ways of increasing the 
magnitude of the improvement in comprehension and provides guidelines for how 
symbols should be most effectively added to text, then the clinical implication would 
be that symbols should accompany written communications from services to their 
adult users with mild or borderline learning disabilities; this would hopefully help to 
increase their understanding of and inclusion in services.
The fifth research aim was to test the prediction that the participants' performance on 
the measures of reading comprehension would be positively correlated with their IQ. 
Recall that this prediction was made on the basis of the fact that IQ correlates with 
working memory capacity (Mackintosh, 1988) and Kintsch (1988) has proposed that 
working memory capacity is required for reading comprehension. It was also 
supported by empirical work by Cohen et al. (2001) that showed that IQ reliably 
correlates with an aggregate measure of people with learning disabilities' capacity to 
read words aloud and to match words and pictures.
To test the prediction, the correlations between Raven's IQ and the scores on the 
various reading tests were examined. As predicted, for both samples these correlations 
were positive and were significant, provided that the Bonferonni correction for 
multiple comparisons was not applied. However, when this conservative correction 
was employed, only the correlation between Raven's IQ and the Neale-R plain text 
score for the restricted sample remained significant. This means that strong claims 
about the relationship between IQ and reading comprehension cannot be made on the 
basis of these data. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to completely dismiss these 
findings, because the Bonferonni correction is considered to be conservative (Clark- 
Carter, 1997). Moreover, the failure of all but one of the correlations to reach 
Bonferonni corrected significance could have been due to a lack of power, the fact 
that the range of the reading comprehension scores was restricted by a floor effect or 
the approximate nature of the Raven's IQ.
Therefore, it would be productive for the hypothesis that reading comprehension level 
is positively correlated with IQ to be further tested in future research. To overcome 
the limitations of the current study with regard to this hypothesis, this research could
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use a more accurate measure of IQ, test reading comprehension using measures with a 
lower floor in order to reduce the effect of the range restriction and employ a larger 
sample size. It also would be valuable for this research to explore the ability of other 
demographic factors to predict the level of reading comprehension of people with 
learning disabilities, perhaps using statistical techniques like multiple regression, 
which would require a substantially larger sample size than is employed here (cf. 
Clark-Carter, 1997). Knowledge of the factors that predict reading comprehension 
could be valuable to clinicians and professionals because it should enable them to 
more accurately estimate the reading comprehension of service-users in situations 
where it has not been possible to conduct a formal assessment, and so tailor their 
written communications more appropriately. In anticipation of this future research, on 
the basis of the fact that the correlations in this study are significant without the 
Bonferonni correction and Cohen et al.'s (2001) and Kintsch's (1988) work, it seems 
reasonable for clinicians to employ a working hypothesis that reading comprehension 
may well be correlated with IQ.
The final research aim was to examine aspects of the reliability and validity of the 
reading comprehension sub-test of the WORD, modified TROG, modified BPVS and 
plain text version of the Neale-R. All of these measures showed good convergent 
validity and spilt-half reliability for both samples. One implication of this, which has 
already been discussed, is that it lends credence to the results of this study, since it 
suggests that these tools can be used as measures of reading comprehension for the 
samples that were tested. An additional implication is these instruments could 
profitably be used in clinical settings to assess the reading comprehension of people 
with mild and borderline learning disabilities. This should be valuable information for 
clinicians, because the importance of individually assessing the reading 
comprehension of adults with learning disabilities has been emphasised throughout 
this discussion, yet before this study was conducted there appear to have been no 
measures of reading comprehension that had reliability and validity data for adults 
with learning disabilities. However, given the concerns about generalising from the 
samples in this study, it would be preferable if future research examined whether 
similar levels of spilt-half and convergent validity were observed for these tests in 
other samples of adults with mild and borderline learning disabilities. In addition, it
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would be helpful if this research measured other forms of reliability and validity for 
these tests, like test re-test reliability, and ideally these tests should be fully 
standardization on a learning-disabled sample.
Thus far in the discussion, no reference has been made to the three-route account of 
adult reading (Patterson & Morton's, 1985) that was presented in the introduction. 
This is because it has been difficult to directly link this model to the data discussed so 
far, because it does not make clear predictions about the range of grammatical 
constructions and specific words that adults with learning disabilities should be able to 
understand. However, this model can be used to understand a subjective observation 
made by the experimenter during testing. Specifically, it appeared to the experimenter 
that a strategy used by some of the participants was to keep saying the constituent 
sounds of words in slightly different ways until they appeared to recognise the word, 
and access its meaning, from these sounds. When this is viewed in terms of Patterson 
and Morton's (1985) triple-route model, which is illustrated in Figure 1 (p. 178), such 
a pattern of behaviour can be thought of as the participants using the sub-lexical 
recoding route. Of course, subjective observations must be treated with considerable 
caution. However, this observation and its theoretical explanation do suggest a 
clinically interesting hypothesis to be tested in future research; namely that the reading 
comprehension of some adults with learning disabilities could be improved by 
encouraging them to repeatedly sound out the constituent parts of words that they 
cannot sight-read.
It is also difficult to relate the data in this study to Ehri's (1992; 1999) stages account 
of the development of reading, since indicators of the different stages of reading 
development, like the ability to sound out letters, were not objectively measured. 
However, given the range of reading comprehension levels manifest across the 
samples, it seems possible that different participants could be assigned to different 
stages in Ehri's model. A valuable direction for future research will be to investigate 
whether this model does provide a good account of the variation in the reading 
abilities of adults with learning disabilities. If it does then clinicians could use it to 
determine what stage of reading development an adult with learning disabilities is in 
and then use the strategies for reading teaching that are appropriate for that stage (cf.
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Eh ri, 1999). This could help professionals to more effectively teach adults with 
learning disabilities to read.
To conclude, this research project has provided a range of information that should 
help professionals to communicate in writing more effectively with adults with mild 
or borderline learning disabilities. A key implication is that where possible the reading 
comprehension of service-users should be individually assessed, given the wide 
variation in this ability. In the absence of such an assessment the data on reading-ages 
and the percentage of participants who probably understood particular grammatical 
constructions and words could help clinicians tailor their writing more appropriately; 
although they should be used with caution for the reasons that have already been 
outlined and further research into these matters is required. Two additional 
implications of this research are that it can be profitable to add symbols to text in 
order to improve its comprehensibility and that the reading tests used in this study can 
be used to reliably and validly measure the reading comprehension of at least some 
adults with learning disabilities. This project is hopefully a useful start in the process 
of providing information to professionals that will allow them to make their written 
communications more comprehensible for adults with learning disabilities, and help 
them to know when not to try to communicate in writing at all. Furthermore, 
hopefully future research will continue this process by following some of the 
directions that have been outlined in the Discussion, and will result in greater 
accessibility of services for adults with learning disabilities.
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Appendix 1
A copy of the information sheet that was given to the participants. The letterhead 
has been removed to preserve anonymity and the sheet has been reduced in size; 
each grey box was a separate A4 page in the original.
253
INFORMATION SHEET
My name is Fergal Jones.
I am doing a project on reading.
This project will help us write better.
I would like you to read to me.
A X
You can say yes or no.
254
If you say yes:
Abed
You will read some stories and words.
??? Abed
I will ask you questions about the stories and words.
&
You will do some picture puzzles.
I will keep private what you say.
I may look in your file.
255
When I finish the project, I will send you a letter.
X
If you say no:
It is OK.
You do nothing. Nothing will happen.
M
People that help you will treat you the same.
256
You can ask I for more information.
You can talk about this sheet with staff and friends.
Think about this information sheet.
# (§ #4. y  X
Take your time to say yes or no.
If you are unhappy, tell Fergal Jones or staff.
If you have a complaint, tell Fergal Jones or staff.
If you change your mind, tell Fergal Jones or staff.
257
You can keep this information sheet. Thank you
258
Appendix 2
A copy of the consent form that was given to the participants. The letterhead has 
been removed to preserve anonymity and the sheet has been reduced in size; each 
grey box was a separate A4 page in the original.
259
E
Consent Form
Project Title: A project about reading.
Name of Researcher: Fergal Jones.
/
Mark the boxes if the statements are true.
1) I read the information sheet []
2) I understand the information shee t []
260
talked about the information sheet.
understand that can say yes or no.
#  #
can change my mind.understand that
understand say no.
understand Fergai Jones may look at my file.
am saying yes to taking part.
261
Your name The date
Your Signature
R ESE A C H ER  (’*+10 i s  t a k in g  c o n s e n t ) ;  f e r g a l  J o n e a  DATE:
W IT N E SSE S NAME:
(1 c o p y  f o r  p a r t i  ci p a r t :  1 f o r  r e s e a r c t ie r ;  1 f o r  r e c o r d s ) .
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Appendix 3 
A copy of the eyesight-screening test.
263
Figure A.3.1: A copy o f the first part o f the eyesight screening test. The rectangular box 
was A4 sized in the original test. See the method section for more details.
264
Q l P  V
Figure A..3.2: A copy o f the second part o f the eyesight screening test. The rectangular 
box was A4 sized in the original test. See the method section for more details.
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Appendix 4
Figures illustrating the demographic properties of the samples and the formally and
informally assessed remainders.
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Figure A.4.1 : Top: A comparison o f the gender distribution in the fu ll sample, the formally 
assessed remainder and the informally assessed remainder. Bottom: The same comparison fo r  
the restricted sample. Note that the formally and informally assessed remainders are different 
for the two comparison; see the main text for details.
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Figure A.4.2: Top: A comparison o f the age distribution in the fu ll sample, the formally 
assessed remainder and the informally assessed remainder. Bottom: The same comparison fo r  
the restricted sample. Only two age bands have been used for the comparison involving the 
restricted sample, because otherwise a test could not have been performed; see the main 
text fo r  details.
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Figure A.4.3: Top: A comparison o f the ethnicity distribution in the fu ll sample, the formally 
assessed remainder and the informally assessed remainder. Bottom: The same comparison for  
the restricted sample.
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Figure AAA: Top: A comparison o f the distribution o f intellectual levels in the fu ll sample, 
the formally assessed remainder and the informally assessed remainder. Bottom: The same 
comparison for the restricted sample. In the latter case there are only two categories oj 
intellectual level because service-users whose level was above the borderline range were 
excluded; see the main text for details.
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Appendix 5
Scatter-plots accompanying the split-half reliability correlations.
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Figure A.5.1: Scatter-plots illustrating the relationship between the scores on the odd and
even items o f the WORD reading comprehension sub-test. Top: The full sample. Bottom: The
restricted sample. See the results section for more details.
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Figure A.5.2: Scatter-plots illustrating the relationship between the scores on the odd and
even items o f the plain text version o f the form one passages of the Neale-R. Top: The full
sample. Bottom: The restricted sample. See the results section for more details.
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Figure A.5.3: Scatter-plots illustrating the relationship between the scores on the odd and
even items of the plain text version o f the form two passages o f the Neale-R. Top: The full
sample. Bottom: The restricted sample. See the results section for more details.
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Figure A.5.4: Scatter-plots illustrating the relationship between the scores on the odd and
even items o f the symbolised version of the form one passages o f the Neale-R. Top: The
full sample. Bottom: The restricted sample. See the results section for more details.
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Figure A.5.5: Scatter-plots illustrating the relationship between the scores on the odd and
even items o f the symbolised version o f the form two passages o f the Neale-R. Top: The
full sample. Bottom: The restricted sample. See the results section for more details.
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Figure A.5.6: Scatter-plots illustrating the relationship between the scores on the odd and
even blocks o f the TROG. Top: The full sample. Bottom: The restricted sample. See the results
section for more details.
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Figure A.5.7: Scatter-plots illustrating the relationship between the scores on the odd and
even items between the basal and the ceiling o f the BPVS. Top: The full sample. Bottom: The
restricted sample. See the results section for more details.
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Appendix 6
Scatter-plots accompanying the convergent validity correlations.
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Figure A.6.1: Scatter-plots illustrating the relationship between the WORD reading 
comprehension age equivalent score and the raw score on the plain text version o f the Neale- 
R. Top: The fu ll sample. Bottom: The restricted sample. See the results section fo r  more 
details.
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Figure A.6.2: Scatter-plots illustrating the relationship between the WORD reading
comprehension age equivalent score and the number o f blocks passed on the TROG. Top: The
full sample. Bottom: The restricted sample. See the results section fo r more details.
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Figure A.6.3: Scatter-plots illustrating the relationship between the WORD reading
comprehension age equivalent score and the raw score on the BPVS. Top: The full sample.
Bottom: The restricted sample. See the results section for more details.
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Figure A.6.4: Scatter-plots illustrating the relationship between the raw score on the plain
text version o f the Neale-R and the number o f blocks passed on the TROG. Top: The full
sample. Bottom: The restricted sample. See the results section for more details.
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Figure A.6.5: Scatter-plots illustrating the relationship between the raw score on the plain
text version of the Neale-R and the raw score on the BPVS. Top: The full sample. Bottom: The
restricted sample. See the results section for more details.
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Figure A.6.6: Scatter-plots illustrating the relationship between the number o f blocks passed
on the TROG and the raw score on the BPVS. Top: The full sample. Bottom: The restricted
sample. See the results section for more details.
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Appendix 7
Scatter-plots accompanying the correlations with Raven's IQ.
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Figure A.7.1 : Scatter-plots illustrating the relationship between the rank o f the participants' 
IQ, according to Raven's CPM, and their WORD reading comprehension age equivalent 
score. Top: The fu ll sample. Bottom: The restricted sample. See the results section fo r  more 
details.
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Figure A. 7.2: Scatter-plots illustrating the relationship between the rank o f the participants' 
IQ, according to Raven's CPM, and their score on the plain text version o f the Neale-R. Top: 
The full sample. Bottom: The restricted sample. See the results section for more details.
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Figure A. 7.3: Scatter-plots illustrating the relationship between the rank o f the participants'
IQ, according to Raven's CPM, and the number o f blocks that they passed on the TROG. Top:
The full sample. Bottom: The restricted sample. See the results section for more details.
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Figure A.7.4: Scatter-plots illustrating the relationship between the rank o f  the 
participants' IQ, according to Raven's CPM, and their raw score on the BPVS. Top: The 
full sample. Bottom: The restricted sample. See the results section for more details.
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